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CHARTERS

W. G. G. G. G.

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NEW YORK TIMES
18 MAY 1980

Things seem to be slipping out of control.

At least, that's what a lot of Americans are saying these days. Whether the talk is of the economy, the election, the refugees, world affairs or the baseball season, the refrain has become familiar. Things seem to be slipping out of control.

It is, therefore, a pleasure to report some good news — minimum good news; perhaps, but is this any time to quibble? And surely the fact that the Senate Intelligence Committee has momentarily "contained" a resurgent C.I.A., without surrendering to it, warrants a couple of cheers.

Just two weeks ago — and four years after the Church committee produced its catalogue of horrors about C.I.A. assassination attempts, illegal activities, bumbles and invasions of citizens' rights — it not only looked as if "the agency" had survived all attempts to put sensible restraints on its powers; the real possibility also existed that in the new cold war mood of Congress and the country the C.I.A. would gain more statutory power than it ever had had to invade the rights of Americans and shroud its activities in secrecy.

Facing stiff resistance from the intelligence community, getting little help from the Carter Administration and abandoned by the Republican leadership in the Senate, the Intelligence Committee had given up its long effort to write a legislative charter for the C.I.A. Such a charter had been recommended by the Church committee and supported pro forma by the Administration, as a means of spelling out precisely what the agency could and could not do — particularly to the rights and liberties of American citizens.

Instead, the committee was giving active consideration to a new bill that would provide no safeguards for citizens' rights, exempt the C.I.A. from the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act, excuse it from giving Congress prior notice of covert operations abroad, and make it a crime for any

IN THE NATION

Minimum Good News

By Tom Wicker

current or former Government official to disclose information that might identify U.S. intelligence officers or operatives — a quasi-Official Secrets Act that would surely have been used against the press as well as "leakers" of secrets.

But numerous members of the committee, most of its staff and some active outside observers — lobbyists, for example, for the American Civil Liberties Union — resisted such a surrender to C.I.A. demands; some still hoped that charter legislation sooner or later could be revived.

So on the classic political principle of give-and-take, they were able to work out a hold-the-line compromise. A bill was approved by the Intelligence Committee that would:

1. Give the C.I.A. something it wanted, by reducing from eight to two — the House and Senate Intelligence Committees — the number of committees to which the agency would have to report on its activities.

2. Put into law, as supported by liberal members and the A.C.L.U., the principle of prior notification to those two committees of "significant anticipated intelligence activities." This is only a small step forward, as the measure specifies that nothing in it can be construed to limit whatever constitutional powers the President

may have; so a President could — and someday no doubt will — withhold such notification in cases where he or she thinks it warranted.

Still, the legislation yields no real ground not already claimed by Presidents and the C.I.A.; and nothing more sweeping was possible in view of President Carter's adamant resistance to an absolute Congressional right of prior notice — based, members say, on his personal conviction that members of Congress cannot or will not keep secrets.

Besides, the committee-approved measure also provides that in cases of "abuse, misuse or failure" of intelligence operations, Congress could subpoena all relevant information. That at least guarantees after-the-fact oversight, a right which Congress has neither specified nor exercised in the past.

The committee bill can hardly be considered a landmark, since there is nothing in it to protect citizens' rights. On the other hand, it does not give the C.I.A. its desired exemption from the Freedom of Information Act and its even more-desired power to prosecute leakers of information — and those who might print the leaks.

Since the committee was unanimous, the outlook is good for passage of the compromise bill by the Senate, and for beating off attempts to amend it with provisions desired by the C.I.A. But the same probably holds true for Senator Pat Moynihan's proposal to bar the agency from enlisting reporters and clergymen as "assets." The problem is that if the bill is opened to any amendments, it might not be possible to stave off the many others that could be offered.

If, as expected, the House also accepts the compromise bill, the battle undoubtedly will be renewed next year; for even the C.I.A., craving legislative legitimacy, would like to have some kind of a charter. Just what kind may depend largely on how the elections go this fall.

DES MOINES REGISTER (IA)

7 May 1980

This is a charter?



Where is the Senate? Has it lost its memory? Can it no longer read history — even the history of the last decade?

Last week, the Senate Intelligence Committee abandoned its attempt to enact a comprehensive charter to govern the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency and the rest of the U.S. intelligence community.

There was certainly a need for reform. The problem was that the proposed charter was a 172-page catalog that stood about as much chance of passing Congress as a congratulatory resolution honoring the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini of Iran.

So the committee shortened the charter. What it has come up with is not so much a charter as a carte blanche. The seven-page bill, inaccurately entitled, "The Intelligence Accountability Act of 1980," would:

- Give the president wide leeway in concealing from Congress various "covert operations," that is, the kinds of things that made the CIA infamous during the 1970s.

- Allow the CIA to use U.S. journalists, academics, clerics and others for intelligence work. The best way that journalists and other specialists can serve their

country is by doing their jobs independently of government. The minute a reporter is suspected of being a CIA agent, his or her credibility and effectiveness are eroded. In places like Iran, his or her life could be endangered.

- Exempt countless CIA documents from the disclosures now required under the Freedom of Information Act. As the article by George Lardner, Jr. on this page today notes, the FOIA has been a target of CIA complaints ever since the agency was required to comply with it in 1974. The CIA has admitted, however, that it never has been harmed by the information divulged under the act.

Recent events in Iran and Afghanistan have given impetus to the move to "unleash" the CIA. If anything, events in Iran have demonstrated the dangers of an "unleashed" agency. If the CIA had been under tighter wraps over the last 30 years or so, this country might not be the object of so much hatred in Iran and other countries.

Members of Congress need to re-read the Church committee's report. They need to remember, or learn, what really happened during the days when the CIA was out of control.

LOUISVILLE COURIER-JOURNAL (KY.)
7 MAY 1980

Scrapping spy-agency charter won't solve CIA's problems

WITH THE NATION suffering a massive case of nervous jitters, it's hardly surprising that plans to impose a comprehensive charter on the Central Intelligence Agency have been consigned to the legislative scrapheap. The prevailing mood on Capitol Hill is to give the CIA just about anything it wants in a desperate effort to relieve our sense of helplessness on the world stage, and to counter the moves of an increasingly powerful Soviet Union.

Kentucky's Walter Huddleston, whose Senate subcommittee painstakingly drafted a 171-page charter for the CIA, FBI and other intelligence agencies, is disappointed but resigned. He told *Courier-Journal* staff writer Ed Ryan last week that a sharply scaled-down intelligence measure will be pushed this year, and another try for a full charter may come in 1981.

But even Senator Huddleston, usually a political realist, may be too optimistic. America seems sliding toward a new and prolonged Cold War, a sort of mental state of siege. Conditions have changed dramatically from the congressional and public dismay, in the mid-1970s, at widespread abuses in the name of national security. That dismay and disgust prompted calls for reform, even at the expense of somewhat reduced efficiency in the CIA and occasional inconvenience to over-eager presidents and CIA and FBI directors.

The irony is that the new "unleash-the-CIA" mood is scuttling the Huddleston subcommittee's reform effort without addressing the agency's real weakness: analysis of information it has gathered. As Ernest Conine of *The Los Angeles Times* reported the other day in this newspaper, there is a growing conviction among outside observers that the CIA has consistently and seriously underestimated the pace and scale of the Soviet military buildup,

especially the development and deployment of new strategic nuclear weapons.

This has occurred, most observers think, not because the agency lacks facts but because CIA analysts just couldn't believe the Soviets had the will, and the technical know-how, to catch up with and surpass the U.S. The facts, in the form of millions of spy satellite pictures and radio intercepts, were available. Sound analysis and judgment weren't.

The Huddleston subcommittee's proposed charter would have set new rules on how information is gathered and how covert operations are handled. It would have protected the rights of American citizens and the integrity of such American institutions as the press and the clergy. It would not have dictated how the CIA is to analyze information once it is gathered. It would neither have encouraged nor discouraged the sorts of analytical errors that have occurred in recent years.

Yet the consequences of past errors — such as a more powerful than anticipated Soviet Union and a virulently anti-American revolutionary Iran — have combined to overwhelm reforms having nothing to do with intelligence analysis. That's doubly a shame. It means an indefinite wait for a more accountable CIA. And it distracts attention from the agency's most disturbing weaknesses.

MINNESOTA DAILY
7 MAY 1980

editorial

CIA coup

Four years ago, a Senate committee investigating abuses of American intelligence agencies warned that "unless new and tighter controls are established by legislation, domestic intelligence activities threaten to undermine our democratic society and fundamentally alter its nature." Since then, Congress has circled around and around the possibility of writing a comprehensive intelligence charter to define the limits and means of accountability. And last week, it became evident that Congress would balk at another opportunity to write some clear, simple rules and require the intelligence agencies to follow them.

At issue is a lengthy and detailed charter proposed by Sen. Walter Huddleston (D-Ky.). After months of horsetrading, various amendments and attempts at re-writing burdened the Huddleston proposal to the extent that critics and proponents alike argued that it was confusing and inadequate. Rather than rework the existing charter, Huddleston last week "reluctantly" abandoned the charter concept and proposed a new, shorter version that will reverse previous reform legislation and make it easier than it is now for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to undertake covert actions. The new version will also exempt the agency from the most significant provisions of the Freedom of Information Act.

In fact, the new legislation—not yet completed by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence—closely resembles a measure supported by Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.), dubbed by many "the CIA relief bill." A far cry from the reforms envisioned by the Church committee, the bill does not mention the dubious use of journalists, clergymen and academics as spies. It also would cut from eight to two the number of committees responsible for Congressional oversight. Incredibly, neither the House Foreign Affairs Committee nor the Senate Foreign Relations Committee would be privy to information involving covert operations.

Much more disturbing, however, is the absence of any legal obligation for the executive branch to give prior notice of covert operations. Instead, the CIA need only keep the two congressional committees informed of "any significant anticipated activity." Committee members also appear ready to approve a more flagrant loophole permitting the president to undertake covert operations without prior notice in some circumstances—leaving the door ajar for a return to the days when an administration could use the CIA as its private corps, without any responsibility for prior justification of its deeds.

Unlike the original charter, the new bill provides no strict controls on intrusive investigating techniques such as wiretapping and burglaries. It merely states that the attorney general must approve "guidelines" in investigating or spying on American citizens. To keep representatives under the illusion that they are watching over the CIA, two congressional committees will receive a copy of the "guidelines"—though the attorney general may ignore reporting requirements in an emergency. It is unconscionable for Congress to neglect to clearly define acceptable intelligence gathering techniques or prohibit snooping that might infringe on civil rights.

The Carter administration—once a vigorous advocate of the charter—has suggested that previous legislation requiring prior notice of covert actions has stymied CIA efforts in the Persian Gulf. To recommend a freewheeling CIA to improve our world position inverts the lessons of recent years. The intelligence agency was the beneficiary, not the source of postwar American strength. In fact, CIA covert actions such as the 1953 coup that reinstalled the shah largely account for growing international hostility towards the U.S. government. An unfettered CIA will threaten citizens at home and abroad and perpetuate illusions. Congress has shirked its duty once again.

AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN (TX.)
5 May 1980

CIA bill incomplete

As predicted, the Congress, torn between calls for further shackling and further unshackling of the Central Intelligence Agency, has backed off for this year.

Instead of a legislative charter spelling out the duties and limits of the CIA, senators have substituted a smaller bill.

But the bill doesn't go far enough in limiting some things the CIA can do, and at least one addition to those limitations would help.

The seven-page bill would:

- Require the CIA to tell Congress what Congress wants to know and in advance of risky covert operations, with exceptions for extraordinary circumstances.
- Make it a crime for anyone to publicly identify an agent or informant by using authorized access to such information.
- Would give the CIA greater leeway in ignoring requests for information under the Freedom of Information Act.

But the new bill does not mention CIA use of reporters, clerics or professors as "cover" for agents, practices that would have been discouraged under the original legislation, and practices which have continued in spite of CIA Director Stansfield Turner's promises — by his own admission.

Those practices are inimical to the professions involved and spying can be carried out without them. The law should say so.

BURLINGTON FREE PRESS(VT)

5 May 1980

Congress Loses Courage to Curb Excesses of CIA

Espionage plays an important role in guaranteeing a nation's security.

In fact, it is almost as crucial a part of defense as the ships, guns and planes that would be used to respond to an enemy attack.

To know what the nation's potential enemies are doing is to be able to chart an intelligent and effective response to their activities. Intelligence agents risk their lives in gathering necessary information for political and military leaders. On occasion, agents must kill to protect themselves and others who have cooperated in obtaining secret documents or materials.

But abuses often can creep into intelligence activities. Some agencies apparently believe that they can exceed their authority by engaging in overt efforts to eliminate national leaders who are perceived as enemies. In abandoning their covert mission, agencies often violate the rights of people in their own countries and citizens of other nations. The distinction between legitimate espionage and illegal activities becomes blurred.

Investigation of charges against the Central Intelligence Agency in the mid-1970s raised questions about the amount of control that was being exercised over the agency by lawmakers and the president. Many citizens were shocked to learn that agents had been involved in schemes to assassinate several foreign leaders, the overthrow of the government of Chile, spying on domestic political organizations and experiments with drugs that were designed to befuddle subjects and leave them open to the use of suggestive techniques. Some persons were given drugs without their knowledge and the consequences were tragic in several cases.

The agency also used journalists, clergymen and professors for intelligence gathering and their institutions as cover for agents.

As a result of the revelations, Congress took steps to curb the activities of the agency and to make it more accountable by writing a detailed charter to set up legal restraints on the agency's activities.

The effort was abandoned by the Senate Intelligence Committee after debating the issue in secret session for several hours. Senate supporters of the charter instead agreed to back a much shorter measure that apparently will make it easier for the agency to engage in covert operations and exempt it from the Freedom of Information Act.

Congressional demands for tighter restraints on the agency seem to have been diluted by the Iran and Afghanistan crises. In fact, it now appears that other rules governing the operation of the agency will be relaxed. Use of journalists, clergymen and professors, for instance, is not proscribed in the new measure.

While most citizens recognize the need for espionage, they certainly are justified in criticizing Congress for its lack of courage and its refusal to challenge executive authority in the case of the Central Intelligence Agency. As it stands now, it appears the agency can revert to some of its reprehensible behavior of the past.

As custodians of the public's rights, congressmen have failed miserably in their attempts to curb the activities of the agency and to protect the interests of the people of the nation.

TULSA WORLD (OK)
4 May 1980

CIA Escapes Senate Ax

THE CENTRAL Intelligence Agency was given a new lease on life last week.

A revised legislative charter defining CIA's role and limiting its authority was set aside in the Senate. A much less far-reaching bill was substituted.

The new charter would not have killed the agency outright. But it would have placed on it so many restrictions it would have practically ended CIA's effectiveness as an important policy instrument.

The CIA is still badly crippled, as indicated by its failure to alert the President to the downfall of the Shah of Iran.

The agency's problems began during the post-Watergate Era when any sort of spying was considered immoral and indecent. Richard Nixon spied, the critics reasoned, and Nixon is always wrong. Therefore, spying is always wrong.

Popular opinion has since rejected this logic. Recent events in Iran and Afghanistan have re-emphasized the nation's need for an effective spy service. But the CIA still has its detractors in the Senate.

The critics' weapon was the new charter. If it had passed, it would have placed a number of specific restrictions on the agency. It would have required the CIA to tell select members of Congress in advance of any significant undercover operation.

But reason prevailed. The bill substituted for the charter still provides for notice to Congress, but with exceptions that will protect confidentiality of truly dangerous operations. For example, the President could sidestep the requirement in case of "extraordinary circumstances."

The CIA is still alive, but perhaps not quite well.

SPRINGFIELD NEWS (MASS.)
3 MAY 1980

Intelligence Code Fails

A congressional effort to draft detailed legislation aimed at eliminating abuses in U.S. intelligence agencies has been abandoned.

Senate supporters of a comprehensive intelligence charter — specifying legal restraints on the activities of the CIA and other organizations — gave up the attempt Thursday and recommended that a shorter and weaker bill be substituted for the charter.

The substitute measure is concerned primarily with changes in existing law.

SENATE ADVOCATES concede that this much weaker bill could make it easier than it is now for the CIA to undertake covert intelligence operations.

This decision is, to say the least, unfortunate.

The need for reforms of U.S. intelligence has been underlined by investigations conducted by the Congress.

IN FACT, INQUIRIES by the Senate Intelligence Committee only a few years ago uncovered covert activities which not only were an embarrassment to the United States, but which undercut diplomatic efforts designed to improve relationships with several countries.

For example, the Intelligence Committee of that day — the mid-1970s — disclosed assassination plots aimed at several foreign leaders; interference in the internal affairs of Chile directed at the overthrow of the government; spying on domestic political groups, and — perhaps most disturbing of all — “experiments” with mind-altering drugs.

Sen. Frank Church, chairman of that committee, voiced outrage.

He said that such tactics cannot be condoned and he and fellow-committee members urged sweeping reforms which would prevent repetition of these and other abuses.

WE SUPPORTED most of the reforms recommended by the Senate Intelligence Committee.

Although we recognized then, and continue to do so now, that a certain amount of secrecy is essential to the success of any intelligence operation, we deplored the free rein which had been given to the intelligence community — allowing it to become a law unto itself.

Since then, some changes have taken place aimed at reducing covert activities and increasing the supervisory powers of Congress in intelligence matters. But these changes were not major ones.

IT REMAINED for Congress to draft the detailed intelligence code, which was in the making but has been scrapped — for this congressional session at least — for lack of sufficient support to pass it in the Senate and the House.

CIA Director Stansfield Turner claims that the covert abuses of the 1970s have been eliminated.

At the FBI, which changed command a couple of years ago, the same claim is made.

We hope that the situation has improved, substantially, at both agencies.

NONETHELESS, THERE IS STILL some evidence that, at the CIA for example, the agency has been using various professions, including journalists, as “cover” for CIA agents.

Therefore, Congress should not permanently abandon its effort to draft, and pass, a comprehensive charter governing the activities of the U.S. intelligence community.

Sen. Walter D. Huddleston of Kentucky, who wrote the detailed code introduced earlier this year, should renew his efforts next year.

We trust he will have the full support he needs the next time around.

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JOURNALISTS/MISSIONARIES

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RUTLAND HERALD (VT.)
4 MAY 1980

Episcopalians Wary Of CIA

BURLINGTON — Representatives at the annual convention of the Episcopal Diocese of Vermont took a firm stand Saturday against the Central Intelligence Agency's use of church workers for intelligence gathering purposes. They also expressed concern about the possible cut-off of the federal food stamp program.

The convention unanimously endorsed a resolution denouncing the use of church workers as undercover agents or information sources for CIA activities and asked Vermont's Congressional delegation to propose an amendment to a Senate bill that would liberalize the charter for the spy agency.

The proposed charter would loosen restrictions on covert activities, as well as use of journalists, academicians and church personnel in intelligence gathering operations.

One minister, whose name was not available, said during the discussion of the resolution that he

had been approached by an intelligence agent who requested he provide the agency with information. The minister told the convention it was his experience that it is better not to become involved with intelligence gathering operations.

The convention felt it "crucial" that church workers not be used by the CIA or other intelligence organizations to preserve the "climate of confidentiality" offered by the church and its workers, said Christine Hemenway, communications coordinator for the diocese.

"There is a separation of church and state, and that separation must be respected and the confidence must not be violated," Hemenway said.

Despite the possibility that the CIA might use church workers to good ends, Hemenway said the convention's feeling was that the "end does not justify the means."

Another resolution, on world

peace, called for at-home reconciliation among all persons to offset the current political climate of "tension and a war-like spirit." It, too, was approved.

Resolutions on peace, hunger and food, a workshop on ecumenism and the bishop's call to respond to the needs of the homeless, hungry and confused people in the world set the tone for annual convention, which met Friday and Saturday at St. Paul's Cathedral in Burlington.

In his keynote address, the Right Rev. Robert S. Kerr, Bishop of Vermont, told the convention, "Charity at a distance is not enough," and challenged the diocese not only to provide financial help but to sponsor refugee families.

In response to the possible cutoff of federal food stamps beginning June 1, the convention passed a resolution that pointed out the duty to support the hungry with food shelves and money.

ROCHESTER TIMES-UNION (NY)
2 May 1980

Under suspicion

Admiral Stansfield Turner, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, has by now been roundly scolded in dozens of editorial pages across the country for his opaque position on using journalists for doing the work of the CIA.

Our thought is to put the dispute into a broader context.

The dispute arose in February when Turner acknowledged that he had several times waived the ban on CIA use of professionals — journalists, clergymen and professors. He told the American Society of Newspaper Editors week before last that he had approved the service of journalists three times (although they weren't used).

Turner seemed genuinely bewildered by the storm of protest. Why do you need a law to protect your ethics? he asked the editors. Why do you feel you "profane your work" if you accept a CIA assign-

ment? Why can't you serve your country and still feel free? What are you, unpatriotic or something?

Turner's uncomprehending position was fully endorsed by Mr. Carter two days later.

They beg the issue. Journalists are concerned not for the ethics of those who accept CIA assignments, but for the reputation and safety of all those who don't, and the integrity of their craft.

Journalists are not alone in feeling threatened. The Rev. William Howard, president of the National Council of Churches, said in February that Turner, in waiving the ban, "had impugned the reputation of every American missionary . . . (with) serious injury to the work of American churches."

And Dr. David Stowe, executive vice president of the United Church of Christ's Board for World Ministries, explained that "ministries around the world . . . depend on intimate, trustful relation-

ships among Christians and non-Christians of many nations . . . We cannot tolerate the jeopardizing of these relationships by even the suspicion that missionaries, clergy or church workers are involved in spying."

The failure of even so sensitive a CIA director as Adm. Turner to understand this simple truth is dismaying. It may be wrong to write a law binding the CIA in this matter, but it may be necessary.

WHEELING INTELLIGENCER (W. VA.)
30 April 1980

Not Their Role

Admiral Stansfield Turner, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, created an uproar among American journalists recently when he said he sees nothing wrong with recruiting overseas employees of U.S. news organizations as spies. The statement should cause all Americans to be equally concerned.

A major flap resulted a few years back when it was revealed that the CIA had been using American journalists overseas for covert intelligence gathering duties. George Bush, then CIA director, announced in 1976 that the practices would be halted. And Turner, in 1977, reiterated the policy—with a loophole that didn't get much attention at the time: he said the exception would be if the director specifically gave his approval.

However, appearing before the annual convention of the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Washington earlier this month, Turner said he endorses the idea of recruiting a journalist for CIA duties "when it is vitally important to the nation." Turner, who also reversed a previous stand and refused to promise that CIA agents wouldn't pose as journalists, said, "I think a lot of correspondents are patriotic enough to do this."

We don't dispute that most journalists are patriotic, but

Turner misses the point. Namely, that the use of even one journalist for CIA purposes would have an adverse effect on all journalists working overseas for American news organizations. Their integrity and independence would be compromised. And the discovery of a CIA agent posing as a journalist would cast suspicion on all journalists.

The job of U.S. journalists is to report the news fairly and accurately. And to do this they must be totally independent. A connection with the CIA or any other government agency would have the potential for two things: drying up news sources overseas (not everyone wants to talk with a newsman who also may be a CIA spy) and destroying the confidence of those back home (a reader could but wonder about the objectivity of a newsman serving two masters).

The New York Times put it this way: "We argue from the premise that free American inquiry around the world has a greater value than any occasional intelligence mission."

Most major American news organizations with representatives overseas prohibit those employees from working for the CIA on the side, and rightly so. Journalists are the eyes and ears of the public, and their objectivity should not be compromised.

MERIDEN RECORD-JOURNAL (CONN.)

26 April 1980

Editor's notebook

Journalists and CIA agents make unhealthy bedfellows

By Barbara C. White

When George Bush was head of the CIA, the news broke that the agency on occasion employed journalists to do its work. Sometimes it would approach people who had already secured a position in a particular country and persuade them to work undercover, along with the regular newswork. Sometimes a CIA agent would masquerade as a journalist.

Newspeople, editors and reporters, rose up in wrath. They labelled the policy dangerous to journalists, demeaning, self-defeating, counter-productive, a threat to the freedom of the press.

Bush, to his credit, saw the point. He issued a formal change of policy insuring that journalists accredited by the U.S. government would no longer be employed by the government as CIA agents or undercover operators.

Reversal

Editors in Washington recently reacted in shocked disbelief to the off-hand remark of the present CIA chief, Admiral Stansfield Turner, that it is now the policy of the agency to employ journalists as secret agents when deemed necessary. Speaking before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Turner insisted that the change in regulations had been made public by him during a Congressional hearing three years ago. He conceded that the practice is used only when necessary, and that of three clearances which he has given on it, not one was put into practice.

If, as Turner states, the policy was publicly and formally reversed, then the nation's newspeople were caught with their sources down. The redoubtable Abe Rosenthal of the New York Times led the questioning and voiced his disbelief that such a change could have gotten by the army of reporters in Washington undetected.

However it happened, Turner has no doubts about the soundness of the policy and no intent whatsoever of changing it.

Turner's case:

He puts it on the simple ground of patriotism.

What newsgatherer or editor, he asks, would not be glad to help out the government, to perform a patriotic duty, to contribute to the well-being of his country? Is this not a small price to pay for the protection newspeople are provided, and the privileges as citizens which they enjoy?

Why do the reporters and editors protest that actions like this curtail First Amendment rights? It is not that they are being denied freedom; rather they are being offered a chance to contribute to it.

Do journalists think they are more important, or that their calling is higher than that of the U.S. government and its officials?

Journalists' case

Journalists, many of whom have hard experience in the

field, see the CIA hiring policy as a threat to the two highest values of their profession, which happen also to be of enormous value to the country and its safety and well-being.

These are the belief of the world and of Americans that our press is as impartial and objective as it is possible to be, and the need of journalists to stand before sources and potential sources with a fair chance of being judged objective, trustworthy and deserving of confidential information.

The argument for the CIA-guaranteed independence of foreign journalists is parallel to the argument that journalists in this country give for the right to protect their news sources. For the first time around, for the short range, the government — CIA or the courts — might benefit from the information gathered by journalists. But as soon as it became apparent that some or all journalists are conduits, willing or unwilling, for information, that information will dry up or become deliberately twisted at the source.

It's a case of killing the goose that lays the golden egg.

A case of conflict

In spite of Turner's equation of the CIA with simple patriotism, it isn't that simple.

Asked whether his agency would inform the employer of the journalist about the extra-curricular CIA work, Turner answered that he hoped the journalist would communicate the facts himself, blow his own cover. No doubt the employer is expected to condone or encourage the moonlighting, again in the interests of patriotism, and to bless the employee and the extra income which the job brings.

But if the journalist has his cover blown by whatever chance, if he is identified as a CIA agent, both his professional reputation and that of his newspaper suffer. His life may be in danger besides.

And how about the very real conflict of interest that could occur if, in the course of his work, a journalist uncovered an instance of corruption or fraud in the CIA itself? To whom then would he owe loyalty? And would he, like Frank Snepp be bound by CIA rules not to talk, not to reveal what he had learned?

Role of the press

Newspeople are not trying to put themselves or their profession above the CIA. They recognize intelligence as a necessary arm of the government, which should be an instrument, not a shaper, of policy.

The American press is another arm of the democratic system, as strong in its own way, and sometimes as arrogant, as any other. Only to the extent that it supplies news and information which is credible because it is objective and thoroughly explored, is it effective.

With all due respect to Chief Turner, the country will be best served if the press and the CIA keep a wary, arms-length, well-publicized distance between them.

NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE (LA)
22 APRIL 1980

DAR Appeals to U.S. to Support CIA, FBI

By EDGAR POE

(Times-Picayune Washington Correspondent)

WASHINGTON — The National Society of the Daughters of the American Revolution, noting the hostage crisis in Iran and declaring America is endangered by a lack of internal security, Monday appealed to U.S. officials to "unshackle and support an effective CIA and FBI."

Releasing the final edited copies of a series of resolutions, the organization went on record urging immediate measures by Congress and the White House to "restore the military strength of the United States to its former position of supremacy" to insure "survival of our country... and to afford protection to the free world."

After concluding the final proceedings of the 89th Continental Congress at Constitution Hall Monday, the 4,000 Daughters representing the 50 states headed for their homes.

The Congress earlier elected Mrs.

Patricia Shelby of Beulah, Miss., as the DAR president general. Mrs. Shelby, in her 40s and described by members generally as probably "the best looking president general in generations," was serving as first vice president general.

She headed a slate of officers that triumphed by a one-sided vote over the slate headed by Mrs. Winnifred Mason, the former District of Columbia state regent. Mrs. Shelby lives on a big Bolivar County, Miss., cotton, soybean and rice plantation. She succeeds Mrs. Jeannete Baylies, outgoing president general from Wisconsin.

The first of the resolutions adopted was entitled "The Eleventh Hour." This 300-word measure stated that since the end of World War II there has been a concerted campaign of unilateral disarmament and because of our foreign policies "we are now faced with a situation of almost complete encirclement by Communist forces. These policies have steered our great nation to the brink of disaster."

Mrs. Arthur F. Felt Jr. of New Orleans, long active in the DAR in Louisiana and on the national level, is a member of the organization's resolutions committee. Mrs. Phyllis Hlaflay of Alton, Ill., was chairman of the National Defense Committee during the administration of Mrs. Baylies.

Declaring that the United Nations once again has proven its "ineffectiveness" in trying to aid in the release of the American hostages in Tehran, the DAR reaffirmed its position in opposing the presence of the United Nations on American soil.

ORLANDO SENTINEL-STAR (FL)
19 April 1980

Press agents

LAST Thursday former Nixon henchman G. Gordon Liddy popped up on the television screen and recalled how he once thought of killing columnist Jack Anderson to keep him from publishing intelligence information that the White House wanted to keep secret.

Exactly a week earlier Adm. Stansfield Turner, current director of the Central Intelligence Agency, stood before the nation's newspaper editors and brashly acknowledged that the Carter administration has resurrected the practice of recruiting American journalists to spy for the United States in foreign lands.

While obviously an extreme exaggeration, the view of Mr. Liddy that government secrets should be kept out of the hands of journalists at all costs is one shared by many government officials. Yet

Adm. Turner and others are quite ready to hire that same journalist to gather intelligence secrets on behalf of the government. And they will readily suggest that anyone who declines to do so is being unpatriotic.

The simple translation of such a conflict is that the government would really prefer for the press to be its agent, gathering all the information it can but publishing only what the government wants published. That's the way it works in almost every nation but this one. And the fact that we don't operate that way is the insurance that we still have what is in effect the only truly free press in the world today.



Unfortunately some people such as Adm. Turner, and President Carter if he is condoning this CIA policy, do not understand that to remain truly free the press must avoid any official relationship with the government, even well-intentioned snooping on America's enemies.

The press can and should snoop, but it should do so independently and on behalf of the American public. This does not mean that the press should go around divulging national secrets or publishing intelligence information that would be detrimental to the national interest. In most cases any foreign correspondent who stumbles on some important intelligence information would see that it somehow found its way to the proper authorities.

But to use the cover of legitimate press function to deliberately go about gathering intelligence for the government is a complete subversion of press responsibility. It not only endangers the life of the reporter, but it does irreparable harm to the credibility of the news organization and to the American press in general.

Most of America thought the practice of using newsmen as spies had ended with the Nixon administration. But now that Adm. Turner has again dragged this skeleton out of the closet, it is time to dismantle it forever. The proposed charter for the FBI and the CIA, now being considered in Congress, should be amended to flatly prohibit the recruitment and employment of legitimate U.S. journalists for the purpose of espionage.

The gathering of foreign intelligence is vital to the U.S. interest, and government agencies such as the CIA should go about the task with resolute purpose. But the gathering of news abroad is also a vital function of a distinctly separate institution equally as important to the American people. And the two should remain that way.

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CIA AND "CENSORSHIP"

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THE NATION
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SNEPP AND 'CONFIDENTIALITY'

The C.I.A. As Censor

ARYEH NEIER

It is much more safe to be feared than to be loved.

—Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince* (1513)

On March 6, when several Central Intelligence Agency officials testified at a secret hearing of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the U.S. House of Representatives, they provided a fascinating revelation of the values the Agency most fiercely guards. The hearing was called at the request of

Representative Les Aspin of Wisconsin and was intended to inform the members of the committee about the censorship procedures that are being employed by the C.I.A. in the wake of the Supreme Court's *Snepp* decision. The C.I.A. officials who testified are associated with the Agency's Publications Review Board; that is, they are the C.I.A.'s censors. A transcript of the hearing has now been released by Representative Aspin. Although parts have been deleted, what remains shows clearly that to the Agency watchdogs, the shadow of its image is more important than the substance of the information it wishes to suppress.

At the hearing, Representative Aspin inquired about a passage in the *Snepp* decision, "where it says . . . that a former intelligence agent's publication of unreviewed material relating to intelligence activities can be detrimental to vital national interests; even if the published information is unclassified. What is your view of that?" Ernest Mayerfeld, an attorney in the C.I.A.'s Office of General Counsel, responded: "Oh, I most emphatically agree with that statement. That, indeed, is the whole point of the *Snepp* case, and I think Director [Stansfield] Turner, in the course of the trial, testified to this eloquently. He said, if we cannot control our own employees, if they can flout the obligation that they have with us, what kind of a signal are we sending to our sources? What kind of a signal are we sending to our cooperators? It doesn't matter whether there is anything in there or not which in fact hurts, but if they can with impunity violate their obligation and publish, it sends a very bad and dangerous message to our sources."

At another point in the hearing, Aspin asked about the publication of William Colby's 1978 book, *Honorable Men: My Life in the C.I.A.* The version published in the United States was submitted to the C.I.A. for censorship and passages disclosing classified information were excised. The French edition, on the other hand, was not censored. Not only was the classified information published but, because of the discrepancies between the two editions, it is possible to tell exactly what information was classified. C.I.A. officials have long contended that the Agency suffers the greatest damage when classified information is not only published but also identified as classified. It saves any hostile government a lot of time, makes it plain that the C.I.A. has a reason to conceal the information and confirms its accuracy. Yet, as the following exchange indicates, at the hearing the C.I.A.'s censors did not demonstrate any concern about Colby's book:

Mr. Aspin: How about suing Bill Colby for the proceeds from the French edition?

Mr. Wilson [executive secretary of the C.I.A.'s Publications Review Board]: We could not sue him on the same ground as *Snepp*, in my opinion. I am not an attorney, Mr. Aspin, but Mr. Colby did submit his manuscript for review.

Mr. Aspin: But the book was published in the French edition without changes.

Mr. Hetu [director of the C.I.A.'s Office of Public Affairs and chairman of its Publications Review Board]: As we understand it, Mr. Colby's U.S. publisher had a copy of the original manuscript and provided it to the French without making changes.

Mr. Aspin: Suppose *Snepp* had sent his manuscript in and you had reviewed it but it had been published that way and somebody could say, gee, the publisher just made a mistake, would that have let *Snepp* off the hook?

Mr. Hetu: A hypothetical. I just don't know what would have happened in that case.

Aspin dropped the line of questioning, but it would be interesting to know what the C.I.A. officials would have said if he had pointed out that Colby violated the C.I.A.'s Termination Secrecy Agreement by giving an uncensored copy of his manuscript to his publisher. Under the agreement, Agency employees pledge never to "divulge, publish or reveal . . . classified information" to anyone outside the C.I.A. without its permission. The C.I.A. could have sued Colby and, since classified information was involved, would have had an easier time proving that it suffered damages than was possible in the case of *Snepp*.

A number of explanations are possible for the decision to sue *Snepp* but not to sue Colby. *Snepp* was a mere agent; Colby was the Director of the C.I.A. *Snepp* is a critic of the C.I.A., though not one who can be readily typed ideologically. Colby, despite his embittered relations with other

former high-level officials of the Agency like Richard Helms, is a defender of the C.I.A. But a more important difference seems to be the one that the C.I.A. censors identified in their responses to Representative Aspin's questions. By arranging for Random House to publish his book, *Decent Interval*, secretly, Snepp conveyed the message, as Mayerfeld put it, "that we cannot control our own employees." Snepp openly defied C.I.A. censorship. Colby appeared to comply with C.I.A. censorship, though he did not actually comply. It may be that Colby disclosed classified information and that Snepp didn't, but as Mayerfeld said, "It doesn't matter whether there is anything in there or not which in fact hurts." What matters to the C.I.A. is appearance. Disclosure of C.I.A. secrets is not nearly so bad, from the Agency's standpoint, as the appearance that it can't keep secrets.

The acknowledgment by the C.I.A. censors that their concern is with appearances rather than with actual secrets helps to explain some of their previous behavior. Their first big test came in 1972, when the Agency got a court order requiring former agent Victor Marchetti to submit a manuscript to the C.I.A. for censorship. The C.I.A. censors specified 339 passages that should be deleted, but in the course of litigation they were forced to allow publication of 171 passages. In 1974, Knopf published the book, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* by Marchetti and John D. Marks, with blank spaces for the 168 passages where the censors had prevailed and with the 171 restored passages set

in boldface type. Why the C.I.A. ever attempted to censor many of the innocuous-seeming passages set in boldface type is a mystery—until we recall the censors' professed concern for appearances.

Seven pages of the Marchetti and Marks book are devoted to "The Tracking of Che." They provide a detailed description of the Agency's role in the capture and summary execution of Che Guevara in Bolivia. Aside from deleting all information that might identify the C.I.A. agents involved, the only sentence the censors tried and failed to excise was this one: "Guevara's last moments were recorded in a rare, touching message to headquarters from the C.I.A. operator."

Another section of the Marchetti and Marks book describes C.I.A. intervention in the 1970 elections in Chile. A lot of this was deleted but the censors left enough to suggest the general outlines of C.I.A. intervention. Among the passages they were forced to restore and that appear in boldface type were the following: "Richard Helms, then Director of the C.I.A., represented a somewhat divided..."; "The central conclusion had been that forces for change in the developing Latin nations were so powerful as to be beyond outside manipulation," and "The 1968 estimate had in effect urged against the kind of intervention..." (The last two references are to a study of Latin America by the C.I.A.'s Board of National Estimates.)

Other attempted deletions included: "As incredible as it may seem in retrospect, some of the C.I.A.'s economic analysts (and many other officials in Washington) were in the early 1960s still inclined to accept much of Peking's propaganda as to the success of Mao's economic experiment"; the

strong objections of the State Department," and, referring to a briefing of the National Security Council by Helms, "His otherwise flawless performance was marred only by his mispronunciation of Malagasy."

At the March 6 hearing of the House Intelligence Committee, the C.I.A. guardians of security contended that if *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* were reviewed today, they would not try to purge so much. As one of them said, "I think the bold print would have been obviated by today's process which is, in my opinion, a lot tighter than it was then." Perhaps, though if it is tighter, it is probably because Knopf embarrassed the C.I.A. by clearly identifying the passages its censors attempted unsuccessfully to delete. As embarrassing as it is for the C.I.A. to have that information revealed, even more embarrassing is for it to be known that the Agency had tried to censor it and failed.

But the obvious question is, what harm could the C.I.A. have seen in the revelation of such trivial information? Let us go on the assumption that there was a method to the seeming madness of the censors, bearing in mind Mayerfeld's assertion that the point of the *Snepp* case was to demonstrate that the C.I.A. could control its own employees. The appearance of division within the ranks of the C.I.A. tends to diminish its fearsomeness. Viewed from the perspective of censors intent on maintaining the Agen-

cy's ability to inspire fear, many deletions from *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* that previously seemed merely capricious begin to make sense. An account of the C.I.A.'s role in the killing of Che Guevara inspires fear. Let it stay in. But reporting that a C.I.A. operator sent home "a rare, touching message" about Guevara's last moments suggests that C.I.A. agents may feel remorse about their acts. Censor it. Censor any passages that suggest that someone within the Agency or elsewhere in the Government counseled against intervention in the Chilean elections or against any other C.I.A. operation. And censor anything that makes the Agency look bumbling, even if it does no more than disclose that the Director of the C.I.A. stumbled over the pronunciation of Malagasy. These revelations detract from the Agency's efforts to appear as a powerful, efficient and ruthless monolith, in full control of its employees, unified on all policies, remorseless against its enemies and insusceptible to such human failings as occasionally mispronouncing a name.

During the course of the *Snepp* litigation, the C.I.A. conveyed to the courts its need for the appearance of control over its employees. The Supreme Court explicitly endorsed this rationale for prior restraint in a footnote to its decision: "The Government has a compelling interest in protecting both the secrecy of information important to our national security and the appearance of confidentiality so essential to the effective operation of our foreign intelligence service." It is a crucial sentence in the opinion. While the events of the last several years have made clear that "information important to our national security" is an elastic concept, it is a model of specificity compared to "the appearance of confidentiality." Even revealing that a C.I.A. official has difficulty in pronouncing a name may detract from the ap-

pearance of confidentiality. And, since it is that appearance that matters to the C.I.A., linked as it is to its interest in appearing as a monolith and inspiring fear, we may be certain that the censors will not restrict their efforts to protecting secrets that might injure national security. Now that the Supreme Court has given them carte blanche, they will be restrained only by a concern that someone will again make them look as foolish as Knopf did by publishing *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* with their outrageous attempts to censor clearly visible. □



Aryeh Neier, a member of The Nation's Editorial Board, is adjunct professor of law at New York University and a fellow of the New York Institute for the Humanities.

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SAN JOSE REP. DON EDWARDS
Plans congressional hearings on CIA agent's case

High court accused of censorship

By Tom Eastham
Examiner, Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — Rep. Don Edwards of San Jose has decided to take on the Supreme Court of these United States.

"Yes, I'm suggesting that the Supreme Court has violated the First Amendment," Edwards said recently, talking about the court's February decision in a CIA case that the government has power to censor its employees.

"The court's ruling is so broad a Forest Service employee couldn't even make a speech about his experiences in the forests of Montana," Edwards said. "It's wide enough to include everything."

Edwards has called hearings next month of his Judiciary Committee subcommittee on civil and constitutional rights to thrash out the matter and frame new legislation.

The Supreme Court case involved a 1978 book, "Decent Interval," by former CIA agent Frank Snepp. Although it was said to contain no secrets, the high court upheld a ruling confiscating \$115,000 the book earned for Snepp and ordering him to submit future writings to the agency for screening.

In accepting employment as an agent, Snepp had signed a secrecy agreement with the CIA. But he did not submit the book for CIA approval. The court said that even without such an agreement, the government could impose restrictions that would otherwise violate the First Amendment guarantee of free speech.

Thus, bolstered, the government initiated breach-of-contract cases against two more ex-CIA men.

"The court should have been talking about classified information. Release of unauthorized information that damages your country should be illegal," said Edwards.

Instead, the ruling says any employee who signed an employment contract can be prevented from publishing a book or articles about his experiences — even if it contains no classified or non-public material. Furthermore, any profits from the work can be taken away.

In Edwards' opinion, the ruling breaches a key legal principle: government may not impose any form of prior censorship on free speech.

"Indeed, the Bill of Rights' First Amendment was written specifically to forbid the kind of laws then prevalent in 17th-century England that required a government license to publish books," Edwards noted.

His subcommittee is calling five experts in constitutional law from leading law schools. After they have defined the terms of the argument and the shape of needed law, Edwards said, he will call in the Department of Justice to state its side of the case.

"The Justice Department is supposed to defend our civil liberties too, you know," Edwards remarked.

Edwards is a former intelligence man himself — an ex-FBI agent who served in Naval Intelligence during World War II. He is also a Stanford Law School graduate and was a California businessman before his election to Congress 18 years ago. He has been subcommittee chairman for almost 10 years.

Edwards said the majority of his panel feels strongly about the Snepp decision and says they intend to look into five areas of major public concern in the issue:

- The public's interest in learning about misconduct through uncensored books, articles and speeches by former employees.
- The legitimate interest of agencies such as the CIA and FBI in protecting classified information. Is new legislation necessary?
- The impact of the court's decision on censorship clauses in employment contracts of other federal agencies.
- The problem of apparent selective enforcement: Was pre-clearance required in writings and speeches by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and former CIA directors William Colby and Richard Helms?

• The administrative process used in pre-clearance. Is there due process? Is there appeal from the agency's decisions?

At a recent Senate Intelligence Committee hearing, Robert Lewis, a spokesman for the Society of Professional Journalists (Sigma Delta Chi), expressed alarm over the scope of the agency's secrecy contracts.

In effect, said Lewis of the society's freedom of information committee, "employees are forced to sign away their First Amendment rights of free speech and free press for the rest of their lives."

At a House Intelligence Committee briefing last month, CIA publications review Chairman Herbert Hetu admitted the review system was selective — but argued that some ex-officials could be trusted more than others.

It is almost impossible to keep up with everything, he said, observing:

"There are a lot of things that take place, you know, that we just can't keep track of. People go on talk shows, make extemporaneous speeches, all sorts of things."

Of 198 manuscripts his board has reviewed, he noted, only three had been disapproved.

Independent review boards have been suggested in Congress.

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FIRST PRINCIPLES
CENTER for NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES
MAY 1980

Snepp: The Case for Judicial Restraint

by Anthony Lewis

Guest
Point of
View

The Warren Court was often chided by conservatives for failing to exercise self-restraint—for reaching out to decide issues instead of leaving them, at least in the first instance, to the political branches of government. Given the great power of the Supreme Court, it *should* be wary of overreaching. But the caution should apply whether a novel decision is being made in the interests of the individual or of the state.

In the case of Frank Snepp, the Court reached out for novel doctrine that greatly enlarges the state's power to suppress what it defines as official secrets. The Court acted without explicit congressional guidelines, in an area where Congress has done much legislating, and it acted in a summary manner that violated its own traditions. The result is to give this country the first elements of an Official Secrets Act: the statute that in Britain has been condemned by repeated studies as an unjustified obstacle to informed democratic control of government.

Snepp was a Central Intelligence Agency man in Vietnam. After leaving the agency in 1976 he wrote a book, *Decent Interval*, that criticized the performance of Secretary of State Kissinger, Ambassador Graham Martin, and CIA officials in the final days—criticized them in particular for leaving behind, when the Americans pulled out in 1975, many Vietnamese who had worked for the CIA and other U.S. agencies.

Like all CIA employees, Snepp on joining the Agency had signed an agreement not to publish anything about it without its prior approval. In the earlier case of Victor Marchetti, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had decided (and the Supreme Court declined to review the decision) that that promise was a legally-binding contract, enforceable by injunction. But *Decent Interval* appeared before officials knew about it: too late for an injunction against publication. The government instead sought to penalize Snepp financially, to discourage others from following his example.

Damages are the usual remedy for breach of contract; but in suing, the Government sought something more: a "constructive trust" that would take all of Snepp's profits from the book and give them to the Government. It won that from the trial judge, but the Fourth Circuit said the proper remedy was punitive damages, fixed by a jury. Snepp asked the Supreme Court to review the whole theory that his promise was an enforceable "contract."

The Government opposed review, saying that it was content with the Fourth Circuit decision. But if the Supreme Court heard the case, it said, it would argue for the constructive trust remedy.

The Supreme Court took the case and decided it summarily, without hearing argument. A 6-3 majority, in an unsigned opinion, found that Snepp had violated both his "contract" and a "trust inherent in his position." The Court imposed a constructive trust on Snepp, requiring him "to disgorge the benefits of his faithlessness."

The manner of the decision was extraordinary. Because the government had only conditionally raised the question of the remedy, saying it was satisfied with what it had won in the Court of Appeals, Snepp's lawyers had not briefed the legal issue of constructive trusts—much less had an opportunity to argue it orally. Justice Stevens, in the dissenting opinion, said he had been able to find no precedent for the Supreme Court thus reaching out to decide a question without giving counsel some chance to discuss it.

The matter—the substance of what was decided—was even more remarkable. For the Court did not stop at holding that CIA employees who sign formal secrecy undertakings are legally bound by them. It did not stop at affirming that those persons may be enjoined from writing or speaking about the agency's secret work, as Victor Marchetti was, or may be financially punished for publishing without prior clearance. The Court raised the possibility that those draconian devices may be applied to anyone in government who has access to significant classified material.

"Quite apart from the plain language of the [secrecy] agreement," the Supreme Court said, "the nature of Snepp's duties and his conceded access to confidential sources and materials could establish a trust relationship." Elsewhere the opinion implied that Snepp's position not only could but did create "a fiduciary obligation" not to say anything without his superiors' approval.

Thousands of people in the Defense and State Departments and elsewhere have access to material as secret as that known to Frank Snepp, who was not a high CIA official. Potentially, therefore, any one of those persons can be enjoined from speaking about abuses in his agency or deprived of his royalties for publishing without approval a book critical of agency policy. In effect the Court has given the government the outlines of a broad new secrecy law, which future judicial decisions can fill in.

CONTINUED

What is especially surprising is that the Supreme Court took such a far-reaching step when Congress had pointedly declined to do so. The United States has never had a statute generally prohibiting the disclosure of classified information. Absolute liability for such disclosure has been attached by Congress only to specific categories of highly-sensitive information, notably that related to codes and nuclear data. The Ford Administration proposed a new statute to restrict intelligence disclosures, but Congress did not pass it.

It has been a fundamental rule of the Constitution that the Executive may not apply to the citizen, or get the courts to apply, a remedy that Congress has declined to authorize. That Separation of Powers doctrine, as it is called, was a major element in the Supreme Court's Pentagon Papers decision of 1971. Five members of the Court noted that Congress had not authorized the injunction sought by the government against publication of the papers by *The New York Times*. Justice White said:

At least in the absence of legislation by Congress, based on its own investigations and findings, I am quite unable to agree that the inherent powers of the Executive and the courts reach so far as to authorize remedies having such sweeping potential for inhibiting publication by the press.

In many ways, then, *Snepp* was an extreme example of judicial "activism"—the word usually invoked by conservatives to condemn new doctrine in favor of individual rights. Why did the majority reach out so far to make law in behalf of government secrecy? The best guess is that the justices were impressed, even awed, by the functions of the CIA—and were genuinely outraged by *Snepp's* behavior. An unusual footnote to their opinion said every President since Franklin Roosevelt had considered an intelligence agency "essential to the security of the United States and—in a sense—the Free World." The footnote ended, "See generally T. Powers, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets* (1979)." The justices were no doubt unaware that the Powers book, unlike *Snepp's*, makes significant disclosures of classified material.

One important question now is how the CIA will exercise its broad new censorship authority. Will it try to prevent publication of merely embarrassing material, such as the fact (which it first cut from Marchetti's manuscript) that Richard Helms had mispronounced the name of the Malagasy Republic? Or will it censor only genuine intelligence secrets? The Fourth Circuit upheld deletion whose tepid character has been demonstrated in later FOIA releases of some of the material.

Cord Meyer, who has written a book covering his 26 years with the CIA, described in *The Washington Star* his experience with "how peacetime censorship is working in this country." Meyer said he saw no tendency to delete merely embarrassing or critical material. But he did find some "real problems" in getting his manuscript cleared by the agency, he said. He had to spend much time and money,

to show the censors that material once classified had come into the public domain. They also tried to delete "whole sections of a chapter describing how a typical KGB station operates abroad," even though that was no secret to the Soviets. But higher officials were persuaded to leave those in.

"Fortunately," Meyer wrote, "the Federal courts have held that it is not sufficient for the government to prove that information has been stamped 'secret.' The burden of proof is on the government to demonstrate that release of the information could cause damage to the national security."

Unfortunately, Meyer's optimism is not supported by the judicial record to date. Courts have been highly reluctant to second-guess classification decisions by the CIA. The Fourth Circuit in the second Marchetti case, *Knopf v. Colby*, held that a classification stamp was sufficient without proof of likely damage to the national security.

Congress ought to provide the explicit guidelines that are inevitably lacking when the Supreme Court makes law so suddenly in an uncharted field. At a minimum the extreme remedies of prior restraint—injunctions against writing and speaking about government activities—and of financial punishment should be restricted to a limited number of agencies explicitly authorized by Congress to impose a secrecy contract as a condition of employment (in certain highly sensitive positions). And censorship should be allowed to reach only those matters that could really, as Cord Meyer said, damage the national security.

It is up to Congress now to supply what Justice White in the Pentagon Papers case said must underlie judicial remedies, especially in the area of speech and publication: legislation "based on its own investigation and findings."

Anthony Lewis is a columnist for the *New York Times*. These views are not necessarily those of the *Times*.

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FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT

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LOS ANGELES TIMES
6 May 1980

The Essence of Democracy

The Freedom of Information Act would be inconceivable in most countries. It is the essence of democracy. The act, passed in 1966, gives the public and the press access to a wide range of federal government records.

But the tendency to suppress information is an enduring fact in government, and the statute has come under increasing attack. The Senate Intelligence Committee now has under consideration a proposal that would exempt the CIA from major provisions of the act. Other legislation would in effect exempt the Federal Bureau of Investigation from the law.

And now a bill, approved last week by a House-Senate conference committee, would virtually exempt an entire agency, the Federal Trade Commission, from the Freedom of Information Act. The legislation would allow the commission to keep secret all information submitted to it related to an investigation. For example, the commission would not be required to disclose any material submitted by a company under investigation for a possible violation of a civil or a criminal law.

Current law permits the FTC to release information that comes within the "trade secrets" category if the trade commission decides that the information is in the public interest, but the new bill would remove the agency's discretion in this connection.

The Freedom of Information Act is the public's ombudsman for information. The act made possible the disclosure of the FBI surveillance of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and a broad category of information about many other FBI abuses of its authority. Two bills in Congress would enable the FBI to suppress such material. One would impose secrecy on FBI records for 10 years after the end of a prosecution or an investigation. A second bill, sponsored by Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.), would permit the bureau to destroy its criminal investigation records 10 years after the termination of a prosecution or investigation.

Present law requires the CIA to release information unless it is properly classified and its disclosure would cause "identifiable damage to national security." The Senate Intelligence Committee is studying proposals to exempt from disclosure additional categories of information. One provision would prohibit judicial review of the agency's decision to withhold material, thus making the CIA the final authority.

Some fine tuning of the Freedom of Information Act may be necessary, but its purpose was sound when it was passed 14 years ago and it remains sound today. Its purpose is to increase the flow of information from government to the people. An informed people is the bedrock upon which open government rests.

GARDEN CITY NEWSDAY(N. Y.)

4 May 1980

Under Cover:

The Government Returns to Secrecy

By Townsend Hoopes

There are a number of indicators, in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, that the government, the Congress and the courts are impelled toward a return to greater secrecy in dealing with the public and toward a greater insistence on internal discipline within government departments and agencies.

Seizing the moment, the CIA has been seeking a total exemption from the Freedom of Information Act, under which citizens can request and obtain unclassified materials relating to operations of government departments and agencies. The CIA's efforts seem now to have been largely achieved through the collapse last week of congressional efforts to write a comprehensive code of behavior for the intelligence community that would have specified restraints.

The CIA is already amply provided with legal safeguards against the release of secret or sensitive information and proposed legislative "reforms" would not have changed that. Journalist Robert Lewis, speaking as chairman of the Freedom of Information Group of the Society of Professional Journalists before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, stated that the Freedom of Information Act represents an equitable balance between "secrecy and sunshine."

The blanket exemption from this act that the CIA appears to have won would remove the agency from public accountability, and would also do severe damage to legitimate journalistic and historical research. This in turn would preclude fully informed public debate on issues of great consequence for the safety of our society.

The Snepp case appears to be a central part of this developing syndrome. Briefly, Frank W. Snepp III was a middle-ranked CIA employee who wrote a book called "Decent Interval" describing the hasty and ill-coordinated U.S. evacuation of

Saigon in 1975. As a condition of his employment by the CIA, Snepp had signed an agreement promising not to publish "any information relating to the agency," either during or after the term of his employment, without specific prior approval of the CIA. By a separate undertaking, he bound himself "not to disclose any classified information relating to the agency without proper authorization."

Snepp did not submit the manuscript for CIA review, and it was published by Random House. His rationale for evading his contractual agreement was that the manuscript contained no "classified" information—that is no secret or sensitive information—and that publication was accordingly his right under the First Amendment. The CIA sued him for breach of contract, arguing that the question of whether the information disclosed was secret was irrelevant. For purposes of the litigation, the CIA conceded that the information was not secret.

The case reached the Supreme Court, and that body's strange and abrupt handling of the case has created a firestorm of controversy and anxiety in the publishing industry. Instead of inviting formal briefs from both sides, studying these, and hearing oral argument—which is the usual procedure—the court decided the case summarily without any briefs or argument. The vote against Snepp was 6-3.

Not only did the court reaffirm Snepp's violation—his failure to submit the manuscript for review—but it argued that Snepp's employment involved "an extremely high degree of trust," and that awarding merely nominal damages for his breach was inadequate—"a hollow alternative, certain to deter no one." It therefore held that Snepp was bound by a fiduciary trust. It argued: "If the agent secures prepublication clearance, he can publish with no fear of liability. If the agent publishes unreviewed material in violation of his fiduciary and contractual obligation, the trust remedy simply requires him to disgorge

the benefits of his faithlessness."

The arbitrary treatment of the case and the vehemence of the language employed in the final judgment have suggested to quite a few Washington observers that the Supreme Court was reflecting, in part, its frustration at the "faithlessness" or disloyalty of its own clerks, as revealed in the pages of the best-selling book, "The Brethren," that the court's hard line in support of greater employee discipline throughout the government was, to some extent, a visceral reaction to a perceived embarrassment in its own house.

The net result of the Snepp litigation is to narrow the First Amendment rights of present and former government employees associated with agencies handling national security information and to create severe deterrents to their readiness to test those rights.

Beyond the CIA, the decision logically fits the situations at the State and Defense Departments and a few others. But the most disturbing aspect of the Supreme Court decision is its failure to indicate any limits on the use of pre-publication review agreements. In theory, the Snepp decision opens the way for the Department of Agriculture or the Bureau of Mines to impose similar contractual obligations on their workers, which could of course serve primarily to protect such government operations against disclosures of wrongdoing or even legitimate criticism in the press.

At the same time, discriminating proponents of First Amendment rights must accept an unpleasant truth about the Snepp case. The Achilles' heel of Snepp's defense was his deliberate refusal to submit the manuscript for pre-publication review. Had he done so, and had the CIA then sought to delete material that was not secret or confidential, but merely embarrassing to the CIA, Snepp could have taken the CIA to court for having exceeded its review authority.

Such a procedure would no doubt have delayed publication and in-

volved possibly expensive litigation, but it would have transformed the nature of the legal issues, and Snepp would almost certainly have prevailed in court.

I think we must accept certain realities that arise from the case. One is that the government will aggressively seek to protect what it regards as legitimate intelligence secrets.

A second is that it is neither legal nor reasonable to deny the government the right to do so.

A third reality is that, given the first two, it is difficult to deny the need for a limited but dependable review procedure, since otherwise the intelligence agency could have no assurance that employees privy to sensitive information would not make purely personal decisions about disclosing what the institution judged to be important secrets.

According to several former CIA employees who now write for a living, the review procedure does not in fact amount to a kangaroo court aimed at choking off criticism of the agency, but is limited to avoiding exposure of sensitive intelligence information, sources, and methods. They claim their new writing careers have not been impaired by the submission of their manuscripts for review.

Whether or not this is the whole truth, the fact is that Snepp sought to evade the requirement. The two lower courts as well as the Supreme Court found against him on that point. Even the dissenting opinion in the Supreme Court, written by Justice John Paul Stevens, conceded that.

Some lawyers have voiced the fear that the Snepp decision virtually reverses the Pentagon Papers decision by greatly strengthening the government's ability to impose "prior restraints" on publication.

I am not a lawyer, but I doubt if this fear is very real. The Fourth Estate occupies a strong and special

position in the Constitution; one deeply rooted in history and legal precedent. Justice Potter Stewart in a different case a few years ago summed it up well. Publishing, he said, is "the only organized private business that is given explicit constitutional protection," and the primary purpose of such protection is to "create a fourth institution outside the government as an additional check on the three official branches."

For these reasons, I believe the issue of "prior restraint" will be judged differently in the case of a publisher and in the case of a government employee. The privileged position of the Fourth Estate does not extend to the government employee, but it applies to the publisher.

The late Alexander Bickel of the Yale Law School, who defended The New York Times in the Pentagon Papers case, has put the matter most clearly. The government has every right to try to protect secret information, Bickel said, but if the secret information passes into the hands of the press, then the government is essentially without recourse to prevent its publication.

The publisher, having obtained the information, has the right to publish it and need not be overly scrupulous about the character of the source or the method by which it was obtained.

The government's right to impose "prior restraint" on the press is limited to extreme cases—the publication of battle plans, or of sailing schedules in wartime that would facilitate attack by enemy submarines. The government's right to discipline its own employees is a good deal broader, but the Supreme Court's ruling in the Snepp case threatens to remove all limits on that right.

Supreme Court decisions are powerful facts. They loom over the situations they deal with, they cast shadows, they are difficult to change, and almost impossible to change quickly.

We must in all probability live with the Snepp decision for quite a while, but we must immediately make a concerted effort to limit the damaging consequences as they bear on First Amendment rights. Specifically, we must urge that pre-publication review contracts be strictly limited to sensitive agencies. And we must urge measures to prohibit unconscionable penalties for the disclosure of nonsensitive information.

President Carter, who could quickly relieve anxieties by issuing a firm executive order, has not been heard from. It is to be hoped that he will be influenced by his former attorney general, Griffin Bell, who has expressed the view that "the contractual principle in the Snepp case should be limited to those engaged in foreign intelligence and counterintelligence."

Some members of Congress are already reacting with vigor. Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.), an able specialist in defense and intelligence matters, said recently that the matter of secrecy agreements is "an area that cries out for legislation" to narrow the effect of the Snepp ruling.

Every American citizen has a direct stake in the outcome. □

Townsend Hoopes is president of the Association of American Publishers.

FORT LAUDERDALE NEWS (FLA.)
18 APRIL 1980

CIA censor wields needlessly heavy hand

Trusting the CIA to use common sense in its approach to censorship and freedom of information hasn't worked very well.

When the CIA got a court order allowing it to censor some passages in a 1972 book, everyone assumed that officials were protecting some deep, dark company secrets — names of spies, details of secret missions or espionage techniques.

It turns out that much of what was censored was harmless information about broad matters of U.S. foreign policy.

The book, "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," contained 168 blank spots ordered by the censor. Now, as a result of a lengthy appeal under the Freedom of Information Act, some of the missing sentences can be printed.

One passage describing a 1969 meeting said, "There was sharp disagreement within the government on how hard a line the United States should take with . . ." The censored words were, ". . . white minority regimes of South Africa, Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies of Africa."

No big secret there.

Some degree of secrecy is obviously necessary for other intelligence agencies to operate, protect their agents and U.S. security. It's clear, however, that giving the CIA too broad a power to censor information about itself can result in a coverup of harmless or merely embarrassing information.

The First Amendment to the Constitution, granting freedom of the press, protects the right and responsibility of the American people to scrutinize

mistakes and policy changes of their government.

Congress should not grant the CIA's current request to be totally exempted from the Freedom of Information Act, which allows the public to obtain copies of many government documents.

Clearly, policies need to be drawn up to protect real government secrets, while assuring that information not really worthy of being labeled secret cannot be hidden by the censor's heavy hand.

Censors, by their nature, are overzealous, and will tend to censor more material than is really necessary to justify their jobs.

The CIA has shown it doesn't know how to keep the right secrets. Congress should tackle the difficult job of writing the proper guidelines.

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CENTRAL AMERICA

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U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
26 May 1980

Worldgram.

Accused American spies of setting fire to a nursery in the Cuban capital.
Charged the Central Intelligence Agency was involved in a May 10 incident in which Cuban MiG jets sank a Bahamian patrol boat. Then two MiG's buzzed a U.S. Coast Guard helicopter on a mission in the Bahamas. Despite a later Castro apology, U.S. still feels he is covering up "intense edginess" in Cuba.

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WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
21 MAY 1980

Central American Unrest Not Cuba's Doing, Panel Told

State Dept. Official Warns That Castro May Become Bolder

By Jeremiah O'Leary
Washington Star Staff Writer

Cuba is not the cause of the political turmoil in Central America but may be tempted to adopt a bolder and more revolutionary role in the region, a Carter administration official told the House inter-American affairs subcommittee yesterday.

Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs William G. Bowdler testified that Central America's future will be decided by Central Americans because few of them want to repeat the Cuban experience.

Describing U.S. policy toward the five Central American nations, Bowdler said, "We recognize that change is both natural and inevitable and

Sandinista leaders with security technicians and advisers, as well as teachers and doctors, but he said the United States is providing financial assistance so that small farmers and democratic labor can contribute to the reconstruction of the country.

In El Salvador, Bowdler said, the United States is vigorously supporting the Junta of young officers and Christian Democrats which has launched agrarian reforms and is under assault from the left and the right. He testified that rightist elements are financing a campaign of assassinations against those cooperating with the reforms while the leftists are assassinating agrarian reform officials in the countryside and terrorizing peasants.

Bowdler said Honduras does not now face a serious threat from internal tensions and that the de facto military government respects human rights and civil liberties. He said the United States is impressed with the Honduran government's so-

cial awareness and commitment to restore constitutional rule.

Guatemala, he testified, faces some of the same political and economic problems which led to the strife in El Salvador. He said the United States has noted encouraging new programs aimed at improving the lot of the poor majority in Guatemala and that U.S. policy is to support these positive developments.

"I tell you frankly, we are not satisfied with the state of our relations," Bowdler said. "We understand Guatemala's legitimate security concerns but we cannot underwrite approaches that are not based on respect for human rights or open political systems."

A former CIA official, Dr. Cletio Di Giovanni took a different view. He suggested that Nicaragua has acquired a Marxist government, that El Salvador is fighting for survival against Communist forces and that Guatemala fears with justification that it will be next.

that peace in the region depends on social, economic and political reforms to strengthen the rights of the individual.

"The U.S. will not use force in situations where only domestic groups are in contention. We will not attempt to impose our views. We harbor no illusion that we can substitute ourselves for Central American leadership, but we can and will support local reform initiatives."

Bowdler said Nicaragua's leaders ultimately could choose an authoritarian system which could mean alignment with the Cubans and Russians. But he said the Nicaraguan revolution's course is still compatible with an open, pluralistic society. He asserted that Nicaragua today remains a largely open society but added that the decisive factor will be economic performance, not ideology. The United States, he said, has not intention of abandoning the field there to the Cubans.

Cuba has provided Nicaragua's

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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
19 May 1980

Bahamas seethes over patrol-boat sinking

By Stephen Webbe
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Nassau, Bahamas

The Bahamas, a doggedly placid nation of 700 sun-drenched islands, is seething with anger.

The reason: Cuba still has not apologized for attacking a Bahamian patrol boat and killing four young Bahamian marines nine days ago.

Havana maintains that it mistook Her Majesty's Bahamian Ship (HMBS) Flamingo for a pirate vessel and has expressed deep regret at sinking it in a savage air strike off its northeast coast.

But Cuba's regrets have not mollified outraged Bahamians, who find it hard to accept that the 104-foot Flamingo was rocketed, strafed, and sunk by mistake.

The notion that the Cuban fighter pilots could have mistaken what was very obviously a Bahamian patrol boat for a pirate vessel is regarded as patently absurd here.

Not only was the Flamingo of typically naval design and painted in naval gray, but also it bore the designation "PO2" on its hull and was, at the time of the attack, flying two Bahamian flags.

"The more we find out, the more it seems the whole thing was deliberate," says Paul Adderley, the Bahamas' external affairs minister.

The Bahamas government is seeking a formal and unconditional apology from Cuba; a guarantee that its territorial integrity will be respected in the future; and compensation for loss of the Flamingo and its four marines.

Reestablishment of good relations between Nassau and Havana, says Mr. Adderley, "depends entirely on the Cubans." The Cuban delegation sent to the Bahamas to iron out the crisis, he notes, "put a very weak case." He added that "the younger fellows seemed ashamed of the whole thing, really."

But Mr. Adderley is wary of predicting that the required apology will be forthcoming.

Last week a Cuban Navy defector reportedly told US authorities in Miami that Cuba's action against the Flamingo could perhaps be explained by the proximity of two Soviet submarine bases to the spot where the incident took place. Informed sources here contend that the Soviet Union "overbuilt" a fishing port on Cuba's northeast coast and that the additional facilities are, indeed, used by Soviet submarines.

But intelligence circles in Washington insist there is no evidence that Moscow maintains submarine bases on the section of coastline in question.

Such explanations do not ease the anger of Bahamians, however.

When a Cuban delegation headed by Pelegrin Torras, vice-minister of foreign affairs, returned here Thursday for a second meeting on the incident with Mr. Adderley,

it was compelled to run the gauntlet of an incensed crowd at Nassau's international airport.

Brandishing handwritten slogans such as "Murdering Cuban pigs!" and "Immoral Fascist dogs: Down with Russia's Castro and Castro's Cuba," some 400 demonstrators hurled insults at two limousines carrying the Cuban emissaries, while others pounded on the vehicles with fists and placards.

"They should come and negotiate honorably," said rally organizer Andrew Maynard, chairman of the ruling Progressive Liberal Party. "Nothing can bring the lives of those men back, but we don't want to be insulted further."

The Bahamian account of the Flamingo's sinking is the following:

HMBS Flamingo was on a routine patrol in Bahamian territorial waters when it sighted two Cuban fishing boats. The two boats fled on sighting the Flamingo, which gave chase, arresting them for illegally fishing.

Cuban aircraft soon appeared overhead, presumably in answer to a distress call from one of the fishing boats, and approximately 55 minutes later two or three MIG-21s swooped out of the sky, fired warning shots across the Flamingo's bows, then blasted it with rockets. The crew leapt clear of the sinking Flamingo, but the Soviet-built aircraft returned and machine-gunned them as they swam. Four men sank beneath the waves.

The survivors boarded the Ferrocem 165 and made their way to Ragged Island, taking with them the eight Cuban fishermen they had detained earlier. Aboard the rusty vessel, the Bahamian marines found a considerable quantity of snappers, groupers, and jacks, 30 crawfish traps and canned food from the Soviet Union.

The seven-man Cuban delegation that flew into Nassau last week continues to maintain that Cuba's MIG-21s had been scrambled to attack what was thought to be a pirate ship bent on kidnapping the crew of the two fishing boats.

Mr. Adderley suggests the fishing boats radioed for help to avoid being taken into custody — and, in the case of the Ferrocem 54, to avoid a second brush with the Royal Bahamian Defense Force.

The Cuban Communist Party newspaper Granma, which serves as a mouthpiece for Havana, has claimed that the Flamingo brought on its own destruction by criminally attacking the two Cuban fishing boats in international waters. "The CIA's hand must certainly be behind this," the paper editorialized, implying that CIA agents had somehow engineered "the pirate attack" on the fishing boats. "In the Bahamas complete mafias of Yankee gangsters, which monopolize smuggling, gambling, and drugs, operate. The government of the Bahamas itself is a victim of the action of these elements," it went on.

Says Mr. Adderley: "The Cubans have a complete obsession with the CIA." Countering the charge in Granma last week, Lynden O. Pindling, the Prime Minister of the Bahamas, observed: "The CIA couldn't be behind a Bahamian patrol craft on a routine patrol of Bahamian waters."

Mr. Adderley says that the Flamingo was not carrying out any surveillance operation for either the CIA or British intelligence and that it did not have any monitoring equipment aboard. Neither, he adds, does the Ferrocem 165, which is being exhibited to the press today (Monday) at the Coral Harbor base of the Royal Bahamas Defense Force.

Could the fishermen have been intelligence operatives? Mr. Adderley doubts it. He thinks the Cubans may have wanted to snatch back their fishermen to show the world they could mount a successful rescue operation in contrast to the recent US debacle in the Iranian desert.

That the Cubans never left their helicopter, he feels, may have more to do with the appearance of two US jets over Ragged Island than uncertainty as to what opposition they might encounter on the ground.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 32NEW YORK TIMES
18 MAY 1980

BIG ANTI-U.S. PARADE IS STAGED BY CUBANS

Hundreds of Thousands in Havana March Through Day to Protest Boycott and Naval Base

By JO THOMAS*Special to The New York Times*

HAVANA, May 17.—Hundreds of thousands of Cubans marched today past the offices the United States maintains here. Cordons of blue-shirted Cuban militia stood between the parade and the building to make sure the demonstration remained peaceful.

The parade, a protest against the United States economic blockade, intelligence overflights and the military base at Guantánamo, began at 10 A.M. led by a prancing white horse whose rider carried a Cuban flag. It was expected to continue until late in the night.

The offices, called the United States interests section and maintained in the seven-story former American Embassy building, were blocked off not only by the militia but also with plywood nailed over all first-floor doors and windows. Still lying on the sidewalk in front are the bricks thrown in a melee two weeks ago, when 383 Cubans now in the building took refuge there.

Today's marchers carried signs saying "Yankees get your claws out of the Caribbean" and "Worms go home," and cartoons showing Cuban refugees leaving the country with the comment, "Good-bye, orphans."

Inscribed T-Shirts Provided

For the occasion the Cuban Government printed up hundreds of T-shirts with such slogans as "No spy flights" and "Yankees out of Guantánamo." Many were wearing T-shirts inscribed, "I am a free man."

The march along the Malecón, the sea-side avenue in downtown Havana, moved rapidly. Marshals urged haste whenever the crowd slowed for the television cameras near the interests section, which is affiliated with the Swiss Embassy.

By midafternoon the only casualties were people who fainted in the heat and were carried out and revived by the Cuban Red Cross.

United States officials, apprehensive about the march, had regarded with alarm reports in the Cuban press that the Central Intelligence Agency had been behind a fire in a day-care center here, a charge that the United States strongly denies but which a number of people seem to believe.

'Don't Touch Cuba'

Before reaching the American offices, groups of marchers were shouting slogans that said in Spanish, "Carter, crazy, don't touch the children." By the time they reached the building they were chanting, "Yankee, crazy, don't touch Cuba."

In the building today were Wayne S. Smith, chief of the interests section, and a small group of United States diplomats. Seventeen diplomats and their families were called home Wednesday, with most expected to return within a few days.

The Cubans who took refuge in the building May 2 have said they are afraid to leave. All have visas to enter the United States.

In past weeks, a common sight from the Malecón has been a steady stream of boats coming from Florida to the port of Mariel to pick up refugees who want to go to the United States. Today the only boats visible were freighters and a ship filming the parade for Cuban television.

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ADVANCES IN SCIENCE

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NEW YORK TIMES
22 MAY 1980

U.S. Says Russians Develop Satellite-Killing Laser

By RICHARD BURT

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 21 — An authoritative intelligence estimate produced by the Carter Administration has concluded that the Soviet Union has developed a ground-based laser weapon that could be used to destroy American space satellites.

Government officials said the estimate, which was sent to President Carter last week, also reports that American intelligence has found evidence that Moscow is working on an antisatellite laser

weapon that could be deployed in space by the mid-1980's.

The Soviet development is not viewed as altering the overall Soviet-American military balance, but it is said to have presented the Pentagon with some troubling questions because the United States has recently become more dependent on satellites for early warning, communications and reconnaissance. Moscow's ground-based laser, the officials said, is probably effective only against low-orbiting American satellites, mostly those used in surveillance systems.

A Soviet laser weapon based in space, they added, would be able to strike high-altitude craft, such as communications satellites.

The officials said that the estimate, which was prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency and other information gathering agencies, concluded that Moscow was pursuing a vigorous program to develop laser weapons. The estimate says there is "evidence of a Soviet project to develop a space-based laser weapon that we believe may have an antisatellite application."

Intelligence officials are in general agreement that the Soviet Union has a laser system that is capable of destroying low-orbiting American satellites. But some experts expressed skepticism about whether Moscow would be able to deploy an antisatellite laser weapon in space during this decade.

While the intelligence estimate reports that Moscow must still work out several technical problems before it can place laser weapons in space, it adds that "such weapons may be available for operational use in the mid- to the late 1980's."

The estimate has stirred a debate within the Administration and on Capitol Hill over the adequacy of American programs to develop laser weapons. The Administration plans to spend about \$200 million on developing laser weapons this year, but most of this is earmarked for research on short-range weapons that could be used to defend ships and aircraft.

The United States Air Force, officials said, has begun to examine the possibility of building a laser-powered antisatellite weapon, but Pentagon specialists believe that such a system is unlikely to be available before the 1990's.

There is growing interest in technical circles over the potential of laser weapons because some experts believe they could transform warfare.

In outer space laser weapons would be particularly effective in destroying satellites. Some specialists also believe that at some future time laser "battle-stations" could provide the Soviet Union with the means of defending itself against American ballistic missiles.

The New York Times reported on Feb. 10 that a secret report transmitted to Congress last year concluded that Moscow "probably" had developed ground-based laser weapons. Intelligence experts have also assumed that Moscow was exploring ways to develop a laser system that would be deployed in space.

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NEW YORK TIMES
22 MAY 1980

Pentagon Sees Chinese Missile as a Threat to Soviet

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 21 — China's intercontinental missile, tested at full range for the first time last weekend, poses new military problems for the Soviet Union and only limited risks for the United States, Defense Department officials said today.

The aides said the test of the missile, designated the CSS-X-4 by the Pentagon, had been expected for some time and did not represent an acceleration in Peking's gradual program of nuclear modernization. The multistage missile, which was launched from northern China, traveled

about 6,000 miles before landing in the South Pacific.

The officials said the most important effect of the test was that Peking had demonstrated to Moscow that it was now able to strike the entire Soviet Union. It had previously been able to strike only at eastern Soviet targets. Officials said it was unlikely that China would possess significant numbers of the new missile before the mid-1980's.

The missile is said by intelligence analysts to be fueled by a liquid propellant and to be roughly the size of the United States Air Force's Titan missile, an aging

weapon that is 109 feet long. The aides also said that the missile was probably equipped with a nuclear warhead with a destructive power of between five and 20 megatons. One megaton is equivalent in destructive force to one million tons of TNT.

Moscow and Points West

Although it would be possible to station the missile to strike at the western United States, officials believe that Peking is unlikely to deploy it within range of American targets. Instead it is expected that the missile will be deployed toward the Soviet border.

As political relations with Peking have improved, American defense officials have expressed declining concern about Chinese nuclear developments.

In his annual report in January, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown referred to the Chinese missile but did not indicate whether it posed a nuclear threat to the United States. Defense aides disclosed recently that some American nuclear missiles that were directed at China have been retargeted against the Soviet Union.

In addition to the CSS-X-4, China possesses three other ballistic missiles, the medium-range CSS-1 and the intermediate-range CSS-2 and CSS-3. CSS stands for Chinese surface-to-surface missile and X stands for experimental.

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NEW YORK TIMES
18 MAY 1980

Threatening Space as a Sanctuary

New Weapons Could Blind Spy Satellites

By RICHARD D. LYONS

WASHINGTON — A possible scenario for the near future: The American spy satellite known as Keyhole-11 is making a low pass above Oriente Province, taking pictures of Soviet troops on maneuvers in Cuba, when officers of the Aerospace Defense Command on duty inside Cheyenne Mountain in Colorado notice that Cosmos-1463 has just been launched from the Tyuratam cosmodrome in the Urals.

The Air Force officers are tense. Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union have deteriorated since the deployment of Red Army combat forces in Cuba, and the coincidence between the flights of Keyhole-11 and Cosmos-1463 does not go unnoticed.

Radars in the Aleutians pick up the path of the Soviet satellite and Air Force computers match the trajectory with the tracks of previous Soviet "killer" satellites. Orders are given to protect the Keyhole spacecraft and at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida an F-15 fighter is scrambled.

This is not an ordinary F-15. Slung beneath the fuselage is a long, thin missile weighing half a ton. Flying at twice the speed of sound, the fighter pushes almost straight up beyond 100,000 feet when, on command, the pilot fires the strange device, then banks away.

The missile's rocket propulsion pushes it 50 miles, then cuts off as a payload hardly bigger than a breadbox detaches itself from the booster and, after a split-second hesitation, veers off at a tangent. In less than a minute it smashes head-on into the Soviet killer satellite, and the Keyhole spacecraft — and its mission of observing Soviet troop movements in Cuba — are safe for the moment.

Recently released testimony before Congress by Pentagon officials indicate that such a scenario is far from absurdly futuristic. In fact, it could result from a \$1 billion antisatellite weapons program being pushed by the Air Force. "Satellite interception and negation are clearly feasible," the defense subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee was told last year by Lieut. Gen. Thomas Stafford, the former astronaut who was then Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development and Acquisition. "In the absence of an agreement eliminating these weapons, I also think a United States antisatellite capability is desirable. Space should not be exclusively a Soviet sanctuary."

For all its rhetoric last week in Warsaw about reducing tensions on earth, the Soviet Union has been testing these weapons for space for a dozen years, most recently, last month. Increasingly, space powers have come to place communications and navigation equipment aboard satellites. "As our dependence on satellites grows, it is inevitable that we be concerned with their availability and survivability in times of stress," said Senator John C. Culver, chairman of the subcommittee on research and development of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

The Iowa Democrat said the United States approach was to continue negotiations with the Russians to seek a "comprehensive and verifiable" ban of the weapons, but at the same time to develop the United States antisatellite capability and to research ways to make American satellites more resistant to Soviet weapons.

While heavily censored, transcripts of testimony released by Senator Culver indicated that \$1.074 billion has been authorized for space defense systems over a half-dozen years. This fiscal year, \$63 million will be spent for research and development of the small antisatellite weapon, originally created in the early 1970's by the Vought Corporation in Dallas for the Army's ballistic missile defense program.

In testimony, again partly censored, before the Senate Appropriations Committee, General Stafford said of the fighter-borne weapon: "I would like to show you an actual model of what it is like. . . . We have small rocket motors here for transmission of control. We have rocket motors here for altitude control. The seeker is up in front. This was a spinoff from the Army effort. It weighs 34 pounds."

Disintegration on Impact

Sources other than General Stafford have said that the model he was describing has a diameter of less than 2 feet. It is composed of an optical sensor, a small on-board computer, and a rocket propulsion system. It carries no explosives. With the weapon traveling at hundreds of miles per hour and the target traveling at orbital speeds of up to 17,500 miles per hour, at impact both disintegrate.

Advanced development is under way at the Air Force Flight Test Center at Edwards Air Force Base in California. Funds allotted to antisatellite development have grown from \$73 million in fiscal 1979 to \$128.6 million in 1981.

President Carter has stressed that the United States is willing to expand a 1967 pact that prohibits nuclear weapons in space to nonnuclear arms. The American development of antisatellite weapons is regarded both as insurance against a negotiating failure and as an added inducement to the Russians to sign; Moscow is said to fear that in the absence of a treaty, the United States will surpass the Soviet Union in the sophistication of its space weapons systems.

Indeed, woven through the censored testimony are hints of much more complicated systems under development or on the drawing board. These include ground-launched systems in which standard Minuteman III boosters would fire the small homing antisatellite. Other designs involve explosive warheads or a far more advanced spacecraft equipped with sensors that could examine an alien space vehicle and blow it up on command.

LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH
3 May 1980

Russia plugs spy 'gap' with nuclear satellite

By A. J. McILROY in Washington

THE Russians have launched a nuclear-powered spacecraft apparently designed to spy on America's fleet in the Indian Ocean, which has been increased to 37 ships because of the crises in Iran and Afghanistan.

Carter Administration officials in Washington said yesterday that the spacecraft had been put into orbit despite United States safeguards imposed on such nuclear-powered vehicles.

They said the satellite, launched on Tuesday, is a twin to one that fell from orbit in January, 1978, scattering radioactivity over a wide area of Arctic Canada.

It was from one of four carriers in the Indian Ocean—the Nimitz, 81,600 tons—that the helicopters were launched that took part in the abortive attempt to rescue the hostages last week.

The Russians are known to be anxious to follow closely the American military response to their invasion of Afghanistan.

Some Washington intelligence sources were saying that the launch reinforces Carter administration assurances that at the time of the rescue mission the Russians were unaware of it and unable to eavesdrop on it.

U.S. to complain

The United States is to complain to the United Nations Outer Space Committee, which has been considering American efforts to draft a treaty governing the use of nuclear reactors in space.

"We felt that while we were working on this at the United Nations, they wouldn't put up a new satellite," an American official said. "This is an unfortunate step."

The launching came 11 days after the Russians sent up a missile designed to destroy American reconnaissance satellites. This was the first testing of that missile since May 1978.

The satellite launched on Tuesday is designated No. 1176 in the Cosmos series, the name used by Moscow for a variety of military and civilian satellites.

American scientists detected radar emissions from it almost at once, indicating it was seeking out American and other allied warships.

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Gordon Liddy Spills His Guts

WILL: The Autobiography of G. Gordon Liddy. St. Martin's. 374 pp. \$13.95

By BOB WOODWARD

WITHOUT G. GORDON LIDDY, the Watergate scandal would never have happened. He dreamed up and managed the most adventurous, illegal and bungled schemes of the Nixon Administration's covert domestic operations. It would not be too much to say that he was both the Rodgers and the Hammerstein of Watergate: music and lyrics by Gordon Liddy. Dozens of higher-ranking officials in the administration—including Nixon himself—were willing, if not anxious, to go along. But Liddy did more than that; he was both the planner and the commander on the scene. He was a possessed, daffy and very dangerous man.

Will, which someone (probably Liddy himself) insisted on calling an autobiography, is far superior to the man. As history and as a study in psychopathology the book is very good. It is the self-portrait of a zealot.

Liddy's account of Watergate is not only believable, but some of what he reveals is front-page news. He suggests, for instance, that Richard Helms, John Mitchell and Richard Kleindienst knew more about his covert operations than previously had been known. There is almost an embarrassment of riches in the book that grows out of his blustery conceit and his freedom from any kind of guilt about what he did. So when he gets down to the accounts of crucial meetings, planning sessions and the actual illegal operations themselves—the Watergate break-in of June 17, 1972, or the "entry" at the office of the psy-

chiatrist of Pentagon Papers defendant Daniel Ellsberg, or the planned assassination of columnist Jack Anderson—Liddy is meticulous. His story rings true, and balanced against the other evidence and testimony of the many Watergate investigations, it is credible. A hundred little facts and inferences convince me that he has been as honest as he could be. And he is no longer subject to prosecution for anything in the book that incriminates him, because the statute of limitations has run out.

Among the important new information in this book:

- Liddy offers his explanation of why the Nixon White House wanted to break into the Democratic National Headquarters in the first place. The June 17, 1972, Watergate break-in, for which the five burglars were arrested, was "to find out what [Democratic National Chairman Lawrence] O'Brien had of a derogatory nature about us, not for us to get something on him or the Democrats." Liddy offers a detailed account of how and why deputy Nixon campaign director Jeb Stuart Magruder ordered the illegal entry.

- The CIA made the expensive charts used to brief Attorney General John Mitchell in early 1972 on the planned illegal GEMSTONE break-in and bugging operations. For me, this suggests more than anything available to date that top CIA officials must have known in advance about Liddy's illegal operations. In my opinion, CIA Director Richard Helms must have been given some inkling from the men over in the CIA graphics department, but Helms has denied it.

- Mitchell was willing as attorney general to pay Nixon campaign funds to members of organized crime for their services in a scheme—never carried out—to kidnap, drug and ship to Mexico radical demonstration leaders. Liddy quotes Mitchell as saying in response to the proposal, "Let's not contribute any more than we have to to the coffers of organized crime."

- Liddy was absolutely serious in his plan to assassinate columnist Jack Anderson and considered four methods, including what Liddy calls "Aspirin Roulette," the placing of a poisoned headache tablet in Anderson's medicine cabinet. The plan was rejected, Liddy says, because "it would gratuitously endanger innocent members of his family and might take months before it worked."

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• The much-discussed piece of tape holding open a stairwell door in the Watergate office building was put there intentionally so a guard could see it. That way, Liddy reasoned, the guard would assume it had been left innocently by a janitor, whereas a clandestine and inconspicuous method of holding the lock open would arouse more suspicion. (Liddy was at least half-right, because the guard tore off the tape the first time he discovered it, apparently not assuming that anything was amiss. Police were only called when the guard found the door taped a second time.)

• Liddy says he delivered logs of wiretapped conversations to Mitchell two days before the Watergate arrests and told him of the planned break-in by announcing that, "The problem [with one of the microphones] will be corrected this weekend, sir." Mitchell has repeatedly denied that he knew of the June 17 break-in in advance; Liddy offers convincing evidence to the contrary.

• Richard Kleindienst, who was attorney general on the day of the break-in (Mitchell had by then become chairman of the reelection committee), was given a full account directly by Liddy the day the burglars were arrested. Liddy writes, "I spelled it out for Kleindienst. I told him that the break-in was an operation of the intelligence arm of the Committee to Re-elect the President; that I was running it for the committee and the men arrested were our people working under my direction when they were caught."

Kleindienst responded, "Jesus Christ," but as the chief law enforcement officer of the nation he apparently failed to tell the federal investigators—his own people—what he knew.

• Liddy says he does not believe the speculations that James McCord, one of the burglars, was a double agent who knowingly sabotaged the illegal entry.

The autobiographical aspect of the book is equally disturbing. He writes a lot about his father, pain, J. Edgar Hoover, and—in a generally adolescent way—about matters sexual. This is all stuff for anyone interested in the psycho-drama. Liddy puts himself forward and on the analyst's couch with embarrassing candor.

For instance, he writes that, as a child, "the most frightening menace of all" was God. Liddy was consumed by shame, dread, fear and self-loathing. The first relief from his bleak childhood was the music he heard on a shortwave radio from Nazi Germany in the 1930s:

"The music . . . was martial and stirring. I lost myself in its strains; it made me feel a strength inside I had never known before . . . Der Fuehrer, Adolf Hitler . . . sent an electric current through my body."

Later, while in prison for his Watergate crimes, he got an associate warden in serious trouble—a victory hailed by a group of blacks who greeted Liddy one afternoon with raised, approving fists.

Liddy writes, "A feeling of immense power came over me. The martial music and roaring crowds that thundered through the shortwave 40 years before rang through my mind again with undiminished strength as I answered the blacks' salute with the one I'd learned before . . . my right arm shot out, palm down, and was answered by a roar of approval. In that moment I felt like a god."

There is also lots of tough-guy talk and macho stories—all much less believable than what he writes about Watergate. Liddy is obsessed with guns; some of the book reads like a Smith & Wesson catalogue. For example, one trusted weapon "had a quick-draw ramp front sight, a wide-spur target hammer, and rear sights click-adjustable for windage and elevation." This is the man who says that when he first came to Washington he was "traveling light" and brought only three guns—"my .357 magnum Smith & Wesson; a snub-nosed Colt .38 Special and a big Colt 1911 model .45 caliber semiautomatic pistol."

As part of a program he followed to develop his willpower—to make himself into a kind of machine, free of emotion and fear—Liddy literally tested himself by fire. He learned to hold his hand over a candle flame and watch without flinching as his flesh burned. "Suffering. That was the key," to achieving his goals, he writes.

He is clearly able to write without sentimentality about his wife, whom he selected because he thought that she had good genes. "Although one of the reasons I had chosen Frances to be the mother of my children was her size and strength, which should have enabled her to bear half a dozen high-performance children, I certainly had not intended to risk damage by pushing her to design limit," so he does not insist she have the six children he wanted in six years. As an FBI agent he ran a name check on her through the files before marrying her. He also says he checked his neighbors names in the FBI files.

Liddy did not meet Nixon until the late 1960s. He writes that he was impressed with "his personal warmth"—a trait not attributed to Nixon by even his most loyal intimates. But who was more loyal to Nixon? He says, to this day, that his refusal to talk during the many Watergate investigations was a great service to the country and to Nixon. "I had, at least, the knowledge that my silence had helped bring him more than two additional years as president."

Liddy will probably be remembered more for his silence, his refusal to break the code, the omer-ta, than he will be remembered for his book. Yet in another era, say the 1930s, in another country, say Germany, Gordon Liddy might have had a genuinely tragic place in history. There, his schemes might have succeeded and his twisted personality might have flourished. □

BOB WOODWARD, coauthor of *All the President's Men*, *The Final Days* and, most recently, of *The Brethren*, is assistant managing editor for metropolitan news, *The Washington Post*.

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NEW YORK TIMES BOOK REVIEW
18 MAY 1980

Ferreting Out the Moles

WILDERNESS OF MIRRORS

By David C. Martin.

Illustrated. 236 pp. New York: Harper & Row. \$12.50.

By EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN

WHEN he was Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms had a recurring nightmare: the discovery of a "mole" within the top echelon of the C.I.A. Ever since John le Carré's spy thrillers, mole has been the term used to describe an enemy penetration agent planted in an intelligence service, who gradually burrows his way upward to a position of influence and access to classified information. An adversary power can easily advance the career of its mole by providing him with a series of stunning successes and, at the same time, block the career of his rivals by providing them with cases and information designed to make them look ridiculous. Once established in a high position, a mole can single-handedly paralyze an intelligence service by feeding back to its enemy information that identifies all of its secret sources and agents. During Mr. Helms's tenure, a mole was never positively identified — though there were occasional mole scares and constant suspicion.

David C. Martin, a Washington correspondent for Newsweek, now dramatically presents the mole nightmare in "Wilderness of Mirrors." Even though this fast-paced narrative is only 236 pages long, Mr. Martin manages to cast suspicion on more than a dozen high-ranking intelligence officers and top gov-

ernment officials. The most sensational suspect mentioned is James Jesus Angleton, the very man who was in charge of counterintelligence in the C.I.A. for a quarter of a century. Since Mr. Angleton was responsible for ferreting out Soviet moles in the C.I.A., this charge — which Mr. Martin first raised in Newsweek two years ago — is particularly serious. Not only does Mr. Martin suggest that Mr. Angleton and his loyal staff may have been under Soviet control, but he also mentions in passing that the loyalty of the C.I.A.'s Soviet Bloc Division, which is the very heart of C.I.A. agent-recruitment and operation against the Soviet Union, was also in doubt in the 1960's. He reports that David Murphy, the head of the Soviet Bloc Division, and Pete Bagley, the deputy head, were considered suspects, along with a number of staff officers who were investigated as possible moles.

Mr. Martin then suggests that various counterintelligence officers working for allied intelligence services could have been Soviet moles. He does not draw the line at intelligence officers; he also notes, almost casually, that defectors pointed to former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson and former Ambassador Averell Harriman as possible Soviet agents. None of these putative mole cases are discussed in more than a few throwaway lines, and the author himself makes it clear that he does not necessarily believe that the surfeit of suspects he mentions are bona fide moles. He claims, in the fashion of many Victorian authors writing about pornography, that he has mentioned this titillating roster of names only to expose the abuses of the counterintelligence system itself.

What is the origin of these extraordinary charges? "Wilderness of Mirrors" has no footnotes, source notes or documentation. The author explains in the foreword that he relied heavily on "retired intelligence officers" who "insisted upon anonymity" in return for telling him their secrets. He then justifies the lack of documentation by stating that "it is hard to say much about them without giving their identities away." Mr. Martin particularly seems to eschew published data. He notes: "The public record is . . . the most fragmentary of all, and in many cases is just plain wrong. The amount of misinformation that has appeared in print . . . is appalling." With these caveats, Mr. Martin leads his read-

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ers to believe that the undocumented portions of "Wilderness of Mirrors" draw on highly secret and therefore unidentifiable sources.

What the author really conceals, however, is the fact that many passages in the book have been paraphrased and most of the quotes have been borrowed almost verbatim from other books and published sources, without any mention of the original works. For example, in a paragraph at the end of chapter nine, Mr. Martin describes the reaction to Mr. Angleton's resignation from the C.I.A. in 1974. The entire passage is taken virtually word for word from pages 284-285 of David Atlee Phillips's book "The Night Watch." Other passages from Mr. Martin's book can be traced to other memoirs of former intelligence officers, such as William Colby's "Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA" and Philippe L. Thyraud de Vosjoli's "Lamia." Besides passages from books, Mr. Martin has also used, without mentioning the published work, the public testimony of numerous C.I.A. witnesses before Congressional committees.

One can only admire the skillful way in which Mr. Martin uses phrases such as "he recalled," "he recounted" and "he said" to create the impression that he himself elicited the story from the various characters in his book. For example, even though Pete Bagley told me that the author never interviewed or even met with him, Mr. Martin is able to state "Bagley thought," "Bagley would still remember," "Bagley continued," "Bagley asked" and at least a dozen other such phrases that lead the reader to believe that he actually was acquainted with Mr. Bagley. The effect of this reportorial legerdemain is stunning: fairly mundane statements in memoirs and Congressional testimony are transformed into what appears to be "investigative reporting."

The problem here is the total deception of readers as to the time, place and circumstances in which a statement was publicly made. The purpose of a footnote is to allow such a determination to be made by the reader. If, for example, Mr. Martin had provided a footnote

for the passage that he took from David Atlee Phillips's book, any reader could determine the context in which Mr. Angleton was described. In this case, Mr. Phillips stated in his book — though Mr. Martin deletes this particular characterization — that Mr. Angleton had "a better understanding of the Soviet Intelligence operations than any other man in the West." This runs directly counter to Mr. Martin's depiction of Mr. Angleton as someone who was invariably wrong in his assessment of the K.G.B. Mr. Martin certainly has the right to omit any characterization that he disagrees with, but he does a disservice to his reader by hiding the book that he has quoted from — under the pretext of protecting his sources.

Although he has borrowed liberally from public sources, Mr. Martin has indeed interviewed a number of former intelligence officers. And while some of his named sources, such as Howard Roman, told me that Mr. Martin spiced up the information they provided with his own inventions, Mr. Martin did in fact have an extraordinary secret source. He appears throughout the book under an array of descriptions — sometimes he is a "counterintelligence officer," other times merely "another C.I.A. officer" or a "fellow officer."

This ubiquitous source must have been Clare Edward Petty, who is willing to tell his story to all comers. Mr. Petty joined Mr. Angleton's staff in 1966 and worked there as an analyst until July 1974, when he resigned and retired to Annapolis, Md., to pursue his hobby of sailing a small boat. (His other pastime is polishing glass eyes for the blind.) A few weeks before he left the agency, he walked into the office of William Nelson, the C.I.A.'s Deputy Director of Operations, and put on his desk a completely unsolicited report. When Mr. Nelson finally got to it, he was completely aghast. Mr. Petty had named the chief of his counterintelligence division, James Jesus Angleton, as his candidate for the Soviet agent inside the C.I.A.

This sensational allegation proceeded from Mr. Petty's frustration during his eight years of searching for the Soviet mole. He first presumed that the mole was in the Soviet Bloc Division, since the K.G.B. had successfully uncovered all of the C.I.A.-recruited agents in the Soviet Union during the 1960's. He worked on the theory that the Soviets had dispatched defectors to the United States to advance the career of their mole, and specifically fastened his suspicion on the deputy director of the division, Pete Bagley, who was then attempting to force a Soviet defector named Yuri Nosenko to confess that he had been dispatched to the United States by the K.G.B. Mr. Petty suggested to anyone who would listen that Mr. Nosenko's true mission was to appear to break under Mr. Bagley's questioning and thereby help Mr. Bagley rise in the ranks to a higher position. Unfortunately for Mr. Petty, Mr. Nosenko did not follow his scenario and break.

Mr. Petty next suggested that another officer in counterintelligence who had served with him in Switzerland was a Soviet agent. Again, however, no one would take the case seriously. Instead, his superior complained that Mr. Petty was merely trying to derogate a rival in the service. Mr. Petty then turned his suspicious eye toward foreign intelligence services and wrote short reports suggesting that the head of the Canadian and French counterintelligence services were Soviet agents. Once again, his reports were not given weight, and he suspected that this was because both men were friends of Mr. Angleton's.

The final straw for Mr. Petty came in 1973. A former high-ranking Polish intelligence officer who had defected to the United States in 1961 now reported that Henry Kissinger might have been recruited by the Soviet Union in 1947, under the cryptonym of "Colonel Boar." The defector claimed that he had seen a document with Mr. Kissinger's name on it in Warsaw in 1956. The fact that the defector had waited some 12

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years before revealing this tidbit — and that he also now claimed to be the Czar of Russia — led Mr. Angleton and most other people in counterintelligence to ignore the revelation. Not Mr. Petty, however. In scrutinizing the defector's story, Mr. Petty found a single detail about Mr. Kissinger's career, not in the public record, which the defector seemed to be aware of. So Mr. Petty recommended to Mr. Angleton that the F.B.I. be called in to investigate the Secretary of State.

When Mr. Angleton refused to countenance his suspicions, Mr. Petty began thinking that perhaps Mr. Angleton himself was a Soviet agent. On his own, Mr.

Petty began "overlaying one troublesome case on top of another," as he explained to me. He found that Mr. Angleton had also refused to investigate his suspicion that the counterintelligence chiefs of the French and Canadian services were Soviet moles. (Mr. Petty developed the theory that practically all Western counterintelligence chiefs were Soviet agents on the basis of the Kim Philby case in England and the Heinz Felfe case in Germany.) Moreover, he realized in his review that all the defectors that he had suspected of being double agents had been handled by Mr. Angleton and his staff. Suddenly, Mr. Petty found a way of explaining all the frustrations that had plagued his career: his superior was the premier mole among moles.

As with all his previous accusations, Mr. Petty found that his charge against Mr. Angleton was not immediately acted on. The C.I.A. did not even order a routine security check of Mr. Angleton. Instead, Mr. Petty's rambling report was filed away. Four years later, however, the retired Mr. Angleton became involved with his former C.I.A. colleagues in a hit-and-run battle of leaks, and one counterintelligence officer decided to leak to Newsweek the existence of the Petty report.

Little of Mr. Petty's own story actually appears in "Wilderness of Mirrors," since Mr. Martin prefers to protect his source rather than expose the motives

for these incredible charges. In presenting the mole story, Mr. Martin skillfully weaves into the Petty affair the threads of other counterintelligence adventures. The Philby conspiracy, the Berlin tunnel, code-breaking and even the assassination plots (taken from the report of the Church Committee) all become part of "Wilderness of Mirrors." With a few strategic embellishments, and a clear and highly charged narrative style, Mr. Martin even manages at times to transform Mr. Petty's frustrations in Mr. Angleton's office to moments of high drama.

In the end, however, Mr. Martin never even attempts to resolve the swirl of suspicions he deftly dishes out. Instead, he simply notes his feeling: "There was a certain poetic justice to be found in suspecting Angleton of being the KGB's mole. It was nothing more than he had done to others." With less poetic rationalization, he also dangles the names of a plethora of other suspected traitors. (How all this passed the scrutiny of Harper & Row's libel lawyers is another question.) He casts a pox on everyone's house, at least in American, British, French, Canadian and German intelligence; he has oddly little to say about the K.G.B. Mr. Martin concludes that the logic of counterintelligence, as personified mainly by Mr. Angleton, is a "wilderness of mirrors" — a phrase he borrowed from Mr. Angleton. ■

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The CIA's Search for the Super-Mole

WILDERNESS OF MIRRORS. By David C. Martin.
Harper & Row. 236 pp. \$12.50

By **ANDREW BOYLE**

THE "GREAT GAME" of secret intelligence continues to exert its peculiar fascination on outsiders. The professionals who play that game are normally invested with the glamor of James Bond or of George Smiley. In fact theirs is an eerie, unreal world—a "wilderness of mirrors" in which the task of disentangling truth from falsehood, substance from shadow, becomes harder and not easier with the advance of sophisticated tradecraft. Amateur mole-hunters are naturally looked at askance by the insiders, though this may be more the case in Britain than in the United States, as I discovered recently in the course of some historical research. Spoors which led me to Anthony Blunt, a self-confessed Soviet spy, also drew me into corners of the twilight nether regions of British and American counterintelligence.

David C. Martin, of *Newsweek's* Washington bureau, could not have chosen a better title for this brief, lively and reasonably well documented study of the Central Intelligence Agency's first 30 years. Whether his handiwork will commend itself to past and present members of the agency itself is questionable. Yet *Wilderness of Mirrors* deserves to be widely read because, despite the inaccuracies and wrong inferences of which Martin will doubtless be accused, it draws together into a coherent if occasionally forced unity the record of the CIA's triumphs, setbacks, divided councils and inner turmoils since its foundation under Truman.

I am not sure that it was necessary or wise to im-

pose on such a complex theme as a kind of subsidiary plot the distant, muted rivalry between two men who both directed and personified the CIA's covert activities: James Jesus Angleton, "orchid-grower, expert fly-fisherman, Ivy League intellectual and master of deception," who was chief of counterintelligence, and William King Harvey, "a small-town, Midwestern lawyer, who became a gun-toting, hard-drinking FBI agent," and "later" spearheaded the CIA's clandestine forays against the Soviet Union and Fidel Castro's Cuba." Those words are not the author's but his publisher's. Martin admits to receiving no help from Angleton, and none from Harvey's widow. His principal sources were "retired intelligence officers; documents released under the Freedom of Information Act; and the public record." I am hardly surprised at his verdict that the last-named source proved the least reliable, nor that most of his witnesses insisted on anonymity.

Enthralling as the story is, it is anything but elevating or edifying. Under Britain's draconian libel laws, I question whether Martin would have been allowed to write so plainly and fearlessly, especially in describing the uncooperative Angleton's fixation about the existence of a super-mole inside the CIA itself. In a book of little more than 200 pages, the provocative details are packed tightly and neatly. As the author implies at the outset, inconsistencies and even errors were almost bound to creep into a work which "begins and ends in mystery, with precious few solutions between." In his rather breathless analysis of "the dispatches sent from behind the American lines," Martin concludes that the CIA's war against the KGB has been going badly, not because the KGB is led by devilish geniuses but because the CIA has stood foolishly in its own light.

The most vividly controversial pages are those which dwell on Angleton's unshakable conviction, acquired in the early 1960s, that such plausible Soviet

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defectors as Michal Goleniewski and Yuri Nosenko, despite invaluable information they brought about the treacheries of George Blake, Gordon Lonsdale, Harry Houghton, Heinz Felfe and William John Vassall, were in reality cunningly placed Soviet penetration and disinformation agents. The suspicion grew by what it fed on, gradually "paralysing the agency's clandestine operations against the Soviet Union." Why Angleton and his superiors should have chosen to trust Anatoli Golitsin, whose defection in December 1961 followed that of Goleniewski and preceded that of Nosenko, is not entirely or satisfactorily explained. However, Golitsin, bursting with paranoid conspiracy theories (few of which could be proved or genuinely tested), evidently became "the pet" of Angleton and the main source of the CIA's increasingly debilitating condition as futile attempts were made to track down the Washington super-mole. The Western allies, including Britain, suffered indirectly through the time-consuming, counterproductive distractions of this great mole hunt. Golitsin's

position of privilege enabled him repeatedly to assert the strangest things, and often to engineer faith in them: some were well founded, most were not. What he told MI5 interrogators did prompt the reopening of the Philby case. It led to this already exposed Soviet agent's selective confession of past activities on behalf of the Russians who, in the nick of time, spirited him away to Moscow from Beirut. Another of Golitsin's tantalizing theories, voiced after a visit to Britain in 1963, was that "the KGB had poisoned [Hugh] Gaitskill [leader of the Opposition Labour Party] in order to promote the new leader . . . Harold Wilson, who Golitsin said was a Soviet asset." This belongs to the trackless regions of higher lunacy, though gullible members of the secret world, British and American, apparently believed it. Is it any wonder that the CIA's morale and sense of purpose reached rock-bottom in the 1970s? To quote Martin again: since "the CIA had such trouble holding its own against the KGB when there were virtually no restraints on the tactics it could employ, how will it fare in this era?"

How indeed, in this reformed era of "stringent legislative charters and executive guidelines"? The gloomy, deeply introspective Angleton, now retired, may not be alone in fearing that the worst phase of the secret war against the KGB has still to come, with the shackled CIA quite unprepared for it. □

ANDREW BOYLE is the author of *The Fourth Man: The Definitive Account of Kim Philby, Guy Burgess, and Donald Maclean and Who Recruited Them to Spy for Russia.*

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MISCELLANEOUS

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26 May 1980

Washington Whispers

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Hearings by a special court on requests by U.S. intelligence agencies to allow electronic surveillance and other spying in the U.S. are held in a metal-sealed, windowless room in the old FBI section of the Justice Department building in Washington. Total secrecy is needed, insiders say, to counter detection devices so sensitive they pick up conversations through windows and decipher information tapped out on typewriter keys.

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WASHINGTON STAR
22 May 1980

Names of CIA Agents Published by Magazine

Covert Action Information Bulletin, a periodical which states its object as destruction of American intelligence agencies, yesterday published the names and some biographical and other details on 40 alleged CIA officers and agents said to be operating in 31 countries. The list included 13 alleged chiefs of station, eight deputy chiefs, and 19 senior "case officers" — officers who supervise local agents. Legislation is pending in Congress to make the unauthorized identification of intelligence personnel a criminal offense.

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22 MAY 1980

NATO SEES RUSSIANS SURROUNDING CHINA

Peking's Strategic Position Called
Worse—Call for United Front
Against Soviet Stressed

By DREW MIDDLETON

Special to The New York Times

BRUSSELS, May 20 — The overall strategic situation of China has worsened over the last year despite its apparently successful test of an intercontinental ballistic missile.

Intelligence and academic specialists on the strategic triangle of China, the Soviet Union and the United States, weighing Soviet moves against China's inability to respond and American unwillingness to provide direct military aid, conclude that China's only course is to re-emphasize the call for a united front with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Sources at Atlantic alliance headquarters here say China faces the prospect of military encirclement. The most disturbing factor for China is thought to be the Soviet support for Vietnam. Soviet aid to Hanoi is now at a rate of \$3 million a day, according to one specialist, and the Russians have established a military presence on China's southern flank through the use of naval and air facilities at Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang.

Submarine Tender at Cam Ranh

A submarine tender in Cam Ranh Bay, the base built by the United States during the Vietnam War, now serves as a depot ship for Soviet submarines armed with cruise missiles and operating in the South China Sea. The submarines, one source said, are within range of the Malacca Strait, a busy commercial artery through which Middle Eastern oil reaches Japan.

The Soviet military presence in Vietnam and Soviet political support for Vietnamese policies in Laos and Cambodia have reminded China's other neighbors, the specialists said, that the Soviet Union and not China is the most significant military power on the Asian mainland.

Over the last four months, the Russians have taken steps to strengthen their ground forces along the 4,000-mile frontier with China. These forces are estimated at 45 divisions, or 450,000 men. The new element is that about half of these divisions are now at full strength, with all their weapons. These weapons include T-72 tanks, the most advanced helicopters and reinforcements in surface-to-air missiles. SS-20 medium-range missiles are said to have been installed in the Sibe-

rian Military District, with headquarters at Novosibirsk, and in the Transbaikalian Military District, centered at Chita.

Chinese Air Force Oldest in World

The ground forces are supported by 500 bombers and 1,400 fighters. The latter, guided by a radar-warning system, are judged capable of handling the obsolete bombers of the Chinese Air Force, which one source said is "the third largest and certainly the oldest" in the world.

The Russians have built up their naval strength in the Far East and show a disposition to use it on targets of opportunity.

About 10,000 men have been landed on islands in the southern Kuriles that were annexed at the end of World War II and are being claimed by Japan. According to one specialist, facilities for the accommodation of another military force are being built on Shikotan, one of the islands. The others are Iturup, Kunashir and the Habomai group. The Soviet troops are equipped with tanks, assault helicopters and ground-to-air missiles.

At Atlantic alliance headquarters, the Soviet move is considered more as a threat to China than to Japan. It has been accompanied by reinforcement of the Soviet Union's Pacific Fleet.

Eight Soviet Cruisers in Pacific

There are now eight missile cruisers and 16 missile destroyers and frigates in the fleet, which has a nominal strength of 75 submarines. The submarines and surface ships using the Vietnamese bases are drawn from this fleet. Its antisubmarine capacity has been modernized.

The Chinese military response appears to be following the dictum of Mao Zedong, who held that defense needs could be met by a nuclear strike force and a vast people's army. The Chinese have both but, as specialists say, nothing in between.

Prospects for forming a mobile, quick-reaction force are limited. Military modernization is the lowest on the list of the four modernizations on which China has embarked, specialists said. The others are in industry, agriculture and science.

The Chinese Navy may inflict losses on the Soviet Union's Pacific Fleet in inland waters. But its range is limited to that of supporting planes. The army's modern weaponry is restricted to some old tanks and a few surface-to-surface missiles left over from the period of Soviet friendship in the 1950's. The air force is described as in "desperate need of modernization."

The consensus at headquarters here is that, if the Russians were sufficiently worried by the prospect of a Chinese-American alliance, they could attack and take Manchuria, which produces half of China's oil and a third of its steel.

The Soviet Union, it is said, is so superior in nuclear weapons that it may carry out the Manchurian operation without nuclear strikes. The other side of the coin is that the Chinese may feel impelled by their weakness in conventional forces to loose nuclear weapons on cities in western Siberia and the Urals.

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Soviet Science Assessed As Flawed but Powerful

By MALCOLM W. BROWNE

INCREASING strains in Soviet-American relations have prompted analysts in this country to take a hard new look at the scientific underpinnings of Soviet strength. The capabilities of Soviet science could vitally affect the future balance of world power, and Government planners need answers to hard questions: Can the Soviet Union develop strategically decisive weaponry before we do? Can the Russians immunize themselves against grain embargos by bringing their chronic crop failures under control? Will they find better answers than ours to the energy shortages beginning to affect even their oil-rich land?

In seeking responses to such questions, The New York Times consulted American and Soviet experts in many scientific fields, working for universities, research laboratories and Government agencies.

Soviet science is partly concealed from outsiders — particularly so in recent months since exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union have been officially diminished as tensions increased — and experts disagree about some aspects of Soviet scientific potential. But some overall conclusions have emerged:

The Soviet Union is investing more human resources in science than any nation on earth. According to Government estimates, some 4 percent of the Soviet gross national product is spent on research, compared with about 3 percent in the United States.

Louvan E. Nolting and Murray Feshbach, of the United States Bureau of the Census, published a new statistical study of the subject last month in the journal *Science*. The authors concluded that the number of Soviet scientists has quadrupled in the past three decades. In 1978, the last year in which comparable statistics were available for the study, there were some 828,100 scientists in the Soviet Union, compared with 595,000 in this country.

Soviet Science Has Many Flaws

There is general agreement that the Soviet scientific colossus is mired in technological backwardness and inefficient political bureaucracy. Many obvious flaws tend to make Soviet science ineffective. And yet, Soviet science clearly supplies Moscow's needs in many fields, including war.

"Consider our own weaponry in this country," a Government expert who wished not to be identified said. "Most of our weapons are based on scientific research that was carried out in the 1940's and 1950's. Suppose the Soviets had no scientific research of their own but had to rely solely on Western research published openly in our professional journals. That would mean they would always lag behind us in basic science by approximately three years. But in weapons technology, a scientific lag of three years is virtually no lag at all." The Kremlin

could visit destruction on any other nation with its sophisticated weapons systems, but still has problems in other areas. Its fighter planes are among the world's most formidable, and yet their electronic systems still use vacuum tubes, relics of an era long past in this country.

Paradoxes like these complicate understanding of Soviet science, but analysts agree on many of its weaknesses and strengths.

Narrow Scientific Education

Among the problems and pressures facing Soviet science are these:

¶The average Soviet scientist receives an education narrowly restricted to his specialty. This frequently limits his perception of the wider implications of his work, Western counterparts believe. Most Soviet scientists who emigrate to this country have difficulty adjusting to American research jobs, which require a broader outlook.

¶The Soviet population is growing rapidly, especially in the regions least able to grow food. The pressure to increase food production may compel Soviet science to divert major efforts from other research needs, including military projects.

¶Observational astronomy in the Soviet Union is held back by the relatively poor quality of its telescopes and other instruments.

¶Shortcomings in every aspect of computer technology make the Soviet Union almost wholly dependent on imports for such technology. The computer shortage inhibits Soviet theoretical analysis of research in weather and climate, in the statistical aspects of economics and psychology and in most experimental sciences, including chemistry and physics.

¶Soviet engineers and technicians have continuing difficulty translating basic science into practical technology. In the 1970's, Moscow contracted with Western companies to build a score of chemical plants in the U.S.S.R. for making industrial chemicals, plastics, fertilizers and other materials.

¶Public health, medicine and environmental protection in the Soviet Union are regarded by most experts as incomparably inferior to those of the West, although medicine in Communist countries is free. Senior officials have access to the best equipment and drugs imported from the West, but most Soviet citizens must make do with fairly primitive medical treatment.

¶Soviet scientists are excessively protected against criticism by their colleagues, American experts believe. As a result, Soviet scientific journals frequently publish papers of doubtful value, whose results cannot be replicated. American experts believe that mediocre scientists and research projects, which would be weeded out of the American system by competitive pressures for financing, generally survive in the Soviet Union, where they are protected by the bureaucracy of their bloc-funded institutions.

Strong in Theoretical Areas

But Western analysts agree that Soviet science has some important strengths. Among them are these:

¶The "blackboard" sciences — those requiring intellectual effort but not laboratory experimentation — are as highly developed in the U.S.S.R. as any country in the world. These include the theoretical branches of mathematics, physics, astronomy, electrochemistry, fluid dynamics and other basic sciences.

¶Since the U.S.S.R. lacks computers, Soviet researchers are compelled to develop theoretical analyses of problems for which their American counterparts would turn to "number-crunching" computers. American experts believe this has cultivated a vital habit of thought among Soviet researchers that is becoming dormant in many American scientists.

¶Some analysts believe the Soviet Union is more venturesome and imaginative than Americans in fields rejected by many American scientists as inappropriate for serious research. They say the Soviet Union experiments much more extensively in behavior modification, parapsychology and the biological effects of electromagnetic fields, and that much of this research is given high government priority.

¶Experimental psychology is regarded by many Western experts as a Soviet strong point, partly because Soviet science is less reluctant to carry out experiments on human beings than are most Western institutions. "I would

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expect a major Soviet breakthrough to be in the field of neuroscience rather than, say, physics of chemistry," one expert said.

"The Soviet Union has pioneered in many branches of space science ever since the 1957 launch of Sputnik I, the first man-made satellite. Soviet achievements have included the successful landing of instruments on Venus and work aboard the manned Soyuz space station that has contributed important knowledge about biological processes in space, weightless metallurgy and crystallography and practical space engineering. A permanent Soviet base on the moon is seen as a likely possibility.

"Soviet scientists are believed to have the knowledge and ability to build the most powerful atomic particle accelerators in the world. The Soviets already have several high-energy accelerators likely to yield data on harnessing fusion energy and the possibility of developing a particle-beam weapon. The feasibility of particle-beam weapons is a subject of intense debate in the West, but there is no doubt that Moscow is actively investigating the problem.

"The U.S.S.R. is among the world's leaders in research on fusion energy. Soviet scientists (including Nobel laureate Pyotr L. Kapitzka) invented the Tokamak magnetic confinement system, which has been copied in this country by various institutions experimenting with fusion.

"Soviet laboratories are also very strong in laser research and the use of lasers in fusion research, as weapons against missiles and satellites, and in many other fields.

"Experiments in climate and weather modification have been much more extensive in the U.S.S.R. than here, partly because of resistance by various citizens' groups to such experiments.

Apparent paradoxes in the quality of Soviet science give rise to disagreements among experts about Soviet potential progress.

For example, the National Foreign Assessment Center, a part of the Central Intelligence Agency, recently published a report stating that "although Soviet grain yields have increased, the average quality of Soviet grain [in terms of nutrition and its ability to resist disease, as well as other factors] has declined since the mid-1960's."

The report added, "No really new wheat varieties have been developed in almost two decades."

A sharply contrasting view was expressed in an interview by Dr. Sylvan Wittwer, director of Michigan State University's Agricultural Experiment Station, based on extensive tours he has made of Soviet agricultural research facilities and evaluation of their results.

"The Soviets absolutely lead the world in the genetic engineering of hard winter wheat and sunflowers. They have developed wheat hybrids that will grow 200 miles farther north

than any that had existed," he said.

Dr. Wittwer acknowledged that the Soviet Union is far from solving its crop problems, underscored by last year's huge wheat shortfall. "But remember," he said, "even we have crop failures, and we have the largest continuous growing region with a benign climate in the world — the Corn Belt. By contrast, the Soviets have staggering drought problems and an extremely unstable climate. Despite such problems, Soviet grain production is steadily rising."

A third perspective was supplied by a Soviet scientist who recently defected. Because he has family members in the U.S.S.R., he asked not to be identified. "From the Communist Party's standpoint," he said, "Soviet science still exists for only two reasons: military advantage and international prestige. Eighty percent of the research in the Soviet Union is for military-related purposes.

"Take my discipline, which is molecular biology. This is a field closely related to genetic engineering, a science that was crushed in the U.S.S.R. during the Stalin and Khrushchev periods. Science then was ruled by [Trofim D.] Lysenko, who didn't believe in genetics, and, as a result, Soviet agriculture went from bad to worse.

"But now the party recognizes that genetics has a very important military offshoot — germ warfare. One of the top-secret military facilities just outside Moscow sent me a student who was to complete his work for a doctoral degree by working on my staff. This man frankly told me the purpose of his higher education — it was to serve the biological warfare facility from which he was on leave."

Soviet scientists see their chronic shortage of equipment as one of the major handicaps.

"I would say that 100 percent of all the advanced equipment in Soviet life-sciences laboratories is imported from the West," another former Soviet scientist said. "Primitive paper chromatographs [used for chemical analysis] and comparable apparatus are made domestically. But everything else — high-speed centrifuges, mass spectrometers, X-ray diffraction equipment, microcomputers, you name it — it all comes from the West, or in a few cases, from Hungary or East Germany."

Labs Get Dollars and Rubles

This is why all major laboratories have budgets in dollars as well as rubles. An institute receiving no dollar budget is unable to buy equipment abroad, however rich in rubles it may be.

"The highest priority Soviet labs are extremely well equipped, because everything is Western," the scientist added. "The other laboratories must make do with very little. Even simple reagent chemicals for a research facility must be ordered one year in advance, and supplies of everything are spotty and uncertain."

But many American analysts share the views of Dr. Thane Gustafson of the Rand Corporation in Santa Monica, Calif., who believes the biggest problem facing Soviet science is the organization of its hierarchy.

"The Soviets have undergone some really impressive soul-searching about science during the past 10 years," Dr. Gustafson said. "But despite all, Soviet science is terribly hampered by its administration, which allows subordinate scientists virtually no initiative. Support and funds are awarded to institutions, not specific research projects, so political influence determines everything.

"The Soviet leaders plan scientific research in great detail and far into the future, while American planners recognize that science, by its nature, is unpredictable. After an American scientific breakthrough, funding and priorities can be changed swiftly to take advantage of the new development. The Soviets lack that flexibility."

How likely is the Soviet Union to spring some unpleasant scientific surprises on the West?

"American scientists are often snobbish about Soviet science," a Government official said. "It's a dangerous attitude, particularly since the Soviets seem to make public only the papers that reflect mediocre science. We have reason to believe that official secrecy and institutional policies shield their best science from public exposure.

"But do you know what scares me more than the possibility of a scientific surprise from Moscow?" he asked. "While the basic mathematical literacy of our children declines year after year, the math skills of Soviet children are steadily improving. In 15 or 20 years that may add up to a huge advantage for them in many fields, including war.

"I'm afraid that from the standpoint of science, we may be playing the hare to the Soviet tortoise."

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ON PAGE D12

THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
20 May 1980

Struggle Develops in Washington Over U.S. Broadcasts to Soviets, East

By Henry S. Bradsher
Washington Star Staff Writer

A quiet struggle has developed in Washington over American-financed broadcasting to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, with several factions exchanging charges — most of them anonymous — and questioning each other's motives.

The argument is over the future of Radio Liberty, which broadcasts news and analysis into the Soviet Union that Kremlin censors try to keep from people there, and of Radio Free Europe, which fills the same role of offering an alternative radio service for five East European countries.

One element of the struggle emerged last week in the leaking of a letter from four senators to President Carter. It charged that "former CIA officials inside and outside the administration" were trying to interfere in the radios' control.

The letter had the effect of defending the present supervision of the stations by the Board for International Broadcasting. This small, government-financed organization located here is responsible to Congress for the stations, which are based in Munich, West Germany.

A second element, to which the letter apparently was a reaction, has been efforts by a loose network of people to correct what they see as serious weaknesses in the ability of the radios to reach people inside the Soviet bloc. Strong emotions are involved in the struggle that has been going on for several years between the BIB, especially its small permanent staff, and its critics, not all of whom are former CIA officials.

A third element is money. Congress and the Office of Management and Budget have had to decide what priority to give to BIB and the stations. This has involved judgments of whether the radios are doing their job as well as possible now, as BIB contends while at the same time wanting more money, or are being mismanaged and are failing to reach enough people.

One critic of the present effort defines Radio Liberty's job as making it "feasible to expect the appearance of an informed public opinion sizable enough to exercise a restraining influence on Soviet policymaking similar to that achieved in East Europe," where RFE has better coverage.

Congress and OMB have in general taken the attitude that money appropriated for the radios has been expanded in the last few years as fast as is reasonable or needed.

"OMB's biggest institutional concern," one official says, "is the absorptive problem — getting access to transmitters, air time, linguistic capabilities, that sort of thing." The stations cannot be pushed too hard, the official adds.

This frustrates the critics who see large unfulfilled needs. Measuring listener audiences is difficult, but it is generally agreed that RL has a fairly small audience because its signals are not strong enough to penetrate Soviet jamming very well and it broadcasts only short periods in many important Soviet regional languages.

The Soviet Union does not jam the official U.S. government service, Voice of America. VOA plays a different role from RL and RFE. It gives general news and U.S. material, while the Munich stations concentrate on news and background of their target areas.

The House Foreign Affairs Committee recently tried to add \$12.7 million to supplemental appropriations for the 1980 and 1981 fiscal years to fund the radios' reach into Soviet Central Asia. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee turned down any extra money, however.

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ON PAGE B15

THE WASHINGTON POST
20 May 1980

JACK ANDERSON

Skepticism Clouds Nerve Gas Charge

I've already reported that the Russians are using poison gas to flush the ragged Afghan rebels from their mountain hideouts. Now there is alarming evidence that the Russians have developed a new "nerve" gas capable of incapacitating its victims long enough for troops to move in for the kill.

The Carter administration apparently has the evidence in hand, but has not made it public. The result is widespread skepticism of the U.S. charges, not only among Third World nations but also among our allies. Like the shepherd boy who cried "Wolf!" too often, the United States may find its claims doubted even when it actually produces hard evidence against the Soviets.

What seems to have happened is that Congress and the White House have been given conflicting interpretations of the available evidence by the various intelligence agencies.

For example, at a recent top-secret Defense Intelligence Agency briefing for Congress, some of the Pentagon experts expressed their opinion that the Soviet Union has been using a newly developed gas that paralyzes its victims. Yet they could offer no evidence of followup attacks by infantry or artillery that would fit the scenario they had worked out.

Meanwhile, Central Intelligence Agency briefings have stressed that there is no hard evidence that will either confirm or belie the allegations of chemical warfare, much less of a new "nerve" gas.

Another region that has produced numerous reports of gas attacks is Southeast Asia. Laotian tribesmen have repeatedly given U.S. representatives detailed accounts of deadly poison gas at-

tacks. But here again, convincing physical evidence has been scant.

"The fact is that there is no physical evidence," a State Department official told my reporter Lucette Lagnado. "The evidence we have is largely circumstantial."

A congressional expert explained: "There will always be doubt until there is an actual canister, or a body, or a physical sample on which chemical tests can be performed with verifiable results. We do not have a body. We did have [evidence]... but it was too old."

In short, the consensus in the intelligence community is that the reports of Soviet gas attacks merit a thorough investigation. Where there's that much smoke, they feel, there may well be a fire — but meanwhile, the United States shouldn't sound the alarm without proof.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
20 May 1980

Britain Pulls TV Film Over 'Security'

LONDON (AP) — A television documentary on British intelligence operations in Hong Kong was canceled an hour before screening last night as a "danger to national security."

The withdrawal was ordered by the Independent Broadcasting Authority, a government-appointed body supervising commercial television.

The IBA said in a statement it asked Granada Television to withdraw the program, which dealt with allegations of corruption and security breaches in the Government Communications Headquarters in the crown colony.

The headquarters, funded by the Foreign Office, is reported to be the

largest British intelligence-gathering operation and monitors communications over the border in China. It has been in the news in recent years when former staffers alleged that Chinese intelligence agents, posing as domestic workers, stole secret documents.

The government resisted demands in the House of Commons last week for an inquiry into the headquarters after press reports of corruption among officials connected with it.

Granada, one of 15 commercial television companies in Britain, filled the time slot with a film on North Sea oil.

Jenny Crick, spokeswoman for the broadcasting authority, said senior

staff decided after a preview that "what was said in the program breached the Official Secrets Act and led to a danger to national security."

An official at Granada responded. "We offered the program in the belief that it was in the public interest, and would help improve national security."

Labor lawmaker and former Cabinet Minister David Ennals deplored the cancellation, which he said "gives weight to the allegation that there is a cover-up operation going on. Moreover, it is a deliberate attack on the freedom of the media."

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CHICAGO TRIBUNE
20 MAY 1980

Top court overturns 'arbitrary' death sentence

By Glen Elsasser

Chicago Tribune Press Service

WASHINGTON—The United States Supreme Court on Monday reversed the death sentence of a Georgia man because the jury arbitrarily decided the murders of his wife and mother-in-law were "outrageously vile, horrible, and inhuman."

NIXON WIRETAP SUITS

THE HIGH court also announced Monday it would decide whether Morton Halperin, a former stiff member of the National Security Council under Henry Kissinger, can sue former officials in the administration of President Richard Nixon for wiretapping his home phone in 1969.

At issue in the case is whether the president and his closest advisers may be held liable for constitutional violations that occur in the president's performance of his official duties.

The Nixon administration had initiated the surveillance because of foreign policy leaks to the news media.

Also Monday the high court denied an appeal by William Kampiles, former CIA clerk here convicted by a Hammond, Ind., jury in 1977 of selling a top secret document to a Soviet agent. Kampiles was sentenced to 40 years in prison.

EXCERPTED

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 27WALL STREET JOURNAL
19 May 1980

The Hearings on Intelligence

Kenneth Adelman's article of April 8, "Intelligence: The Wrong Debate?" contains serious misrepresentations of the work of the Church Committee and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. In his article Mr. Adelman asserts:

"During its relentless raking over of the agency, the Church Committee never once touched upon intelligence analyses and estimates. Nor has its successor, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, held a single hearing on the accuracy of intelligence reports during its three years of existence."

As a former staff member of both committees, I can only conclude that Mr. Adelman has not reached the point of reading the products of either committee. Had he done so, he would have been spared the embarrassment of making inaccurate statements.

To illustrate, Book I of the Church Committee report devoted an entire chapter to "CIA Production of Finished Intelligence" and included a second chapter on the role of the Director of Central Intelligence which addressed his responsibilities as the producer of National Intelligence. Book IV of the Church Committee report, the History of the CIA, devotes considerable attention to the problems and shortcomings of intelligence production and analysis from the CIA's inception to the present.

The published work of the Select Committee has included a report entitled "U.S. Intelligence Performance and the Oil Crisis, 1973-74" as well as an evaluation of the A-Team/B-Team effort. Other classified efforts have been underway. Moreover, public hearings on the quality of intelligence

have accompanied hearings on proposed charter legislation, and through the budgetary process the committee has considered and acted on issues related to intelligence analysis.

ANNE KARALEKAS

Washington

[Mr. Adelman replies:]

The Church Committee did indeed mention the topic of estimates and analyses, but mostly to urge that it be thoroughly investigated. The committee's Final Report said that CIA analyses and estimates "require the most searching and systematic examination by a future oversight committee." Its own findings in the area, which involved the process of estimates rather than the product (i.e. their accuracy), the committee humbly admitted "can only be regarded as a beginning, only broadly indicative of the problems involved and suggestive of the areas which will require more thorough and comprehensive attention in the future."

Such "comprehensive attention in the future" has not been given. As the article stated, the successor committee never held a hearing to examine specifically flaws in analyses and estimate. Some members of the committee have urged such a hearing, but they have been foiled thus far. The committee has issued reports on oil and the Team B experience. But these are reports, not hearings, written by the staff mostly for the staff (and intelligence community) with little senatorial involvement.]

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A15THE BALTIMORE SUN
19 May 1980

The CIA Restrains the SEC

Washington.

FOR THE FIRST TIME in our history (as far as we know), the Central Intelligence Agency has prevailed upon the Securities and Exchange Commission to drop a suit for alleged violations of U.S. laws. On grounds of "national security" the SEC dismissed charges against Page Airways. It is important to look at this case at a time when Congress is considering lifting previously legislated controls on the CIA.

When the CIA was established in 1949 it

By Ralph Nurnberger

was exempted from many forms of congressional supervision, particularly in its covert actions. In addition, the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 excused the agency from seeking regular appropriations, allowing it to receive funds by way of secret transfer from the appropriations of other government agencies.

By the early 1970s, Congress slowly began to look into CIA operations and the need for greater congressional restraints. The Vietnam War and CIA operations in Chile and elsewhere led to the first congressional investigations of U.S. intelligence activities by a Senate committee headed by Frank Church. As a result of the final report of the Church committee, Congress enacted measures to control the activities of the agency, most notably the Hughes-Ryan Amendment.

Those who seek to "restore" the CIA to its pre-1970s role should not draw correlations between the current restraints on the agency and the weakness of the Carter foreign policy. For example, some of these critics feel that the agency was so weakened by congressional action that it could not play an effective role in Iran during and after the shah's fall. This interpretation fails to take into consideration the fact that President Carter may have had quite enough information, but that his misuse of the data led to the current dilemmas.

Another common argument is that the agency has "learned its lessons" and that the time for its accountability to Congress has passed. The Page Airways case shows the fallacy of this reasoning. Last April 8, at the urging of the CIA, the SEC dropped its charges against Page Airways, Inc.; its chief executive, James P. Wilmot; and five other Page executives. Under the terms of the settlement, the company agreed to cease further violations of federal securities laws and conduct an internal investigation of the charges.

At no point during the legal proceedings did the CIA explain to any congressional committee what elements of national security were involved or why the alleged violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act should be ignored.

This was not an ordinary case, nor was Mr. Wilmot an ordinary defendant. Mr. Wilmot has been a leading Democratic fundraiser for years. He has been a major contributor to the campaigns of Senator Daniel Inouye (Hawaii), formerly chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Senator Ernest Hollings (South Carolina), Hubert Humphrey, and House Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill, as well as numerous other Democratic officials. In 1975, Mr. O'Neill interceded with officials at the Department of Housing and Urban Development to speed a decision on \$2.2 million in rent subsidies from HUD for two projects built by Wilmore, Inc., a construction company controlled by Mr. Wilmot. Mr. O'Neill said the action had no connection with the contributions and was something he would have done for "anyone."

In April, 1978, the SEC had filed suit accusing Page executives of defrauding company shareholders by failing to disclose \$2.5 million used to make illegal payments to foreign officials. These included charges that in connection with the sale of jets, Page made questionable payments of \$200,000 to President Albert Bongo of Gabon; \$900,000 to Datuk Harris Ben-Mohammed Salleh, chief minister of the state government of Sabah, Malaysia; \$412,000 to Timothee Ahoua, the Ivory Coast ambassador to the United States; and that Page "disguised the true recipients and amounts involved" in sales to Morocco and Saudi International Airlines. Finally (and most interesting) Page was the American corporation with the closest direct ties to former Ugandan dictator Idi Amin.

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In press accounts Mr. Wilmot even admitted that he gave Amin a Cadillac Eldorado convertible. He insisted the Cadillac was not a bribe; it was merely a "gift," a token of esteem for the leader of a country that had bought two jets from Page, among other dealings. When Amin came to address the United Nations, only Mr. Wilmot and Page vice president Charles Hanner, who incidentally had been named "honorary consul to the United States" by Amin, were on hand to greet him in New York.

Although the American Embassy in Kampala was closed in 1973 and all Americans were urged to leave the country, Mr. Hanner still made more than 25 trips to Uganda and Page pilots continued to fly Amin's planes.

There had been occasions in other countries when Page had acted on behalf of the CIA, and it may be in the national interest to keep these confidential. Still, it is regrettable that the agency used its influence to terminate this case. Barring future developments we will never know the truth of the CIA's interest in Idi Amin's regime nor will the judicial process be allowed to continue. It is equally upsetting that even those congressmen with an interest in this case have been

unable to determine what elements of national security would be jeopardized if the lawyers for Page were asked to prove in court the innocence which Page executives have been so willing to claim in the press.

Thus, while the Hughes-Ryan Amendment probably should be altered so that fewer congressional committees need be informed of covert actions, these measures must be undertaken with great care. The agency can be "revitalized" without granting it unrestricted freedoms or the ability to interfere in the domestic justice system.

Ralph Nurnberger is a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University. As a staff member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Nurnberger handled the committee's inquiry into U.S. relations with Uganda.

ARTICLE APPROVED
ON PAGE 39NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
18 May 1980**TERRORISM****'The next targets—
U.S. citizens'**

For a perspective on world terrorism today, View talked to Ray S. Cline, executive director of the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, former deputy director for intelligence for the Central Intelligence Agency, and author of a new book, "World Power Trends and U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1980s."

Will we see more terrorism in 1980?

Yes, I think we're just at the beginning of the trend. The number of arms and weapons scattered about, the number of units trained, the grievances of PLO and the Libyans and all sorts of other discontented peoples, preyed upon by professional troublemakers—mainly the KGB—build up a reservoir of potential violence, especially in the Middle East. Unfortunately, the United States, and United States citizens, are going to be the targets, more than in the past, because we are so vulnerable. We tend not to know what to do to avoid problems, we tend to dither more when they happen, and we have this absolutely fantastic media capability of making international heroes out of anybody who causes us trouble.

Why is all this happening now?

I believe the heart of the problem is that we are in a rather decisive stage of the geopolitical conflict for influence in the world, especially the Mideast, to dominate political regimes which control the oil resources that are so critical in the common welfare of all the countries. Alternative sources of energy simply are not going to be adequate for the next several years. So I believe we have seen a clear-cut policy of the Soviet Union to strengthen its position in this part of the world and weaken ours. Terrorism is one of the cheap ways to undercut authority and discipline and stability.

The industrial world, the U.S. and its major allies, are going to have to decide whether or not to try to fight some kind of a counter war to occupy these regions and prevent the chaos which would cause an industrial breakdown in Western Europe and Japan.

Do you see that coming?

I'm really very worried about a regional, non-nuclear war which we're very poorly prepared for.

Should we meet violence with violence?

If we have a firm and effective way to make definite steps toward a more stable international order, I reluctantly say that we might have to lose the lives of a lot of Americans in the process.

The law-and-order concept, while discredited to some extent by some people and the way Nixon conducted himself, is a real issue. How do you maintain the human right to live in an orderly society as well as all the other human rights?

Should we negotiate with terrorists?

My general philosophy is not to negotiate on the political level. You can't negotiate a political settlement with a

PLO or some other terrorist organization because they don't have the same goals you do. You negotiate when you have to, under duress, tactically, just as they negotiate with us. You try to disarm them; you try to mislead them; you try to save hostages, and so on. I don't think there's any way to talk to terrorist organizations out of terror.

Why do you feel that we are so vulnerable to terrorism?

I think that we will increasingly become the target because of the importance of our press and media in publicizing the purpose of terrorism and because our relative freedom from violence in this society and our traditions of skepticism about the uses of intelligence have hampered our ability to deal with incidents in the way most other governments do.

Our vulnerability is great because of the openness of our society. We need to know a lot about the kind of people we are dealing with, but we have tended to cripple our intelligence agencies in collecting the kind of information which might protect us against this trend.

We've waffled and talked and Carter has said something about unshackling the CIA, but he put the shackles on. I don't see any change.

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NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
13 May 1980

GLOBAL GUNSLINGERS

WASHINGTON (UPI)—Nearly 600 persons were killed in terrorist attacks during 1979, the highest figure on record, the CIA reports.

The intelligence agency said international terrorist acts decreased from 353 in 1978 to 293 in 1979. But it noted "with alarm" that despite the fewer incidents—the total of nearly 600 victims was the highest since the agency began keeping statistics on international terrorism in 1968.

The highest number of terrorist attacks occurred in 1976—more than 400.

The CIA believes a growing apathy of world opinion to terrorist acts may account for the steep 1979 rise in terrorist victims.

Since 1968, worldwide terrorist acts have claimed 8,641 victims—5,955 wounded and 2,689 killed. The most frequent targets were in the industrialized democracies in Western Europe and North America, followed by Latin America and the Middle East.

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ON PAGE 32

NEW YORK TIMES
17 MAY 1980

Study Sees Oil Promise For Soviet

Findings Clash With the C.I.A.'s

By YOUSSEF M. IBRAHIM

Special to The New York Times

LONDON, May 16 — A Swedish research group has concluded that the Soviet Union has begun a major reform of its oil industry that will enable it to maintain its daily oil production at present high levels and possibly increase output by the end of this decade.

This finding was the principal conclusion of a 260-page study released today by PetroStudies, a Swedish research group based in Malmo that specializes in analyzing Soviet oil and gas industries. The report's conclusions directly contradict American reports, particularly earlier studies released by the Central Intelligence Agency, suggesting that oil production in the Soviet Union has peaked and is declining.

In Stockholm, Western diplomatic sources asked to comment on the PetroStudies findings said the group had no established record. It was begun in 1976 and describes itself as an independent research organization. One diplomatic source in Stockholm characterized the findings as "a very convenient answer to the C.I.A. reports"

and suggested they might have been "fed" to the group as part of a Soviet campaign of misinformation. Other sources in the Swedish capital and in oil circles here said they could neither confirm nor refute these assumptions.

The C.I.A. has argued that the Russians are facing many technical difficulties and has projected that their oil production will fall to around 10 million barrels a day by 1985.

New Oilfields

The Russians are currently producing about 12 million barrels of oil a day. The Swedish study contends that this level will remain steady until the end of the century and might in fact increase to as much as 16 million barrels a day by the end of the decade if the Russians initiate new oilfields. PetroStudies said the economic and administrative reform program took seven years to prepare.

Western and Saudi Arabian oil officials have used the more pessimistic C.I.A. findings to argue that the Russians have aggressive designs on the Persian Gulf region. American oil officials, echoed by the Saudis, have repeatedly suggested in the past few months that the Soviet aim was to put pressure on Gulf producers to sell a portion of the oil that now flows to the West to Communist clients, making up for the anticipated shortfall in Soviet output and the resulting decline in Soviet oil supplies to Eastern European satellites.

The Swedish firm said its research, based on official Soviet Government documents, concluded that the Soviet reform would put an end to what it described as "30 years of systematic underexploitation of oilfields."

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Washington: Prime Target for the KGB

While U.S. intelligence agencies are muzzled, crippled and harassed in their activities by zealous liberals, the Soviet Union's formidable spy network is allowed to function almost with impunity in the Nation's Capital, benefiting from a double standard the Russians can find nowhere else.

By BRYAN LOPS

Although this news may come as scant comfort, the recent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan does seem to have had one healthy consequence: it has made life considerably more difficult for "progressives" and "revolutionaries" who denounce the United States and its allies for violating human rights and interfering in the affairs of other nations who keep silent about the much greater transgressions of the Communist world. But based on what Jeane Kirkpatrick pointed out in a much acclaimed *Commentary* article on "Dictatorships and Double Standards" written early last fall, those who judge foreign affairs by that sort of "progressive" double standard can still look back on the past year or so with a certain amount of satisfaction.

For the fall of the shah of Iran and Nicaragua's President Somoza not only deprived two of their long-time targets of political power, it also freed "progressive" and "revolutionary" energies for a new round of attacks on South Korea, the Philippines, and each and every other flawed regime which happens to be friendly to the United States. And it also, should the "progressives" and "revolutionaries" so desire, free them to redouble their efforts to shape public thinking about the organizations which collect political, military and strategic intelligence about other nations—one area of foreign policy discussion in which their double standards all too frequently seem to reign supreme.

Anyone who doubts that this is the case should lead off by considering the Soviet Union's charge of this past January, complete with documentary photos in *Izvestia* and an indignant note of protest to the State Department, that the "subversive activities of U.S. intelligence services" were to blame for the placement of electronic listening devices in a new apartment building the Soviets have been building to house members of their legation in Washington, D.C. For all its detail, the Soviets' expose contained not the faintest hint of the fact that they have been "bugging" the American Embassy in Moscow on a far greater scale for decades.

While that kind of double standard can perhaps be dismissed as a stock in trade of the Soviets, it can also be seen at work in other, less predictable quarters as well.

Consider, for example, those thousands of "revolutionary" Iranians who were demonstrating on Tcheran's Taleghani Street against the presence of CIA agents in the American Embassy. Anyone waiting for them to travel over to the Soviet Embassy to make the same charges about Soviets engaged in the same type of activity is still waiting. And closer to home, just consider the offerings at any large newsstand. Magazines like *Counterspy* and the *Cov'ert Action Information Bulletin* regularly identify alleged CIA agents and their alleged misdeeds—while the occasional book or article about Soviet spy activities aimed against the West is dismissed by "progressive" opinion as Cold War propaganda concocted by the heirs of Sen. Joe McCarthy (R.-Wis.) himself.

Double Standard Of Lawfulness

In short, although by any objective measure the KGB, the organization which handles the collection of foreign intelligence for the Soviet Union, is far more extensive and ruthless than the CIA, it is not commonly held to the same standards of lawfulness and propriety as the latter. (In fact, were a group of Dr. Andrei Sakharov's friends to attempt to introduce a *samizdat* version of *Counterspy* on the news kiosks in Moscow, they would do well merely to be dispatched by the KGB to one of its famous "psychiatric wards" for political and religious dissidents.)

As America gropes toward a new conception of U.S.-Soviet relations free of the overblown hopes and illusions of the "detente era," it therefore seems to be an ideal time to lay the "intelligence double standard" to rest and to begin to subject the Soviet intelligence apparatus to some of the same type of scrutiny which has been aimed at its American counterpart in recent years.

One reason why this seems necessary is because there is in general so little public awareness of the extent of Soviet intelligence activities within the United States. For even if it is true, as former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was telling us before the Administration adopted its current foreign policy "hard line," that Jimmy Carter and Leonid Brezhnev "have similar dreams and aspirations about the most fundamental issues," the evidence is clear that as far as Brezhnev is concerned the need to curb hostile spy activity on American soil is not one of them.

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John Barron, for example, whose *KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents* (Reader's Digest Press, 1974) remains the definitive general work on the subject, pointed out in January 1978 that since the Nixon-Brezhnev "detente summits" of 1972 the number of Soviet and East European intelligence officers operating in the United States has increased by roughly half to 800. And just the summer before Barron's estimate appeared, the *New York Times* had uncovered the startling news that the Soviets were engaged in eavesdropping on and recording millions of civilian and government long-distance telephone calls with antennas perched atop their embassy and missions in various American cities.

But while there would seem to be little doubt that this is an ideal time to abandon the intelligence double standard by analyzing Soviet spying in the United States, there is no totally obvious locale to focus on.

One might, for example, look to the judgment of those intelligence experts who have known for some time that much Soviet espionage centers around San Francisco and Chicago—the former because of the Soviet consulate there and the latter because of the good opportunities it presents for gathering information on industrial technology. On the other hand, one might take a cue from former U.N. Under Secretary-General for Political and Security Council Affairs Arkady N. Shevchenko, a Soviet citizen who defected to the West in April 1978.

In an interview broadcast in Britain last September, Shevchenko called New York City "the most important base of all Soviet intelligence operations in the world"—largely due to the presence of the 150 professional Soviet spies he estimates use full-time U.N. employment as their "cover."

In the final analysis, however, let us proceed on the not outlandish assumption that Soviet intelligence activities may well be most concentrated and significant in the place where the most American political, military and strategic power is concentrated as well. That leads us inevitably to focus our investigation on Washington, D.C.—and it also gives us a chance to recall two almost forgotten case studies which illustrate the nature and magnitude of the phenomenon we are dealing with.

Perfect Applicant for House Committee

Rep. Paul Findley (R.-Ill.) was very pleased. James Frederick Sattler, the 36-year-old political scientist he was interviewing for the position of minority staff consultant to the International Security and Scientific Affairs subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee, seemed like the perfect applicant. He was personable, his patrons included two former U.S. ambassadors, his writings mirrored Findley's own skepticism about Soviet motives in European disarmament negotiations, his resume sported a connection with the staunchly anti-Communist Coalition for a Democratic Majority, and he had a warm recommendation from the Atlantic Council, the prestigious foreign policy organization where his current job would soon be expiring.

All in all, thought the congressman, Sattler seemed like just the right man for such a sensitive post, and he was eager to hire him. Even though he personally felt that it was rather a waste of time, Findley called the FBI for a routine security check on Sattler after interviewing him on Thursday, Feb. 27, 1975. But what was really on Findley's mind at that point was how his new staffer would be able to prepare for an upcoming foreign policy conference.

However, as the congressman was to discover when three FBI agents paid him an unexpected visit the next afternoon, Sattler's impressive list of credentials omitted one disconcerting fact: he was a spy. Ever since being recruited in Germany eight years before, Sattler had been a paid agent of East German intelligence—an organization which is virtually an auxiliary arm of the KGB—and the FBI was keeping him under close surveillance to see if he was part of a spy ring.

So as not to impede the FBI's investigation, Findley decided to refuse Sattler the job on a pretext, and the likeable political scientist continued his search for a new job. By the following winter he found out about the FBI investigation, and on March 23, 1976, thinking it was a way of protecting himself from prosecution, he filed a rather remarkable statement with the Justice Department's Foreign Agent Registration Section.

In the statement Sattler admitted to

his spy activities—and to the fact that in November 1975 the East Germans had ordered him "to attempt to obtain a position in the United States government with access to classified information."

At this point it should be kept in mind that while the existence of a public "confession" makes the "Sattler case" rather unique, it was by no means the first time an incident of its kind had occurred on Capitol Hill.

One need only turn to an article in *Time* magazine's March 22, 1976, issue, which recalls the not terribly different stories of James Kappus and Kenneth R. Tolliver, two former congressional staffers who claim to have been enlisted by the FBI as double agents after they had already been approached by Soviet intelligence operatives.

Kappus, who worked for former House Armed Services Committee Rep. Alvin E. O'Konski (D.-Wis.) from 1967 to 1970, described how his relationship with a KGB agent using an embassy post as a "cover" gradually escalated from friendly invitations to embassy parties to pointed requests for classified documents from O'Konski's files. Tolliver, meanwhile, who served as an aide to powerful former Sen. James O. Eastland (D.-Miss.) for two years in the late 1960s, claimed that between 1968 and 1974 he was paid nearly \$20,000 by Soviet intelligence for passing along "sensitive" information which had already been examined and cleared by the FBI.

As for Sattler, an interesting footnote to his story is that he apparently did not realize that his Justice Department revelation was a matter of public record. Within a few days after it was filed the government informed the Atlantic Council about its employee's activities, Sattler was fired from his job, the incident was picked up by the press, and the bright young political scientist who had made such a favorable impression on Congressman Findley fled with his wife to Mexico.

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Soviets Charge Their New Embassy 'Bugged'

Anyone who wishes to do some first-hand investigating of the Soviets' recent charge that their new diplomats' living quarters were "bugged" with the connivance of "very high-ranking U.S. authorities" might like to take a short trip between the Soviets' present embassy chancery just down the street from the White House at 1125 16th Street, N.W., and the new embassy complex being constructed on the 12.5-acre site of Washington's former Mount Alto Hospital.

In order to get there our investigator would probably travel along Massachusetts Avenue, a wide, elegant thoroughfare that winds its way through the heart of the city's embassy section as it climbs up a hill to the highest point in the city and meets Wisconsin Avenue. Since this intersection is just three blocks from the new Soviet embassy complex, as our hypothetical visitor walks down the street to take a look at the apartment building in question, he may wish to ponder the fact that the transfer of official Soviet addresses currently underway has been taking place simultaneously with the unmasking of what might well be one of the greatest yet least noticed threats to the civil liberties of the American people in history.

To understand why this may be so, we must refer for background to the mid-1960s, when Soviet personnel known by the U.S. intelligence community to be KGB agents suddenly started turning up at conferences on computer technology held in the United States and other Western nations. On the face of it the motives they gave for Soviet participation in these meetings sounded innocent enough: they merely wanted to introduce computer science to their nation's industry, transportation and communications. But U.S. intelligence experts suspected from the start that their real goal was to use Western know-how to improve the KGB's surveillance system.

By the early 1970s, when most U.S. domestic long-distance telephone calls began to be transmitted by microwave radio signals instead of cables—thus making them vulnerable to electronic interception—the KGB was able to put its newly acquired knowledge to work.

Using the huge antennas on top of the 16th Street chancery in Washington—as well as those on top of Soviet buildings in New York City and San Francisco—Soviet intelligence agents using diplomatic "covers" began eavesdropping on and recording millions of both civilian and government long-distance telephone calls—with particular emphasis on the government side to calls originating in the White House, Pentagon, State Department and Capitol.

Recordings of the calls were then either shipped by tape or relayed by satellite to the Soviet Union, where the KGB's new high-speed computers sorted them out and extracted whatever sensitive information might be present.

No Action on USSR Telephone Espionage

Both the Nixon and Ford Administrations knew about this telephone espionage, but neither took any decisive action aside from studying the matter. According to the *New York Times*, in fact, then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was particularly eager to keep the news about Soviet eavesdropping quiet for fear it might endanger detente. Partly as a result of an in-depth expose by the *Times* during the summer of 1977, however, the whole episode began to emerge from the shadows.

Leading the efforts in this direction was Sen. Daniel P. Moynihan (D.-N.Y.), a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, who publicly lambasted all three administrations involved for their silence on what certainly appeared to be a massive violation of the 4th Amendment right to privacy. "Here we are standing around in the Rose Garden pinning medals on one another for having discovered that the FBI is tapping somebody's telephone," commented Moynihan, "while secretly aware, but unwilling to state, that the Soviet Union is doing the same thing on a scale of what?—one hundred thousand to one?"

Moynihan then proposed a law requiring the President to order foreign officials engaged in violating U.S. internal telephone privacy out of the country. But the Carter Administration took a more passive approach.

At a news conference on July 12, 1977, President Carter—obviously nettled by Moynihan's statements and activities—said that he would not interpret KGB eavesdropping on Americans as an "act of aggression," and declared that steps were being taken to see that sensitive government telephone calls (though not civilian ones) were secure.

In late August 1977, it was revealed that instead of openly confronting the Soviets about the eavesdropping and demanding that it cease, the federal government had for the two previous years been spending \$10 billion in tax money to improve the security of government telephone calls. By December 1977 President Carter was reported to have signed a secret directive increasing both these amounts of money and government assistance to private corporations willing to undertake similar programs on their own, and by March 1979 the Administration was openly admitting that it had established a new Special Projects Office in the Commerce Department's National Telecommunications and Information Administration to direct these activities.

On careful examination the rationale which was offered for the Administration's unwillingness to confront the Soviets about the eavesdropping seems rather weak.

First of all, high-ranking Administration officials argued that the Soviets were primarily interested not in personal telephone calls, but in those likely to contain economic or defense-related information. This, however, still ignored the fact that much personal information is inevitably present even in those types of calls.

Secondly, it was argued that the President did not want to jeopardize U.S. intelligence agencies' eavesdropping inside the Soviet Union. However, it seems unlikely that that effort amounts to very much, since the Soviets are nowhere near as dependent on their rather primitive telephone system as Americans are. And it would in any case be difficult to accomplish a great deal from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, since besides being "bugged" as previously noted, it has for long periods during the past four years been bombarded with Soviet microwaves apparently intended to frustrate any retaliatory American intercept campaign.

Finally, there is the distinct possibility that the Administration's unassertiveness may have been due to the tight secrecy that shrouds the National Security Agency, the intelligence body which uncovered the Soviet operation—and which may well have overstepped the bounds of its charter by listening to the U.S. telephone calls that were being transmitted back to the Soviet Union. Since the NSA has not yet been victimized by the intelligence double standard to the degree that the CIA and FBI have, the idea may have been to "save the NSA" by deflecting attention away from it as much as possible.

Citizens' Privacy vs. NSA's Activities

However much one might sympathize with this argument, it too has its weaknesses. Not only is it presumptuous for government officials to decide to sacrifice the privacy of U.S. citizens for the sake of the NSA, but it seems to be a bad gamble as well. For close public scrutiny of the NSA is eventually bound to come anyway—quite possibly through the efforts of "progressive" investigators who can be counted on to minimize whatever Soviet provocations spurred the NSA activities in the first place.

In any event, as the initial furor about the eavesdropping fades into memory—and as the public still awaits an adequate explanation from the principals involved—the prospects for increased KGB telephone espionage in the Nation's Capital seem bright indeed.

For one thing, since the original public disclosures were made in 1977 the type of public indignation one might have expected the eavesdropping to arouse has conspicuously failed to materialize.

For example, during a "CIA Round Table" discussion sponsored by Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies in March 1978, former CIA Director Richard Helms contrasted the "great public turmoil" which occurs "when the CIA is accused of wiretapping without a warrant" with the "curious indifference in this country to the well-known fact that the Russians are carrying out a massive program of intercepting Americans' telephone conversations—right here!"

Arnold Beichman, moreover, summarizing in the September-October 1979 *Freedom at Issue* the papers presented at a recent Washington colloquium on "intelligence requirements for the 1980s," noted that former CIA covert action and counterintelligence chief Hugh Tovar had emphasized that the official Soviet presence in Washington "pursues its clandestine objectives with minimal interference, and is not in the least embarrassed by the recent charges of Sen. Moynihan that the Soviet Mission is engaged in an enormous intercept operation within the Nation's Capital."

Aside from this general public lack of concern, another boon to the Soviets, outlined in detail by John Barron in the December 1979 *Reader's Digest*, is nothing less than the site of the new Soviet Embassy itself. For because Mount Alto not only towers over practically all microwave transmitters and receivers in the Washington area but also provides an unobstructed line of sight into numerous federal government offices, it is the ideal Washington location for electronic eavesdropping. And the Soviets have known it for some time.

That is why, after the Soviets persuaded an initially reluctant U.S. government in the late 1960s to provide them directly with a site for a new embassy and diplomatic living quarters so that they would not have to buy the land on the open market, they listed their "specifications" for a location in such a way that only Mount Alto would meet them. Fully aware of the potential value of Mount Alto for intelligence purposes, the NSA, the Defense Department, and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board jointly did all they could to persuade the Nixon Administration not to accede to the Soviets' request, but in the interests of promoting international cooperation their protests were overruled.

Construction of the new diplomatic complex thus began with little public notice, and even today, since the only sign at the entrance to the site is its

street number of 2650 Wisconsin Avenue, N.W., it is unlikely that any uninformed passer-by realizes just what is being constructed. And while the Soviets' charge that the apartment building recently completed on the site was "bugged" at least raises the faint possibility that the Carter Administration has been taking steps to neutralize some of the Soviet espionage activity envisaged for the new complex, the whole broader issue of the eavesdropping remains clouded and uncertain. But if any single incident seems to point out the need for the United States to take a less compliant attitude toward the Soviet Union in the future, this would seem to be the one.

Shuttered Windows Conceal 'Referentura'

Another feature of both the present Soviet Embassy chancery and the new apartment building is certain to catch the eye of the perspicacious observer: namely, the fact that all the windows are blocked out, whether by shutters or blinds. One can easily conclude that at least one of the purposes of the louvered shutters on the present chancery is to keep prying eyes away from that floor of the building which contains the KGB Residence or *Referentura*, a section of rooms which according to numerous Soviet defectors is the same in Soviet embassies the world over. The *Referentura*, to which even most Soviet ambassadors do not have access, is where KGB activities in the immediate geographic area are conceived and administered, and it is guarded with the tightest security.

To a certain extent, of course, the Soviets have always been wary about letting foreigners see too much about what goes on inside their embassies: a second secretary of their Washington embassy, for example, has openly admitted to this writer that while the U.S. Embassy in Moscow employs locals as translators, chauffeurs, and the like, everybody who works in the Soviet Embassy in Washington is a Soviet citizen. But in the case of the *Referentura*, the security is absolute, and the staff which guards it can leave the embassy grounds only in a group containing armed security personnel. This is no surprise, since if they defected they undoubtedly would be able to supply American officials with a neat "who's who" among the 40 to 65 per cent of official Soviet diplomatic personnel in the United States which U.S. intelligence experts estimate are agents of either the KGB or Soviet military intelligence.

As high as this percentage may seem at first glance, it becomes easier to comprehend once one recognizes the different role that intelligence plays in the Soviet Union's totalitarian police state and in America's constitutional democracy. But unfortunately it is precisely that understanding that is hard to find in much current writing about intelligence matters.

For even among those too sophisticated to accept the "progressives'" double standards, there is a highly misleading tendency to treat the KGB and the CIA merely as different national variations of the same phenomenon.

For example, when this writer went to the present Soviet chancery during the summer of 1978 and asked Second Secretary Aleksandr A. Kukhar what he thought of the frequent allegations of widespread spying among the Soviet diplomatic corps, his quick response—after he took a long puff on a cigarette and gently reminded this writer that he and his colleagues do not like "that type of propaganda"—was the question: "Do you know how many CIA agents work in the American Embassy in Moscow?"

A less predictable sample of basically the same attitude could be seen in a review of John Barron's *KGB* written several years ago by the well-known British spy novelist John leCarre. Arguing that "as I once wrote in a novel, it is essential, when drawing comparisons, to compare method with method, not method with ideology," leCarre went on to add that based upon the evidence both in Barron's book and in an expose of the CIA co-authored by a disaffected former agent, "there is nothing to choose between the two services when it comes to method, except that the Russians seem marginally better at it, as usual."

To a certain extent leCarre obviously had a point, since at least in the course of their foreign activities both the CIA and KGB do use eavesdropping, informers, double agents, concealed microphones, and all the rest.* But by ignoring ideology both leCarre and Second Secretary Kukhar failed to take into account the political context in which both the KGB and the CIA operate—a context which profoundly colors the way they view such concepts as accountability and human rights.

For regardless of what one may think about any past abuses committed by either the CIA (which, it must always be kept in mind, is just the foremost of a number of American agencies charged with gathering foreign intelligence)

or by the KGB, the primary body charged with gathering domestic intelligence pertaining to internal security, he cannot deny that today they both respect the American democratic tradition of operating within the constraints of the legal code, judicial review, and the oversight of various congressional committees.

The KGB, by contrast, known officially as the Committee for State Security (*Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti*), is first and foremost a political organization which directs both foreign and domestic intelligence gathering in a way that will help promote the Soviet leadership's version of Marxist-Leninist ideology. Because of this—and also because it couples its intelligence functions with preliminary powers to investigate "crimes against the state"—the KGB is in effect the highest embodiment of Soviet totalitarianism. And totalitarianism, however much those "enlightened" political scientists who shy away from the term today might like to forget it, remains a system which reduces "the government" into the passive administrative arm of an all-powerful political party, and transforms government constraints into minor impediments which may be flouted at the party's will.

KGB Controlled by Central Committee

Accordingly, although up until 1978 the official Soviet "line" was that the KGB was subordinate to the Council of Ministers, the Soviet Union's top government body, it has been common knowledge among Western intelligence experts for years that it actually takes its orders from the Administrative Organs Department of the Soviet Communist party's Central Committee Secretariat. The Administrative Organs Department in turn implements the policies laid down by the 15-member party Politburo—the chairmanship of which (and not his simultaneous occupancy of the Soviet presidency) automatically makes Leonid Brezhnev the No. 1 figure in the Soviet collective leadership.

Although 65-year-old Yuri V. Andropov, a Politburo member and director of the KGB since 1973, is not one of the more admirable figures in the Kremlin hierarchy—as ambassador to Budapest during the Hungarian Freedom Fighters' uprising of 1956, he is widely "credited" with having lured the leaders of the rebellion to the Soviet Embassy so that they could be rounded

up—by the KGB, the primary body charged with gathering domestic intelligence pertaining to internal security, he cannot deny that today they both respect the American democratic tradition of operating within the constraints of the legal code, judicial review, and the oversight of various congressional committees. —he did perform a real intellectual service not too long ago when he neatly summarized the KGB's role as preventing "ideological sabotage." This, in short, means trying to stop anyone and anything at home and abroad that stands in the way of the Soviet Communist party's objectives.

As Andropov further explained at a February 1979 "election meeting" in Moscow, KGB agents "have not given and will never give anybody the right to act to the detriment of socialism, for which triumph they give up so many lives and put in so much work."

This clearly political task is carried out through a network of professional agents and *stukachi* (informers) which not only dwarfs the CIA and FBI in size* but which has so thoroughly penetrated every institution in Soviet society that its assaults on the U.S. Congress and U.S. internal telephone privacy seem like child's play by comparison.

Known colloquially to most Russians as *gebists*, the men and women of the KGB are found stationed in every office, every apartment building, every factory, and every collective farm in the Soviet Union. This list, it should be stressed, also includes every formal government body, which helps to explain the 40 to 65 per cent penetration of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Washington diplomatic corps.

Invariably Communist party members, those *gebists* not engaged in the collection of foreign intelligence, make it their business to inform their superiors about those of their fellow citizens suspected of having committed "crimes against the state," a category which may include espionage, dissemination of "anti-Soviet" propaganda, illegal border crossing, and a whole spectrum of "economic crimes" such as black-marketeering, currency speculation, or unauthorized private enterprise—the last of which is often punishable by death.

As for contemporary examples of the KGB's handiwork, any careful reader of a good daily newspaper is bound to be able to cite a few: the harassment of Dr. Andrei Sakharov and Alexander Solzhenitsyn before the first was internally exiled and the second was forcibly deported; the summer 1978 sentencing to between eight and 15 years' imprisonment of three dissidents who formed "Helsinki Watch" committees to monitor Soviet compliance with the Helsinki Accords; the conviction and sentencing to 13 years imprisonment of Anatoly Scharansky on "treason" charges during the same period; and the previously mentioned use of incarceration in psychiatric wards to help "cure" religious dissidents.

One of those currently undergoing such "treatment," to cite a typical case, is a 50-year-old Russian Orthodox nun, Valeria Makeyeva, who was convicted of "engaging in prohibited trade" after her convent was closed down and she tried to support herself by selling Christians canvas belts embroidered with words from the 90th Psalm.

If anything, the Kremlin's sudden decision at the end of January to strip Dr. Andrei Sakharov of his state honors and to send him into internal exile made the proof ever more conclusive that the KGB's activities against such "enemies of the state" were being intensified so as not to frustrate the party leadership's desire to present a harmonious facade of national unity at the projected Moscow Summer Olympics.

This past November Amnesty International's *Newsletter* had already noted, for example, how one dissident whose case was to have been reviewed in February 1979 was told that "until the Olympic Games have taken place, there can be no rush in your case," while shortly before Sakharov's exile Amnesty's director of research had pointed out that the heavy wave of arrests and convictions since last fall had indicated that "instead of releasing a lot of people for the Olympics," the Soviet authorities had decided to "arrest the most informative and influential dissenters and starve public opinion of information."

(Interestingly, although back in 1974 and 1975, the *New York Times* showed little hesitation in printing often very poorly substantiated charges about past CIA abuses, it "killed" a Red Smith sports column citing the recent KGB crackdown as reason for a U.S. boycott of the Summer Olympics on the grounds that Smith was using reports based on unsubstantiated error.)

Bloody Past of Soviet Intelligence

In any event, those analysts transfixed by the way in which the Soviet Union has "liberalized" in recent years can and would point out that none of the above KGB activities, however deplorable, even remotely compare with the persecution and murder of millions which took place when its forerunners the OGPU, NKVD, and NKGB functioned above even Communist party control as personal terrorist instruments of Stalin.

And to a certain point such analysts would be right. For example, Amnesty International's rough estimate of the number of Sovi

a major 1975 report was "only" 10,000—not including those confined to mental hospitals.* Similarly, contrary to what was the case in the past, when the KGB investigates "crimes against the state" today, it is required to act within the bounds of written regulations enforced by the procuracy, an elite corps of legal officials which has been in charge of supervising the administration of Russian laws since the days of Peter the Great.

Yet in spite of all of this, Prof. Leonard Schapiro of the London School of Economics, one of the world's leading Sovietologists, observes that even this primitive system of restraints "is, to say the least, precarious." As Schapiro points out: "The procurators, as Soviet writers repeatedly stress, are under general party control and are bound first and foremost to carry out the policy of the party. If the policy of the party requires or endorses illegal action towards an individual the procurator will afford him no protection."

Agrees that the human rights climate has improved in the Soviet Union since Stalin "due less to any improvement in the law, than to the tolerance by the party...of greater observation of the law," Schapiro nevertheless adds: "It can properly be objected that so long as the party retains the power of circumventing or influencing the administration of the law, all law is tolerated law and no more; and 'tolerated law' is not really law at all, since law can only flourish where it exists as of right."

In short, under a system in which the protection of human rights against the secret police depends on the whims of the party leaders in the Kremlin, it is anyone's guess what kind of KGB horrors they would be prepared to tolerate if they detected any genuine threat to the party's ability to dominate virtually every aspect of Soviet society.

U.S. Open Society vs. Soviet Espionage

In a conversation with columnist James Reston of the *New York Times*, the late Jean Monnet once said that when a country as open and democratic as the United States tries to engage in secret intelligence activity, it finds the whole enterprise so foreign to its normal way of doing things that the drawbacks eventually seem to outweigh the gains. Leaving aside the logic behind this proposition—which is highly debatable—it is certainly true that America's open nature makes it a far more difficult task to curb Soviet espionage, and this is more so than ever

For unlike the unresolved matter of the Soviets' telephone intercept operation, much Soviet spy activity in the Nation's Capital consists simply of rather pedestrian efforts to take advantage of America's openness. It consists, in other words, simply of the collection of political intelligence, a category which ranges from the information contained in any and all government and non-government publications to random chitchat about staff or bureaucratic infighting that Soviet intelligence agents may pick up in casual conversations with Americans.

While no one should underestimate the significance of this type of information—after being transmitted back to a body like Moscow's Institute for the Study of the U.S.A. and Canada, it might aid the Soviets considerably in interpreting more sensitive data—since it is theoretically available to everyone, its collection by the Soviets is probably an unavoidable cost of an open society. And according to various stories which periodically appear in the national press, the KGB apparatus in the capital wastes no effort in exploiting this to the fullest.

In August 1977, for example, Rowland Evans and Robert Novak reported in their column how two alarmed Congressional Research Service defense analysts fired off to their supervisor a memo complaining about lax security procedures after a third secretary of the Soviet Embassy suspected of KGB connections turned up at Deck A of the Library of Congress requesting an unpublished comparison of U.S.-Soviet military strength.

And during summer 1978, Rep. Robert H. Michel (R.-Ill.) noted on the op-ed page of the *New York Times* that the only observer at an important defense appropriation subcommittee hearing open to the public was one of the Soviets' military attaches—who may, like all Soviet foreign military attaches, be assumed to have been an agent of the GRU (*Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravleniye*), the military intelligence service which functions more or less as an appendage of the KGB.

Were this all that Soviet espionage in Washington amounted to, aside from the telephone eavesdropping, there might seem little cause for worry. However, such is not the case.

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For one thing, the Soviets' collection of political intelligence is by no means always so overt. For example, both the previously cited 1976 *Time* article on Capitol Hill espionage and a 1975 Jack Anderson column mentioned the tiny electronic listening device discovered in 1973 when it dropped out of a slit cut in the lining of a chair in the hearing room of the House International Relations Committee.

The device, immediately shipped off to the FBI for observation by the then committee chairman, Rep. Thomas E. Morgan (D.-Pa.), was eventually traced to the Soviets, thus raising the prospect that the Washington KGB Residency had been listening in on closed-door committee discussions of such matters as the SALT I negotiations and the Vietnam withdrawal.

Since John Barron notes in the December 1979 *Reader's Digest* that it would be extremely easy from the heights of the Mount Alto embassy complex for the Soviets to activate tiny listening devices called cavity resonators placed in offices across town, the incidence of this type of Soviet "bugging" in the capital could well increase in the future.

Another reason why the Soviets' collection of political intelligence takes on a new light is because the number of agents engaged in it differs from what it might seem to be at first glance. Actually the number is much higher than the roughly 110 to 180 agents we would expect to be talking about if we applied the "40 to 65 per cent" rule mentioned earlier to the 143 members of the official Soviet community whose names appear in the State Department's August 1979 *Diplomatic List* and the 137 Soviets named in the State Department's October 1979 compilation of "Employees of Diplomatic Missions Not Printed in the Diplomatic List." *

Part of this increase can be attributed to the fact that nobody really knows how many members of that shadowy community of agents known as KGB "illegals" may be stationed in Washington. Having entered the United States with false identities and forged or illegally obtained documents, "illegals" have no directly traceable KGB connections, and their identification thus poses a major challenge to U.S. intelligence officers. However, the other three main explanations for the swollen size of the Soviets' Washington "intelligence corps" are direct consequences of the all too frequently ignored political context in which the KGB operates.

Pervasive Power Of the KGB

The first explanation is that because the Soviet Union's totalitarian structure means that the Communist party and its watchdogs dominate every institution in society, the KGB benefits from the services of numerous bodies which in the U.S. are private and are prevented either by law or their own internal policies from cooperating with the CIA or the FBI.

One such organization is the Soviets' Aeroflot national airline, located just down the street from the current Soviet Embassy chancery, whose headquarters in Washington and elsewhere around the world have been cited by John Barron and many other intelligence experts as noted havens for agents of the GRU. In the summer of 1978 the State Department reported that the Soviets' Aeroflot office employed not only two full-time Soviet professionals, but also numerous other Soviets who happen to be in the country for other reasons—as well as a number of diplomats' wives.

A still more formidable addition to the KGB's Washington resources is found in the capital's corps of Soviet journalists. Because of the high priority the Soviet party leadership places on total, tight control of the mass media, these "journalists" are, in effect, full-fledged employees of the Soviet Communist party. And William A. Branigan, who from 1951 to 1976 was in charge of FBI counterintelligence focusing on the KGB, has told this writer that the percentage of Soviet journalists who engage in espionage work is considerably higher than the normal percentage figure for diplomats.

It is certainly not difficult to see why the KGB would find the journalists' services attractive, since once they are armed with their press passes they have extraordinarily easy access to spoken and written political intelligence. And unlike U.S. foreign correspondents in Moscow, they do not have to contend with government censors or *stukachi* doing clerical work in their offices.

This writer was not, therefore, particularly surprised to discover that four of the names on a July 1978 State Department list of the 13 Soviet journalists in Washington also appear on the lengthy list of "Soviet Citizens Engaged in Clandestine Operations Abroad" found in the back of John Barron's *KGB*. According to past news accounts, however, it is one of the nine whose names did not appear on Barron's list, *Izvestia's* veteran Washington correspondent Yuri Barsukov, who is most prominently involved in Soviet intelligence work on Capitol Hill.

Described once by columnists Jack Anderson and Les Whitten as "a human vacuum cleaner who collects press releases, congressional reports, military and foreign policy documents and every scrap of paper he can find on Capitol Hill," when asked by this writer over the telephone if he had any comment about such allegations Barsukov simply responded: "No, I have no comment to make about that at all."

The second factor which increases the size of the Washington KGB network is the Soviet Union's ability to maintain tight control over its satellites. For as the Sattler case illustrated, intelligence experts both in the United States and abroad are convinced that not only the East German but the Cuban, Polish, Czech, Hungarian and Bulgarian intelligence services function as appendages of the KGB, using the same kind of diplomatic and journalistic "covers" and essentially the same tactics; according to a February 1979 report in the *Christian Science Monitor*, in fact, the head of the East German intelligence service holds dual citizenship with the Soviet Union.

Unlike allied intelligence services, which cooperate closely with the CIA but zealously and often jealously guard their independence, Soviet-bloc "satellite services" are openly subordinated to the KGB by a variety of techniques. Among these are the presence of KGB "advisers" at their headquarters who have access to any data they wish; the penetration of these agencies by covert agents whose first loyalty is to the KGB; their receipt of orders based on policy directives transmitted from the Soviet Communist party's Central Committee (the body directly below the Politburo) to the Central Committees of their own national parties; and orders they frequently receive from the KGB to perform missions it would be inconvenient or embarrassing for the Soviets to be directly associated with.

Satellites Aid USSR Intelligence

As was the case with the Soviet journalists, the exploits of the KGB's satellite auxiliaries have too from time to time been brought to light.

For example, a non-government expert who asked not to be identified told the *New York Times* in November 1977 he believed that the Poles, the Czechs, and the East Germans were intercepting U.S. telephone calls along with the Soviets. And one of the more interesting stories in John Barron's *KGB* was his account of how the Czechs, noted for their skill in spreading fabricated "disinformation," pass along the Christmas cards their embassy receives from prominent Americans so that the signatures can be used on KGB forgeries of "sensitive" U.S. government documents containing material designed to sow discord between the United States and the governments of other countries.

As for an indication of the manpower involved in "satellite service" activities, if we use the figures supplied at a 1975 Senate hearing by Joseph Frolik, a defector who served with Czech intelligence for 17 years, we can estimate that around 20 of the diplomats and non-diplomatic employes at the Czech Embassy at 3900 Linnean Ave., N.W., are indirectly at the disposal of the KGB.

(In addition, since the United States has not "normalized" relations with Cuba, the official Cuban presence at 2630 16th Street, N.W., is referred to as the "Cuban Interests Section of the Czechoslovakian Embassy," and it is common knowledge that a high proportion of its nine diplomatic employes work for the Cuban intelligence service, the DGI.)

The Church Committee Report therefore felt justified in concluding that "in aggregate" the capabilities of the Soviet-bloc services "approaches that of the Soviet intelligence services," and thus represents "a significant enhancement of the already formidable capabilities of the KGB and GRU."

The third and final reason why the Washington KGB network has ballooned in size stems from the Soviets' systematic if somewhat cynical use of the cultural, scientific, commercial and other Soviet exchange groups which frequently begin and end their tours in the Nation's Capital. Largely because

worthy instruments for promoting international understanding, their number has increased as a result of various agreements stemming from the "detente summits" of 1972.

The number of Soviets visiting the United States as participants hence mushroomed from 6,344 in 1972 to roughly 12,000 in 1977, and during 1979, 60,000 Soviet and Soviet-bloc citizens are estimated to have made short-term American trips. But since the Soviet delegations on the programs are organized and constituted from start to finish by the Soviet government at the behest of the Soviet Communist party, it is actually no surprise that they have become instruments of the party's foreign intelligence strategy.

The inkling that this is the case actually did surface to public consciousness last August with the numerous rumors that the reason why the wife of defecting Bolshoi ballet star Alexander Godunov returned to the Soviet Union was because she was a KGB agent or informer charged with keeping an eye on her "unreliable" spouse. John Barron has also illustrated the problem of the exchange groups with another interesting story in the January 1978 *Reader's Digest*.

After noting that "virtually every Soviet scientific or cultural delegation visiting the United States contains KGB agents," Barron recalled an episode recounted by Mark Perakh, a Soviet scientist who emigrated to Israel. Perakh noted how one colleague about to depart for the United States on a scientific exchange group was given special memory training by the KGB to enable him to extract as much information about American scientific laboratories as possible. According to Perakh, when the scientist returned home he admitted that his intelligence assignment had been so time-consuming that he had not had time to do anything else on the trip.

One particularly useful adjunct to Soviet intelligence capabilities has been the Soviet-American student exchange program, whose Soviet participants have in recent years made Washington the first stop on their academic-year-long journey.

William Branigan, whose former FBI counterintelligence colleagues have in recent years done battle with State Department officials over what they consider the latter's reluctance to cooperate in denying visas to prospective Soviet visitors known to have KGB links, has told this writer that U.S. intelligence officers have always been intrigued by the contrast between the Soviet and American students involved in the program.

The Americans invariably are students of the humanities in their early 20s, while the Soviets are just as often science students in their mid- and late 30s. It therefore hardly seems surprising that the Church Committee Report pointed out that the FBI had identified over 100 KGB and GRU agents among the 400 Soviet students who took part in the program between 1964 and 1974.

Thus far our analysis of the Washington KGB network has dealt only with Soviet and Soviet-bloc personnel, but to stop at that point would be highly misleading. For both captured KGB documents and incidents like the Sattler affair have left no doubt that the KGB and its satellite auxiliaries place a high priority on recruiting American agents who can penetrate both the lower and higher reaches of important American public and private institutions. By no means a subject for idle speculation or wild allegations—even though knowledgeable Washingtonians whisper about it all the time—this penetration effort constitutes one of the most formidable if murkiest challenges the United States faces in international affairs. And a brief review of its nature thus seems appropriate.

Two Types of KGB Recruitments

Broadly speaking, those Americans the KGB does succeed in recruiting fall into two categories. First of all there are those new agents who can supply the Soviets and their allies with information considered too sensitive even for "open America" to leave privy to overt collection. The Church Committee Report, for example, noted that "a 1959 Soviet directive which was reaffirmed as recently as 1975 states that 'great attention' should be given to the recruitment of U.S. agents who have 'access to encrypted and other secret correspondence, such as code clerks, secretaries and typists.'" And a vivid if aborted view of how just such an operation could take place was provided late

ty officer in the Pentagon stuffed a "top secret" report entitled "USSR/Warsaw Pact General Indicator List" down his trousers, walked out of the Pentagon, and then handed this document over just as he had six others to an interested "contact" who paid him \$700—and who also turned out to be an undercover FBI agent.

The second group of KGB recruits includes those categorized by U.S. intelligence officials as "agents of influence." Far removed indeed from the rather sordid business of stealing documents, these agents simply try whenever they have the opportunity to shape political decisions and events in a way favorable to the aims of Soviet foreign policy.

Performing their "services" from within the worlds of government, journalism, business, labor, and even the arts, KGB agents of influence are undoubtedly the KGB resource that best eludes identification and appraisal. For as they are being cultivated by KGB personnel trained specially for the purpose, the agents of influence themselves sometimes are not aware of the intelligence background of their contact, and in fact the "agreement" by which the KGB secures their willingness to promote the Soviet cause is often so informal that it enables them to retain both their loyalty to the United States and their freedom to follow their own conscience in the event their views and Soviet ones do not coincide.

Immense Possibilities For KGB Infiltration

Similarly, the "payment" they receive from the KGB cannot be measured in terms of dollars but rather in intangibles such as favorable Soviet publicity and special communications channels to the Kremlin leadership. But all of this notwithstanding, they must still be considered agents because the KGB regards them as such.

It hardly needs to be added that the concentration of political power in Washington makes the opportunities for KGB and "satellite service" penetrations immense. And so, it appears, are Soviet and Soviet-bloc ambitions to exploit them.

for example, former Czech intelligence agent Joseph Frolik noted that while the "principal targets" of the "political group" of the Czech intelligence *Referentura* in Washington were "the Pentagon, the White House, the State Department, the National Security Council, and the Department of Defense," its targeting encompassed the much broader ground of "the U.S. Congress, the U.S. Government/White House; all ministries and independent agencies; the Republican party, the Democratic party; all other small political parties except the Communist party; all of the more important mass organizations such as the AFL-CIO, the NAACP, the Civil Liberties Union, etc."

This is, to put it mildly, a mind-boggling list, but amid those institutions included on it there seem to be three in which the state of KGB penetration efforts seems particularly worth reviewing.

The first of these, as the Sattler, Tolliver and Kappus incidents at the beginning of this article would suggest, is the U.S. Congress. A *Newsweek* article of June 26, 1978, noted that it was the KGB's attention to the resources of congressional committees which had helped make Capitol Hill "a prime target for Soviet operatives," while the 1976 *Time* piece cited earlier mentioned "more than a dozen cases in the past decade" in which the FBI had decided that a relationship it was aware existed between the KGB and a key congressional staffer had gone on long enough, at which time the FBI stepped in either to terminate it or—as Tolliver claimed—to enlist the staffer as a double agent.

The FBI itself, which has learned about KGB approaches from the staffers but whose policy otherwise is to report them directly to the senator or representative the staffer works for, has claimed both in the *Time* article and elsewhere that it knows of no current congressional penetrations or of any "unsanitized" information having been passed along to the Soviets. But the Church Committee Report did stress that "the FBI has advised the Committee that there have been instances in the past where hostile foreign intelligence officers have used the opportunity presented by overt contacts to attempt to recruit members of congressional staffs who might have access to secret information."

to remain a high infiltration priority of the KGB, as one prominent Washington intelligence expert has told this writer, is because, aside from certain special committee procedures like the one that uncovered Sattler's background, it lacks a general security program for congressional personnel. And given the great power which staff members quite frequently amass on Capitol Hill—cited in the *Time* account as the main reason why KGB agents do not bother with the senators or representatives themselves—it is easy to envisage the benefits a strategically placed agent of influence could bring through his impact on research activities, his power to leak information to the press, and his ability to in effect "stage-manage" hearings through the "advice" he gave to the busy congressman he was working for.

The second site of potential penetration efforts which should be considered is the CIA itself. For since 1978 in particular, Washington has been filled with rumors that a KGB "mole" has burrowed deep into the high reaches of the agency. Viewed simply on a hypothetical basis it is, of course, easy to imagine the damage a "mole" could inflict by promoting policy positions that would tend to lower the morale of the U.S. intelligence community, corroborating the stories of Soviet "defectors" who are actually double agents, and spreading "disinformation" about Soviet motives and plans.

And indeed, some skeptical observers, doubting that a real "mole" would have been able to survive CIA security procedures this long, have maintained that the recent rumors must not be elevated above just such a hypothetical level. They feel that those who talk most freely about there being a "mole"—many of them former CIA and FBI counterintelligence officials who have left during the many voluntary and involuntary shifts of personnel during the past five years—are simply raising it as a specter of what could well happen unless the intelligence agencies can once again generate the wide public and congressional support they once had. During the 1978 "CIA Round Table" discussion cited earlier, moreover, CIA Director Stansfield Turner's three most recent predecessors all seemed dubious about the "mole" thesis, although they did not discount the possibility of some penetration at the edges of the agency.

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Nevertheless, in various forms the speculation and circumstantial evidence continue to mount. As noted above, some of those who have left the CIA in recent years are convinced that its counterintelligence capabilities have dwindled to the point that a KGB infiltrator must have had a hand in the process. As a logical point, moreover, it has been argued that since the British, West German and Canadian intelligence services—among other Western ones—have been deeply and seriously penetrated in the past, it is naive to suggest that somehow the CIA has been immune.

Russian 'Mole' In the CIA?

In addition to these arguments there are three more concrete pieces of evidence which have surfaced during the past year and a half.

First of all, for a number of complex reasons it has recently seemed more likely that a KGB officer who defected to the West in late 1961 and did report that there was a "mole" operating in the CIA's covert operations arm was telling the truth.

Secondly, in early 1978 a 23-year-old CIA junior clerk who sold the Soviets a copy of the operational manual for a crucial U.S. spy satellite covered up his crime so ineptly that suspicion mounted that he had either exposed himself or had been exposed in order to protect a Soviet agent higher up in the agency.

Finally, in autumn 1978 a retired CIA analyst who had contributed to the manual which had been sold and who was at the time working on highly sensitive agency projects as a consultant, mysteriously disappeared from a boat equipped with a highly sophisticated radio set and was later found dead in Chesapeake Bay with weights tied around his middle and a bullet wound behind his ear.

As all of these events unfolded, both former CIA Director Richard Helms and former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger were quoted as speculating that it would be unwise to reject the "mole" thesis out of hand, and for the present enough Washingtonians seem to share their disquiet that chances are good that it will not be.

The third KGB penetration target that bears special watching are the news media, particularly those headquartered in Washington. Once again, of course, it requires little imagination to think of just how much impact a strategically placed agent of influence could have in the world of broadcast and print journalism, slanting some news stories, suppressing others, and, if he or she was powerful enough, influencing who rose where in the journalistic hierarchy.

In fact, since it is generally conceded these days that the development of technology and the decline of strong political parties have combined to give the news media more and more power to inform and influence the public, it might even be said that KGB penetrations of the journalistic world could be more dangerous than those in either Congress or the CIA. But what cannot be disputed is that for a number of special reasons the news media seem to be the most vulnerable institution of the three.

The first reason concerns the type of cultivating, cajoling and sheer bravado broadcast and print journalists have to engage in in order to permeate the cloak of party-managed propaganda and find out just what really is going on in closed societies like the Soviet Union.

As a result, they may easily become dependent on such "news sources" as Soviet diplomats and journalists who may well be KGB agents skilled in manipulating such professional relationships to spread Soviet propaganda or even to extract information in return for "scoops" or "inside information" about current Soviet affairs.

The evidence that so many of the Soviet journalists in Washington are engaged in intelligence work provides an indication that the Soviets are fully aware of this. And the twisted, tragic story of suburban Washington resident Sam Jaffe, a former ABC News Moscow correspondent who last August was accused by the FBI of being a KGB agent of influence, illustrates the personal dilemmas involved in vivid detail.

Jaffe's problems seem to have stemmed, basically, from the "unauthorized" social contacts he had with Russians during his Moscow years after he had already worked with the FBI in the United States and had already agreed to supply information

about the Russians he met to the CIA. Through a succession of events Jaffe was introduced to and saw more and more of a Moscow news contact nicknamed "Slava," a Soviet official who openly admitted to Jaffe that he was working for the KGB.

"It was," as Philip Hilts wrote in a long *Washington Post* analysis of the "Jaffe affair" last fall, "a conventional reporter-and-government source relationship, except that the players were simultaneously wired up to opposing intelligence agencies." Even though Jaffe dutifully reported to the CIA during the course of his relationship with "Slava," other evidence convinced U.S. intelligence officials that Jaffe had turned into a KGB agent of influence, and although Jaffe—who has vigorously denied the charge—has a letter from the CIA clearing him of suspicion, the FBI apparently remains unconvinced. Citing "the possibility that [Jaffe] could be used by other foreign officials," it refused last summer to release FBI files Jaffe had requested in order to resolve the matter and bolster his denials.

Another reason why the news media are so susceptible to KGB penetration is because newspapers, magazines and broadcast companies are so reluctant to institute security measures to examine the backgrounds of their employees.

While in light of America's free press tradition this is perfectly understandable, it also means that determined foreign intelligence operatives would potentially have a free hand in their penetration efforts.

Reed Irvine of the Washington-based media watchdog group Accuracy in Media has pursued this matter and has wrung admissions from such figures as the president of CBS News and the chairman of the board of the *Washington Post* that their organizations have no specific protective measures to guard against KGB infiltration.

At the *Post*'s shareholders' meeting in May 1978, in fact, Board Chairman Mrs. Katharine Graham, after stating that prospective *Post* employees are questioned about their background, dismissed one of Irvine's inquiries with the comment: "I am also sure that the editors of this company's newspaper are not disloyal to their country." Yet as annoying as Irvine's query may have seemed to Mrs. Graham at the time, an unclassified 1978 CIA report prepared at the request of the House Select Committee on Intelligence indicates that more than good faith is likely to be necessary in order to guard against KGB manipulation of the U.S. news

The specific evidence mentioned in the report was a United States visit in early 1978 by what was ostensibly a delegation of "parliamentarians" from the Supreme Soviet, the two-chamber government body which elects the Soviet Union's Council of Ministers.

The report noted that the delegation, which visited newspapers and radio stations in several American cities, just happened to include the Communist party officials who serve as the leading executors of the international arm of the Soviet propaganda apparatus, whose major operations are well known to be examined and approved by the Politburo itself. "It is apparent," concluded the report about the "parliamentarians'" objectives, "that one purpose of their mission was to determine major concerns of American opinion makers, as well as the susceptibility of American mass communications to Soviet media operations."

What Can Be Done About Soviet Spying?

Overlooked by "progressives," obscured by the intelligence double standard, and benefiting from the apparent indifference of large segments of the American public, the pervasive Soviet espionage operation throughout Washington appears to be encountering few obstacles. Just what, then, can those citizens aware of the problem and anxious to reverse this trend do?

First of all, they might write to the editors of influential publications asking that the same investigative zeal that was in recent years used to uncover and publicize the past abuses of the CIA and FBI be applied to exposing the assaults of the Soviet and Soviet-bloc intelligence apparatus both in Washington and throughout the country.

Specifically, they might suggest that some of the topics raised only briefly in this article—the eavesdropping controversy, the mechanics behind the decision to award the Soviets the Mount Alto embassy site, the issue of congressional staff penetration, and the problem of KGB manipulation of the U.S. news media—be subjected to more detailed analysis.

Attention might then be focused on those governmental and non-governmental bodies which deal with intelligence matters on a day-to-day basis. It would seem sensible that in the future, proposals to strengthen the CIA or the FBI's counterintelligence capacity should be preceded by full examination of the Soviet intelligence efforts the proposed reforms are designed to counter. To this end both the Senate and House intelligence committees should be urged to devote as much attention to Soviet intelligence operations—particularly in the United States—as they do to U.S. intelligence operations abroad.

The same goes for the non-governmental bodies that concern themselves with intelligence issues—especially those that persist in employing the intelligence double standard. The editors of *Counterspy* and the *Covert Action Information Bulletin*, for example, might be deluged with letters asking them why they ignore the misdeeds of Soviet and Soviet-bloc intelligence agents. Nor should letters and inquiries stop there.

Even as these words were being written, a coalition of 36 groups in Washington calling itself the "Campaign for Political Rights" announced a drive to oppose recent congressional proposals that would strengthen the CIA's capacity to conduct covert action operations abroad and would restrict the number of non-professional intelligence personnel who have access to sensitive CIA information.

The various groups which comprise this coalition—the American Civil Liberties Union, the Americans for Democratic Action, the National Lawyers' Guild, and the Women's Strike for Peace—should be pressed to clarify a few matters as they mount their campaign: namely, why have they hitherto said nothing about Soviet intelligence activities inside the United States? Do they not consider the KGB's assault on U.S. internal telephone privacy a threat to American civil liberties? If not, why not? Do they really feel that the danger that would result from strengthening the CIA in the ways proposed compares with the danger presented both at home and abroad by the KGB? If not, why not?

Moreover, all the current presidential candidates should be urged to express their opinions on the Soviet intelligence threat and how it affects their view of U.S.-Soviet relations.

On the Democratic side of the aisle, such an effort seems especially necessary. For although part of President Carter's "hard-line" response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has included a call to strengthen the U.S. intelligence community, his earlier refusal to adopt Sen. Moynihan's firm approach during the eavesdropping controversy and his appointment to many high-level foreign affairs posts of those drawn from the same circles where "progressive" double standards are rife can only raise questions about his willingness to firmly resist the expansion of Soviet espionage.

Sen. Edward Kennedy (D.-Mass.), meanwhile, for all his indignation about the crimes supposedly committed by the intelligence service of the former shah of Iran, has yet to make any similar public denunciation of Soviet or Soviet-bloc intelligence activities.

As for the Republican presidential candidates, matters seem less dismal only because none of them—even the former CIA director in their midst—has yet publicly addressed the issue.

Finally, those who would like to see a more even-handed public approach toward intelligence issues could familiarize themselves with the objections they are apt to encounter in their efforts and how best to rebut them. Foremost among these objections is the favorite if dated "progressive" argument that those who would like to see a firmer attitude toward Communist espionage and subversion are urging a return to the era of "McCarthyism." On this score, the most effective rebuttal is to put matters in historical perspective.

Aware of 1940s Intelligence Penetration

For the record is by now clear that Sen. Joseph McCarthy began his crusade against Communist penetration in the U.S. government in the early 1950s only after the many other government officials who had impressive evidence about such penetration had defaulted their responsibilities by refusing to take action.

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As Michael Ledeen, editor of the *Washington Review of Strategic and International Studies*, pointed out in a 1978 review of some recent books dealing with espionage, both FBI counter-intelligence and other high executive branch officials were aware of such penetration throughout the 1940s but were afraid to "go public," in part because they nursed the hope that silence might help preserve America's wartime friendship with the Soviet Union. Had they taken a more realistic view of matters, "McCarthyism" probably never would have emerged at all.

However, another criticism which might be raised to the suggestions mentioned above—that they amount to putting the cart before the horse—may make more sense. For whatever specific measures might eventually emerge as a way of dealing more firmly with the Soviet and Soviet-bloc intelligence threat will ultimately have to flow from one thing: an informed and aroused citizenry. Consequently, the best suggestion of all may simply be for everyone who talks, reads, or writes about intelligence matters to see to it that the difference between the Soviet Union's totalitarian police state and America's constitutional democracy is no longer obscured by a failure to consider the activities of the KGB alongside those of the various American intelligence agencies. For even the most elementary investigation reveals that regardless of any abuses they may have committed in the past, the CIA and FBI are not now and never have been American versions of the KGB. And no intelligence double standard that is used to imply the contrary should go by unchallenged.

FOOTNOTES

Mr. Lops, 27, is a University Fellow in the Government Department of Georgetown University. A former Human Events summer intern, he has also worked in the White House and at the American Enterprise Institute, and he holds degrees from Princeton University and Columbia University. His articles have appeared in numerous magazines. This article was underwritten by a grant from the Fund for Objective News Reporting.

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* Although one leading Washington intelligence expert has told this writer that it is common knowledge that the KGB—unlike the CIA—will kill its own agents if it deems it necessary.

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* The six-volume Final Report issued in April 1976 by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence chaired by Sen. Frank Church (D.-Idaho)—hereafter referred to as the Church Committee Report—set the number of national level KGB personnel (including support staff) at 410,000, not including informers or the separate KGB structures of each of the Soviet Union's 16 republics and five autonomous regions.

The CIA estimate of the number of personnel in the KGB's First Chief Directorate—the directorate charged with clandestine activity abroad—was 10,000. These figures compare with 19,000 total FBI personnel (7,700 of them agents, an unpublicized percentage of them engaged in counterintelligence work, i.e., the frustration of hostile intelligence activities inside the United States), and according to unnamed Carter Administration officials quoted in the *New York Times* of Nov. 13, 1977, 4,000 of the CIA's approximately 16,000 employees in the Directorate of Operations, which handles clandestine intelligence collection and covert actions abroad.

* * * *

* Just to illustrate how far apart the Soviet Union and the United States are on the criterion of "political prisoners," it is worth noting that in its 1979 *Annual Report* Amnesty, which has itself been accused in recent years of having a "progressive" bias, cited the following examples of American "political prisoners": an American Indian in South Dakota sentenced to life imprisonment but awaiting a motion for a new trial; an unspecified number of Mexican-Americans and illegal Mexican immigrants who have been "alleged" to be "victims of systematic ill-treatment"; an American prisoner calling himself the "President of the Republic of New Africa," serving a 12-year sentence for conspiracy to murder a federal law officer; the "nearly 500" prisoners in American jails who have received death sentences; and the "Charlotte Three" and the "Wilmington Ten," all convicted of criminal offenses related to arson, but nine of whom had been released on parole when Amnesty's report was released, and all of whom, in the case of the Wilmington Ten, had had a U.S. Justice Department *amicus curiae* brief filed on their behalf.

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* According to an agreement which went into effect in December 1978, the latter, along with members of their families, now enjoy the type of diplomatic immunity from criminal prosecution restricted in the case of other nations to diplomats only.

WILLIAMSBURG VIRGINIA GAZETTE

14 MAY 1980

They also serve

Remember when the chamber of commerce was attempting a few years ago to build an information booth somewhere along Interstate 64? It never materialized, but that's not to say tourists who reach town aren't getting directions from I-64.

The other day, a Williamsburg man's car broke down on I-64 near the Route 132 exit. Someone stopped and picked up his family to take them into town, while he walked to the Camp Peary entrance to phone for a tow truck. The guard at the entrance booth was very cordial and cooperative. While the distressed motorist waited around for an hour for the tow truck to arrive, three tourist families drove up to the Camp Peary gate. The same guard gave them detailed instructions on how to reach various nearby destinations.

The local motorist told us that it's apparent that confused motorists flock to the Peary gate when they get off I-64 because it's the only sign of life to be found. As a result, the gate has become a de facto tourist info booth, and the guards there are performing a valuable service to the community.

It's no fluke, either. The guards reportedly have been helping tourists for a long time, albeit quietly. It shows an extraordinary contrast of missions at Camp Peary, where only last month the 90-man American commando unit trained for its assault attempt on the U.S. Embassy in Iran. As the poet Milton put it so well, "They also serve who only stand and wait."

THE LONDON TIMES
12 May 1980

Lord Bethell's campaign succeeds in opening up intelligence files 69-year fiction over MI6 comes to an end

By Peter Hennessy

Whitehall has officially admitted that the British Secret Intelligence Service, MI6, exists in peacetime, 69 years after its foundation in 1911. Foreign Office files for 1946 containing references to MI6, the Security Service, MI5, and the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Cabinet (JIC), previously not due for release until 2022, have begun to arrive at the Public Record Office in Kew.

In the past all governments have sustained the fiction that MI6 came into existence only with the outbreak of the last war in September 1939 (after a brief life in the First World War) and ended with the cessation in August 1945. All official papers, even if they merely alluded to MI6 on their distribution list, were exempted from the 30-year rule prescribed by the Public Records Act, 1967, and had 75 or 100-year closures placed upon them.

The change of heart in Whitehall was precipitated by a campaign mounted by Lord Bethell, MEP for London North-West, the preparation of whose history of the last years of the

British Mandate in Palestine, Palestine Triangle, revealed substantial gaps in Colonial Office and Foreign Office records for 1946. The Times discovered, subsequently, that the reason for their closure was passing references to MI6 and MI5.

Mr. James Callaghan, the then Prime Minister, on the advice of his Secretary of the Cabinet, Sir John (now Lord) Hunt, commissioned a review to be undertaken by the Security and Policy Methods Committee of the Cabinet. In a written answer to Lord Bethell on February 12, 1979, Lord Peart, then Lord Privy Seal, announcing the new policy, could not bring himself to mention MI6 or MI5 and referred instead to "certain organizations". It has taken the ensuing 14 months to "weed" the "intelligence-related records" as they are officially known, prior to transfer to the Public Record Office.

The extent of the secrecy imposed by the old regulations can now be gauged from a 1946 Foreign Office file on reconstruction policy. A summary of a newspaper article in *The New York Times* on developments in germ warfare was to be



Sir Derek Ezra: Intelligence work in occupied Germany.

withheld until 2022 simply because its covering note mentioned the JIC.

Another 1946 Foreign Office file on the repatriation of German agents from the Irish Republic was subjected to a similar closure as its distribution list included two MI5 officers, a Mr R. T. Reed and a Captain Liddell.

One of the more intriguing revelations in the newly opened papers is that Sir Derek Ezra, chairman of the National Coal Board, was a military intelligence officer in Germany after the last war. Sir Derek's entry in *Who's Who* refers simply to "Army 1939-47".

But document C 3504 in file FO 371/55798, discloses that Lt-Colonel D. J. Ezra in 1946 was secretary of the British Intelligence Objectives Staff responsible for acquiring technical intelligence in the Russian Zone of occupied Germany. The work of the organization involved acquiring information on coal, industry, chemical warfare, radar and sabotage and reporting to the Berlin sub-committee of the JIC.

The Government has no intention of releasing the internal files of MI6, MI5 and the Government Communications Headquarters. Details of active espionage operations abroad, counter espionage work at home and the individuals involved in them are destined to remain secret indefinitely, stored in the registries of the Cabinet Office, Foreign Office, MI6 and MI5.

RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (VA)

8 May 1980

Carter, Raiders Met at Peary?

Times-Dispatch State Staff

President Carter reportedly held a tearful meeting with members of the Iran raid commando team at Camp Peary, the CIA's secret base near Williamsburg, on April 27.

Carter reportedly traveled to the base by unmarked car and helicopter, according to Newsweek magazine in its current issue, and spoke with 150 of the raiders "and... by

some accounts, he and [raid] field commander [Col.] Charlie Beckwith wept in one another's arms."

A White House spokesman said yesterday that "the president did meet with the commandos. I cannot confirm or deny any location."

An aide to a Virginia member of Congress said yesterday that the meeting has never been disclosed at the hearings held by House and Senate groups investigating the aborted raid to free the American hostages.

The aide said, however, that there is "a basic understanding around Congress" that the president did go to Camp Peary on the Sunday following the mission's failure to meet with leaders of the commando force.

Ironically, the aide continued, the President probably flew in a helicopter not unlike the ones used in the unsuccessful raid.

The aide, who is familiar with military affairs information, said that Camp Peary probably was used for the mock-up of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and to train commandos to get into the buildings and the embassy compound.

But no such activity at Camp Peary has been discussed at the congressional hearings, he said.

The aide surmised, however, that the base has been and is still being used because it is close to Washington.

The visit to Camp Peary was reported by Newsweek yesterday. The New York Daily News had reported that a duplicate of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran had been created at Camp Peary and that almost 30 practice missions were staged there by the commando group.

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ON PAGE 13

MINNEAPOLIS STAR
7 MAY 1980

Twin Cities have what spies want

By RALPH VARTABEDIAN
Minneapolis Star Staff Writer

When Soviet KGB agents fly into the Twin Cities, they rent cars from Hertz and know exactly where they are going and what they want to do, says an agent for the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The KGB agents are well-trained and slick, he says, a big change from the old stereotype of balding, overweight Russians dressed in rumpled, ill-fitting suits.

"They are very adept at cleaning themselves," the FBI agent said, referring to the ability of spies to lose counter-agents who are following them. "But we have the best counter-intelligence agents in the world."

Although the Twin Cities area is isolated from the big spy centers on the East and West coasts, it has managed to attract a resident community of foreign agents and regular visits by agents based elsewhere, the FBI says. The presumed number of foreign agents here is kept secret.

Several years ago, a Soviet spy was evicted from the Twin Cities in an incident whose details are classified. Other Soviet agents are allowed to remain because the FBI believes it has neutralized any threat they might pose.

Minnesota—a major center for defense contracting and industrial technology and one of the largest grain-trading centers in the world—has plenty of information the Soviets would like to have, including that in this news article, according to the FBI.

Special area code

How seriously do the FBI and the local defense industry take the foreign espionage threat?

Very, very seriously.

Take, for example, the use of secure telephones by some local contractors.

Classified defense information is never transmitted by ordinary telephone because the Soviets are constantly monitoring long-distance microwave transmissions in the U.S. telephone system.

They intercept millions of telephone conversations automatically and feed them into computers that scan for key names, places and phrases, and then kick out the important calls for intelligence agents to analyze.

To prevent possible leaks of defense secrets, several local defense contractors—their identities are secret—have secure telephones, which use devices to transmit information in code.

The special agent in charge of the local FBI office has such a telephone on a stand next to his desk, for example.

But having a secure telephone doesn't mean that a contractor can just pick it up and blab all kinds of defense secrets. Each time a secure telephone is used, the authorization of a key intelligence agency is required.

That reportedly is the supersecret National Security Agency, an enormous arm of the Department of Defense that is charged with monitoring worldwide foreign communications and maintaining security for classified domestic telecommunications.

The NSA, whose computer facilities include some of the most complex and sophisticated electronic machinery in the world, according to congressional testimony, is so secret that it doesn't even have a public affairs office, unlike the Central Intelligence Agency.

Not just Soviets

The FBI believes that most of the 1,266 Soviet diplomats and officials in the United States are operating as intelligence agents. And that barely touches the surface of the foreign espionage network.

In addition to non-official Soviet nationals—about 60 percent of whom are presumed to be intelligence gatherers—there are agents in the United States working for East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland, among other communist countries that FBI agents consider "enemies of democratic capitalism."

And that doesn't include agents working for foreign terrorist organizations, such as the Irish Republican Army, the Palestine Liberation Organization or the Italian Red Brigades.

"It is a very real threat," says Washington D.C.-based FBI agent Otis Cox. "In private industry, if something happens and there's a security breach, you often don't hear about it because the company doesn't publicly announce it."

Last year, an East Coast computer maker reported to the FBI that

one of its executives had been offered a \$500,000 bribe by a Soviet agent for a copy of unclassified software used in programming computers at Citibank, Gulf Oil Corp. and other major companies.

Much of the work of intelligence agents is not illegal. Agents make the most of published trade journals. They attend trade shows and conventions.

"We have watched these guys walk out of conventions with arm loads, literally arm loads, of technical data on the most recent U.S. technological hardware," bemoans a local FBI agent. "And they load it up in the trunk of their car and send it back to Moscow."

Expanding trade with the Soviets and Chinese has made the job of industrial security harder, because

trade promotion gives the Communists exactly the type of contacts with American executives that are the textbook basics of the spy business.

This is the so-called "insidious encroachment" theory of foreign

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counter intelligence, as explained by Capt. R.A. Maulden, head of the Industrial Security Directorate of the Defense Department in Washington.

This almost trite-sounding theory has proved a valid explanation of many security leaks, in which foreign agents established social or professional relationships with American executives and then subtly pressured the executives into performing favors. Ultimately, the innocent favors became a basis for blackmail.

Honeywell recognized this in its recent newsletter to employees, titled "Security Shoptalk."

"It is the common practice of hostile intelligence services to maintain dossiers on U.S. personnel whose jobs afford them access to vital information in any area of special interest," the newsletter warns.

"Recruitment and exploitation is then carried out by agents who usually occupy some type of official or quasi-official position in their country's consulate or embassy, in trade delegations, state-owned business firms, etc.

"An often used approach is to develop a social relationship with a targeted American. . . . Once this social closeness is achieved, they begin to work on the individual to convince or even ultimately force

him or her to furnish specific information," the newsletter reads.

The spy game is largely one of gaining people's confidence. For this reason, some newspaper reporters eventually move on to the intelligence business, taking with them skills honed in years of interviewing people, the FBI says.

Keeping secrets

To defend against spying, security programs are run by the Industrial Security Directorate at 11,350 defense facilities in the United States, including a total of 90 sites in Minnesota, South Dakota and North Dakota. The programs include protection of classified documents, factory sites and explosives used in manufacturing.

The local directorate office has two security specialists; that's down from four in the early 1970s, despite a workload that has increased by 20 percent, according to Bruce Harriman, specialist in charge.

Each defense contractor in the Twin Cities has a security program involving a rigid system of safeguards intended to minimize unauthorized information leaks.

At all defense plants, everyone wears a badge with his or her name and photograph on it. An individual's level of security clearance is represented by the color of the badge. At one plant, a green badge indicates a high security

clearance. An orange badge indicates a lower one. Colorless badges are worn by those with little or no clearance.

At the headquarters of the Honeywell Avionics Division, a major defense contractor, a giant plaque on a tripod in the lobby reads:

"Honeywell Avionics Division Is Secure: No Violations 1979."

Inside the Roseville plant, locked shades block windows in rooms containing the most secret work. Doors have electronic locks. Secret codes have to be pushed to get into certain rooms.

The level of concern at Honeywell can be judged from the hiring of Col. Jack Pruett as head of industrial security. Pruett is the former executive director of the Industrial Security Directorate.

At the Northern Ordnance Division of FMC Corp., which makes missile launchers and gun mounts for the Navy, visitors are queried by armed guards immediately upon arriving at the plant.

U.S. citizens are allowed to walk the 50 yards or so between the guard shack and the factory headquarters. Foreigners must be accompanied by a guard, plant officials said.

Similar precautions are taken at Sperry Univac's defense headquarters in Eagan. Foreigners, even visiting dignitaries representing the closest U.S. allies, are not allowed into certain sections of the plant where plant officials recently took a Star reporter.

All this effort is aimed at preventing the kind of breaches that can occur. Last year, for example, two former executives for II Industries, based in Sunnydale, Calif., pleaded guilty to the illegal sale to East Germany of semiconductor manufacturing equipment worth \$300,000.

DULUTH NEWS TRIBUNE (MINN.)

1 May 1980

CIA series would be dangerous, absurd

Television's traditional love affair with government agencies and political power brokers soon may reach new heights of absurdity: A weekly program celebrating the swell exploits of the Central Intelligence Agency.

A right-wing Texas millionaire and a former CIA agent are the masterminds of the project, which has been in the planning stage for more than two years.

The CIA says it sounds like a dandy idea. "We're listening to them," a CIA spokesperson said. "Their approach sounds very positive."

In many ways the show would be similar to "The FBI," the phony ABC series that glorified the late FBI director J. Edgar Hoover's boys and eventually became the No. 1 weapon in the Federal Bureau of Investigation's massive propaganda arsenal.

"That 'FBI' series was very successful, and I think the time is right for a darned interesting series on the CIA," declared Gordon McLendon, a Dallas broadcaster who has enough money to finance the program single-handedly.

McLendon admits that he and his partner, ex-CIA man David Phillips, would give the CIA wide behind-the-scenes authority on the program in exchange for the agency's cooperation and the use of its official seal.

It sounds dangerously close to the deal producer Quinn Martin struck for "The FBI," which ran on Sunday nights for nine years through 1974.

Martin allowed FBI officials to screen all scripts, dictate changes, and veto story ideas. In addition, he hired only actors and writers

who were "politically acceptable" to the FBI. Indeed, Efrem Zimbalist Jr., the star of the show, was Hoover's personal choice.

Throughout its run on ABC, "The FBI" fed us hoked-up tales of murder, bank robbery, kidnapping, drugs, organized crime, and Communist espionage. Those were the old, reliable cops-and-robbers stories that Hoover & Co. preferred.

Meanwhile, the FBI rejected scripts dealing with civil rights, wiretapping, antiwar protests, draft resisters, police brutality, antitrust violations, and anything else remotely connected with controversial social or political issues.

With producer Martin as a willing dupe, the FBI distorted the nature of the agency and censored stories in which the FBI appeared to be anything less than a well-oiled machine incapable of malfunction.

It's transparently clear that McLendon's proposed CIA series is headed in that same red-white-and-blue direction.

"They want to do something like the FBI story," the CIA representative explained.

"But it's not that easy. We aren't in the cops-and-robbers business. We don't know if we

can cooperate with them at all. Another thing we are very concerned about is that we don't want people with whom we work,

particularly foreign services and agencies, to think that they are going to appear in a TV series."

It's not hard to read between those lines.

The CIA wants to control the program, supposedly for reasons of national security, and to insure that the CIA looks like a wonderful organization fighting a never-ending battle for truth, justice, and the American way.

In other words, don't look for any true-life tales of how the CIA has assassinated foreign leaders, propped up so-called "friendly" dictators, spied on law-abiding citizens in the country, or tried unsuccessfully to murder Cuban premier Fidel Castro.

The situation is nothing short of infuriating. Federal agencies are overflowing with factual cases that could provide us with seintillating drama every night of the week. But the networks are frightened to death of Official Washington and therefore gladly surrender control over any program depicting a federal agency.

That's why we get such dishonest, melodramatic twaddle as "The FBI," "O'Hara, U.S. Treasury," "Treasury Men in Action," and "Project UFO" (based on Air Force files).

As for the CIA series, no major network has expressed much interest yet. But even if CBS, ABC, and NBC take a pass, McLendon, with his millions, can afford to produce the show himself and sell it as a syndicated package on a city-by-city basis.

HOUSTON POST (TX.)
28 APRIL 1980



Donald Morris/an analysis

Soviet-trained leftists hold Iran power

America on the whole continues to feel that any consideration by its government of political covert action is reprehensible and to be given the widest publicity as a means of discouraging it. At the same time, we make no effort to consider the massive Soviet use of clandestine techniques, even when their successes result in our being caught in such an impasse as the Iran hostage situation. (In the last five years, American media coverage of the CIA ran ahead of coverage of the KGB 20 to one.)

We believe, as always, what we want to. It is still our fond delusion that the shah was a blood-stained ogre maintained in power for a quarter century by the machinations of the CIA and finally overthrown by a spontaneous popular uprising in which the righteous indignation of an exploited people suddenly exploded.

At this point the scenario gets confused: the shah is replaced by a crazy who commands mass support; there is some sort of government that doesn't have its act together; and in the background is an allegedly all-powerful Revolutionary Council, which no one writes about for the simple reason that no one knows anything.

In the meantime, we are understandably obsessed with the problem of getting the hostages out, whose detention is an outrage unparalleled in diplomatic history. The situation stymies the collective efforts of the responsible international community, and our paramilitary effort to resolve the problem is botched.

But we still react in disapproving shock to news of our covert efforts. The New York Times published the story of how the Carter administration, after prolonged shillyshallying, finally sent an Air Force general to Tehran last year to "develop contingency plans" (oh joy!) for a countercoup in the event that revolutionary forces appeared to be toppling the moderate Shahpour Bakhtiari.

The general reported that a military coup might yet succeed, but even as he spoke events overtook him.

The State Department announced that comment on the story "would not be constructive in view of the present negotiations to get the hostages released" — surely this year's understatement.

At the same time, unidentified "quarters" are upset that Carter is generating propaganda overkill against the Soviets, which he unquestionably is.

The pity is that Moscow is being blamed for a number of things it probably isn't guilty of — and has yet to be accused of the major international crime it did commit: playing a major role in the overthrow of the shah, the seizure and detention of our hostages and the current unrest in Iran, which inevitably will result in the replacement of the ailing Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini with a hard-core leftist state.

The real power in Iran is helped by a group of five young Soviet-trained radicals embedded in the shadowy Revolutionary Council. The leader — the real power in Iran — is Nurudin Khia Noury (Khomeini's neph-

ew and second in the Communist Tudeh Party), who, like Khomeini's son Hadi, is a graduate of Moscow's Lomumba University. Massoud Rajavi and Mihan Rezai (the only woman) also were trained in the Soviet bloc, and with Mehdi Abrishamanchi revitalized the leftist Mujabeddin Khalq under Soviet direction to bring down the shah.

These five gave the Khalq a fanatic Islamic facade, pleasing the mullahs and convincing the people they were in a religious crusade. SAVAK's excesses had been mainly aimed at the Mujabeddin Khalq, which these five now control and which is preparing the way for a leftist takeover when Khomeini succumbs to his leukemia.

That is the scene in Iran, while we follow not the Chubin report on Soviet-Iranian relations released by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London (Who? What?) but first the engrossing travels of a Marine corporal's mom and Dick Gregory's hunger strike, and then the chilling and spectacular failure of our rescue strike.

Events in our captured embassy are not determined by Khomeini in Qom, nor by Bani-Sadr or Ghotbzadeh in Tehran. Nothing moves without the say-so of five Soviet-oriented figures whom not one American in ten thousand could identify.

But of course, it's much more fun reading about how bad we are than about how successful the Soviets are. By 20 to one.

Donald Morris served with the CIA 17 years. He has been a columnist for The Houston Post since his retirement from government service in 1972.

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WILMINGTON EVENING JOURNAL

25 April 1980

CIA's John Paisley cleared of disloyalty by U.S. Senate panel

By Joe Trento
and Richard Sandze

Staff writers

WASHINGTON, D.C. — The estranged wife of missing CIA official John A. Paisley has been told by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that its investigators have cleared her husband of any disloyal or subversive acts against the United States.

But in a letter from chairman Birch Bayh, D-Ind., Mrs. Paisley was told that the report on the committee's probe would remain secret because of the nature of the work her husband did for the CIA.

Paisley disappeared Sept. 24, 1978, while sailing from Solomons, Md., on the Chesapeake Bay. His abandoned sloop Brillig was found aground the next day and on Oct. 1, a body with a bullet hole through the skull was recovered.

Later, government officials identified the body as that of Paisley. A series of articles in the News-Journal papers raised questions about the identity of the body and challenged the CIA's description of Paisley as a low-level analyst. As a result Sen. William V. Roth Jr., R-Del., called for the intelligence committee investigation.

News-Journal articles tied Paisley to an investigation of the theft of spy satellite secrets and sources told the newspapers he was a CIA "contact man" for the team of White House plumbers that conducted a series of burglaries, including the Watergate break-in.

Intelligence Committee Counsel Michael Epstein told the newspapers yesterday, "Chances are we will never understand the outcome of this case. It is a mystery. We never had the resources to really investigate it. Obviously if more evidence comes in we will look at it again."

Mrs. Paisley, through her lawyer, Bernard Fensterwald Jr., is currently involved in a series of Freedom of Information lawsuits

against the FBI and CIA to try to determine what really happened to Paisley.

Fensterwald and Mrs. Paisley said yesterday they were not satisfied with the committee's explanation of the Paisley mystery.

"I just don't think the body they fished out of the bay is my husband's," Mrs. Paisley told News-Journal reporters yesterday.

STRATEGIC REVIEW
Spring 1980

A NATIONAL SCANDAL?

In the intelligence business there is a phenomenon commonly called the "mind-set." It refers to the major subjective factor in the processing of intelligence—the preconceived picture on the part of the individual official or government agency evaluating a given item of intelligence. This preconceived picture (which may, indeed, mirror a broader official "consensus") can be pivotal in how the item is weighed—whether it is accepted or ignored, judged important or disparaged.

History teems with horrendous examples of the "mind-set." In early 1940, Stalin disdained repeated warnings of German preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union, simply because the warnings did not fit his image of Hitler's strategy. The tragedy of Pearl Harbor arose not only from grievous gaps in U.S. intelligence-gathering and transmission, but in the final analysis from the inability of U.S. officials to give credence to a Japanese surprise attack scenario.

Because errors of the "mind-set" usually emerge from a scramble of circumstances, it is not always either easy or just to cast categorical blame; besides, hindsight is not necessarily the fairest judge. Some errors are the product of honest, if tragic, human myopia and misconception. But one generalization seems unassailable: if governmental leaders deliberately suppress intelligence that is highly relevant to the security of the nation—and if that suppression is inspired not by doubts about the intelligence, but rather by political self-interest and protection of a given policy—then we have the potential of a national scandal.

Such a scandal seems in the making in the strange case of the Soviet "Sverdlovsk affair." All of the facts in the case have not yet come to light. But that is the point: the implications of the facts unearthed thus far are so grave that the full story *must* be brought to light.

Both the Soviet Union and the United States are signatories to a treaty that prohibits the development, production and stockpiling of biological ("germ") weapons. The treaty went into effect in March 1975. In June of that year,

the Soviet Union solemnly declared that it "does not possess any" such weapons. Yet, later in 1975 U.S. reconnaissance satellites recorded new construction and expansion by the Soviet Union of facilities that U.S. experts confidently identified as sites for the production or storage of biological warfare agents—at Zagorsk, some 50 miles north of Moscow, at Omutninsk, 500 miles northeast of the capital, and at Sverdlovsk, 900 miles to the east.

It seems that some officials in the Ford Administration deemed the evidence sufficiently compelling to urge that the United States challenge the Soviet Union and lodge a formal complaint with the U.N. Security Council. They saw the implications reaching beyond the issue of a Soviet germ warfare potential (frightening though this prospect was in and of itself) into the taller question of Soviet intent to comply with the provisions of arms control agreements, notably SALT. Apparently, however, these initiatives were deflected at the highest levels of the Ford Administration (presumably at least the level of the Secretary of State) precisely on the grounds that the evidence was not totally conclusive, that the Soviets obviously would deny the charges, and that a challenge therefore not only would prove futile, but would unnecessarily roil the waters of detente and arms control. End of Act I.

We do not know what additional intelligence concerning the three Soviet sites accumulated between the fall of 1975 and early 1979. In any event, Act II opens in April 1979, when the United States received intelligence of an explosion in the Soviet facility in Sverdlovsk. This was followed by hard evidence, including eyewitness reports, of an epidemic in Sverdlovsk of the deadly (but virtually extinct) anthrax disease which victimized hundreds of Soviet military and civilian personnel—evidence that, given the specific manifestations of the disease, clearly linked it to the Sverdlovsk explosion. This time it was the Carter Administration, locked into the last stages of the SALT II negotiations and into the selling of the im-

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pending Treaty to the U.S. Senate, that said nothing and did nothing.

Act III began on March 18, 1980, when the U.S. Department of State finally issued the first public statement about the Sverdlovsk incident and its meaning. The statement came amid a swelling flood of information that Soviet forces were using nerve gases against primitive rebel tribesmen in Afghanistan, again in brutal breach of a convention that the Soviet Union signed more than fifty years ago and has reaffirmed since. The fact that Moscow subsequently denied the Sverdlovsk allegations with the feeblest cover story, which is overwhelmed by the available evidence, need not detain us.

The main point to be made here concerns not so much Soviet unscrupulousness, nor even those implications of the "Sverdlovsk affair" that hang heavy over any lingering prospects of SALT II. Veteran analysts of the Soviet Union have long contended that, notwithstanding the Soviet leaders' pretense at legalism, Soviet compliance with treaty obligations is dictated by a definition of self-interest that is bereft of the usual qualifier "enlightened." In the conception of a total struggle between two global systems, all means and methods are admissible. Power yields impunity, and we are witnessing the accelerating manifestations of that impunity today.

The point to be made, rather, has to do with the implications of the "Sverdlovsk affair" for the conduct of our own government "of the people, by the people, for the people." They are implications sharpened by the statement attributed to a State Department official that *the American people would never have heard about the Soviet germ warfare program had it not been for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.*

For some fifteen years now, the "mind-set of detente" has well nigh dominated U.S. security

policies—in their perceptions and in their execution. The "mind-set" shaped a whole series of grotesquely erroneous intelligence projections of Soviet power. It mandated the deliberate braking of U.S. defense efforts. And the "mind-set" either refused to admit evidence of Soviet transgressions—such as a host of reported Soviet violations of SALT I—or tried to shield them from public consciousness as "minor" or "peripheral" to the substance of detente and American security.

Some such "shieldings" conceivably might have been rationalized in the past by honest, if misguided, belief in the "minor" nature of the transgression, or on the grounds of ambiguous treaty language. But the "Sverdlovsk affair" suggests less leeway for charitable interpretation. It emits the odor of what other societies—no less civilized or democratic than ours—would indict as governmental perfidy worthy of impeachment:

—That odor alone would seem to warrant a full Congressional inquiry into the "Sverdlovsk affair" and its handling by the Executive Branch. Since the fuller story spans two administrations, the inquiry would be bipartisan in a real sense. Moreover, perhaps it is high time that Congressional committees that have staged dissection after dissection of the purported misdoings of U.S. intelligence agencies turn the floodlights fully upon the equally serious question of the use (and abuse) of intelligence by its "consumers" in policymaking.

If such an investigation is not mounted today, and if the current drift continues, one could well envisage a new and more catastrophic version of the post-World War II inquiry into Pearl Harbor. Only in this new scenario, there might not be a Congress around to do the investigating.

Walter F. Hahn

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AFRICA

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THE WASHINGTON POST
24 June 1980

Senate Votes to End Curb on Covert Aid in Angola

By Michael Getler

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Senate, in an action certain to be controversial here and in Africa, voted last week to lift restrictions on the White House that effectively prevented any U.S. military aid or undercover help to rebels fighting the Marxist-central government in Angola.

Though there is no evidence at this point that the Carter administration plans to begin such aid or covert activities, the Senate action, if it becomes law, would allow the president to do so without making the action public and without an act of Congress specifically approving the aid.

The Senate action is a crucial first step in overturning a legal ban on

such activities that was instituted four years ago in an amendment sponsored by then-senator Dick Clark (D-Iowa).

The Clark amendment was passed overwhelmingly by both houses of Congress in 1976, reflecting congressional fears in the immediate post-Vietnam era that the Ford administration might involve the United States in the Angolan civil war.

Last Tuesday, in a voice vote that—in sharp contrast to the 1976 events— attracted little notice, the Senate approved an amendment to the fiscal 1981 Foreign Assistance Act. The amendment was first offered by Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) and would have repealed the Clark amendment entirely. However, a compromise measure in which Sen. Jacob K. Javits

(R-N.Y.) and Sen. Paul Tsongas (D-Mass.) joined Helms as cosponsors was the one that passed.

Under the new amendment, if the president determined such aid was in U.S. national security interests, he could move ahead by privately informing the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs committees behind closed doors.

To become law, the new amendment would also have to be approved by the House. A conference committee meeting is scheduled for Wednesday, and several U.S. groups interested in African affairs are mobilizing to oppose the measure during these next legislative steps.

The new amendment is strongly opposed within the State Department's

African Bureau and other quarters of the department as certain to raise immense political problems for the United States in Africa. This is so, officials said, because it comes at a time when relations between Angola and the United States seem to be improving and some progress also seems possible in negotiations over the independence of Namibia, talks in which Angola plays a key role.

In this view, the amendment is certain to be open to misinterpretation in Angola, since it seems to open the door to new covert or CIA-sponsored actions. U.S. officials, however, say there is "absolutely no intention of mucking around in Angola."

The amendment also has produced some ambivalence within the Carter administration.

The Clark amendment was unique in that it was the only legal restriction of its kind that dealt with a single, specific country. The administration has generally resisted such measures on the grounds of opposing actions that restrict presidential authority.

There were incidents in 1978 when some officials specifically sought repeal of the Clark amendment. But President Carter said publicly afterward that the United States has no intention of getting involved in Angola, and officials claim that is still the policy.

State Department officials said privately the administration did not request the new amendment.

In making the case for the new amendment, Helms argues that the Clark amendment is no longer useful and is counterproductive because Soviet, Cuban, East German and even Nicaraguan troops are helping the Angolan regime, while the United States has its hands tied as far as helping opposing forces.

Helms said these countries "feel that they can continue to send troops into Angola with relative impunity... because the Clark amendment requires a full-blown congressional debate" that signals U.S. intentions to the Soviets and Angola and thus makes any military or covert aid useless.

Helms said the president must be given more flexibility.

Helms talked of a "new mood" emerging in this country, of a "spirit of reawakening" to the dangers posed by the Soviets and their "surrogates." He cited the recent overwhelming vote in the Senate repealing the so-called Hughes-Ryan amendment, a broader law restricting covert activities elsewhere, as another sign of turning away from what he called the earlier "overreactions" to the alleged abuses of covert action.

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NEW YORK TIMES
23 JUNE 1980

Soviet May Be Seeking Base in Seychelles

By DREW MIDDLETON

The precarious stability established in the Indian Ocean and the approaches to the Persian Gulf by the deployment of a powerful United States naval force may be disturbed by further Soviet penetration into the region, according to British sources.


Military Analysis Russian diplomats, these sources say, recently have begun a campaign of what was described as "ruthless friendship" toward the Government of the Seychelles Islands in the Indian Ocean.

The chief importance of the islands is their location. They lie about 1,150 miles east of the coast of Tanzania in East Africa, astride the main route for tankers leaving the Persian Gulf for Western Europe and North America.

A Soviet presence in the islands, such as the use of a naval anchorage and facilities at one of the seven airfields on the islands, would counterbalance the proposed establishment of American naval and air facilities at Mombasa in Kenya.

A One-Party State

A new Constitution announced in March 1979 turned the country, which has a population of about 65,000, into a one-party state under President France Albert René. The Cabinet, according to a



The New York Times / June 23, 1980

Soviet Seychelles presence would counter a U.S. base at Mombasa

Central Intelligence Agency report, includes ministers who are pro-Soviet.

The initial Soviet approach to the Government was made through these ministers. Subsequent Russian efforts to establish closer political and economic relations, possibly as a prelude to a military presence, have worried the British Government. Its concern was expressed by Douglas Hurd, Minister of State in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, in a recent letter to a constituent.

The Seychelles were once a British colony and the Republic of Seychelles is now a member of the Commonwealth.

A State Department spokesman in Washington said the department had no comment on the situation.

Only One Small Port

Military analysts are divided about the potential value of the Seychelles. Victoria, on Mahe Island, is the republic's single small port. Of the seven airfields only one has a surfaced runway.

Other sources said that although the Seychelles today have little to offer in the way of base facilities, the same might have been said of Diego Garcia 20 years ago. The Diego Garcia Atoll in the Chagos Archipelago, about 1,000 miles south of India's southern tip, is being transformed into an important United States military base.

The Navy and the State Department have been reticent about the military use of Diego Garcia, but the islands' facilities are being expanded to serve at least two missions.

One use for the island base is as a support point for United States naval forces in the Indian Ocean. The force now consists of 2 aircraft carriers and 20 escorting surface warships. The runway at

Diego Garcia has been lengthened from 8,000 to 12,000 feet to allow use by large cargo planes.

A naval construction force of 25 officers and 850 men is improving other facilities on the island. Additional parking aprons, aircraft arresting gear for emergencies and limited maintenance facilities have been installed. At present the field can accommodate high-performance tactical aircraft from the Indian Ocean squadron's carriers as well as transports.

A second use for Diego Garcia is as an anchorage for the seven merchant ships that are to be pre-positioned in the Indian Ocean this autumn as part of the Rapid Deployment Force.

These ships, manned by merchant seamen, will carry the heavy equipment, fuel, ammunition and water for the Marine Corps amphibious brigade now being trained in California for desert operations. The brigade has a strength of about 12,000 men. Air support is provided by two squadrons, one of F-4 fighters and the other of A-6 attack aircraft.

Marine Battalion Withdrawn

There are no present plans, officials said, to deploy the brigade in the Indian Ocean area. But after the withdrawal on June 1 of the reinforced Marine battalion attached to the Indian Ocean squadron, the brigade appears to be the logical reinforcement if a crisis develops in the region.

In that event the brigade would be flown to airfields near the critical point. The United States now has the use of airfield facilities in Kenya, Somalia and Oman. From these airfields the Marines would pick up their equipment at the adjacent ports.

Present planning does not anticipate the use of Diego Garcia as a main staging area for operations. One reason is that, at about 2,500 miles from the entrance to the Persian Gulf, it is too distant from any potential theater of operations.

The Russians, an analyst said, "got there early and have all the cards in this game; a base at Aden in South Yemen and an important naval anchorage at Socotra at the entrance to the Gulf of Aden." Only a secure American base in Oman, he believed, would correct this geographical imbalance, and that correction might be minor if the Soviet Union establishes itself in the Seychelles.

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ON PAGE 1

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
25 June 1980

US intervention in Angola again?

Senators seek measure that would free arms for anti-government rebels

By Daniel Southerland

Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Conservatives in Congress may be in the process of overturning negotiations that the State Department contends could help stabilize mineral-rich but turbulent southern Africa.

But the conservatives themselves argue that by taking the teeth out of restrictions contained in the so-called Clark amendment on Angola, they aim at giving more flexibility to American presidents, present and future. Such flexibility, they say, would permit a president to counter Soviet-sponsored actions in Africa, possibly through the use of American Central Intelligence Agency-sponsored actions now prohibited by law.

The negotiations in question have been conducted, in part, by the Carter administration with the Marxist government of Angola. State Department officials say the Angolan government is seeking closer ties with the West

and gives signs of wanting to lessen its dependence on ties with the Soviet Union and Cuba.

But if the conservatives have their way — and if Ronald Reagan is elected president of the United States — the US could find itself once again intervening in Angola with support in the form of weapons supplies to the faction that is still fighting the Angolan government.

State Department officials argue that such intervention would place the US on the side of South Africa in that country's conflict with Angola and turn much of black Africa against the US. All this would in the end, they say, benefit only the Soviet Union.

The current dispute over Angola policy erupted after the US Senate voted last week to remove restrictions on the President, which, in effect, prohibited any US military aid being given to the rebels — the conservatives would call them freedom fighters — who continue to battle the central government in Angola.

The restrictions were contained in a 1976 amendment sponsored by then-Sen. Dick Clark (D) of Iowa. He and others feared deepening American involvement in the Angolan civil war. The CIA had, in fact, been involved in

that war, aiding (among others) the rebel faction known as UNITA, led by Jonas Savimbi. Mr. Savimbi visited the United States several months ago to plead for a renewal of American support for his cause.

On June 17, Sen. Jesse Helms (R) of North Carolina introduced a new amendment aimed at repealing the Clark amendment. In an effort to dilute the force of the proposed Helms amendment, Sen. Paul E. Tsongas (D) of Massachusetts and Sen. Jacob K. Javits (R) of New York joined Senator Helms to cosponsor the amendment, which ultimately passed. The House now must make its judgment on the amendment with a House/Senate conference meeting scheduled for June 25. If it became law, the amendment would allow the US to move ahead with aid to the Savimbi faction.

The State Department has taken the position that it will not oppose this amendment, because it gives the President more flexibility. But the department is going to great pains to emphasize that the Carter administration has no intention of intervening in Angola and that would include a continuing refusal of aid to the Savimbi faction. Department officials contend that Angola has been playing a construc-

tive role in negotiations involving the United Nations and the US and its key allies in their attempts to bring about a peaceful solution to the guerrilla war in Namibia, or South West Africa.

But Mr. Reagan, the Republican presidential candidate, told the Wall Street Journal in an interview last month that, as President, he would favor providing Mr. Savimbi with weapons.

When asked about the State Department contention that such a renewal of aid to the Savimbi faction might derail negotiations with Angola, an aide to Senator Helms declared that the department was engaging in "hackneyed arguments... which we've been hearing with regard to many different areas around the world where Soviet involvement has been increasing."

In a statement on the subject June 17, Senator Helms claimed several hundred Nicaraguan troops have made an appearance in Angola alongside the Cubans already there. But State Department officials said they had no evidence to support this claim and that there had, in fact, been some suggestions from diplomatic sources that the number of Cuban troops in Angola had been reduced by several thousand since last fall.

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ON PAGE A7

THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
26 June 1980

S. African Copter Shot Down, Crewman Slain, in Angola

PRETORIA, South Africa (UPI) — Angolan troops shot down a South African helicopter near the Angolan border and attacked the crew, killing the flight engineer, the defense force announced today.

The incident occurred two weeks after South Africa revealed it had made a massive strike into southern Angola, losing 16 men and killing more than 200 guerrillas of the South West African Peoples Organization.

The brief announcement did not say when the incident took place but said it happened "in the operational area" — the border region between northern South West Africa (Namibia) and Angola.

The statement did not say the helicopter was downed over Angolan territory, but Western intelligence sources said it was unlikely that Angolan troops had crossed the frontier into Namibia.

The announcement said that after the helicopter was hit, the pilot and crew escaped unhurt "but were later attacked by Angolan soldiers of company strength," about 30 men.

The flight engineer, Sgt. Jacobus Cilliers, 23, was fatally wounded in the attack.

The pilot fought his way to safety through the Angolan lines, the defense force said.

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ON PAGE 1

WALL STREET JOURNAL
25 JUNE 1980

Unrest in Zaire

Anti-Mobutu Feeling Swells Among Masses Living in Destitution

Corruption, Favors to Elite Rile Students, Workers; But Dissent Is Quashed

Vanishing Mining Profits

By JONATHAN KWITNY

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

KINSHASA, Zaire—Mingi, a 21-year-old engineering student at the national university here, has two things in common with millions of other Zairians: poverty and anger.

There is much to fuel his anger. In a nation rich with diamonds, cobalt and copper,

This is the first of two articles on Zaire.

a privileged elite siphons off the benefits. President Mobutu Sese Seko is a multimillionaire. The bureaucrats, military officers and others in his favor also prosper. The politically connected class of merchants known as *commerçants* can be seen jouncing along Kinshasa's dirt roads in \$20,000 Mercedes-Benzes.

Many Complaints

Interviews around Zaire with students, workers, farmers, women in their homes, frustrated job seekers and others disclose a rising tide of resentment in this nation of 28 million or so—resentment at the near-absence of government services, at the corruption and favoritism that surround the authoritarian Mobutu government, and at the Western nations, mainly the U.S., France and Belgium, that are seen as propping up the Mobutu regime.

"It's you (the U.S.) who are keeping him in power," says a Zairian regional administrator who has begun to criticize government policies—anonously. "If the Americans put pressure on him to leave, cut off all aid, he'd be gone today. If America set the pattern, Belgium, France and the other countries would follow." (Repeated efforts by a reporter to obtain interviews with Mr. Mobutu or other government officials for this story met with failure.)

And who would replace Mr. Mobutu? The people don't know. Many emphasized that they don't want a Communist-style revolution. "We just want honest leaders," says a student strike organizer in Kinshasa. In fact, there are potential leaders at home and abroad, but there is no single visible challenger to the man who has survived handily since he seized power 15 years ago. For Western diplomats and bankers, it is an awkward matter; Mr. Mobutu represents a counted-on alliance and a huge economic stake.

Zairians sometimes use the example of Iran, and the shah, in talking about their hopes for an upheaval. "We read and we make the comparison," says one student leader.

Mr. Mobutu, for his part, portrays himself as a bastion of anti-communism. Zaire's cobalt, some 50% to 60% of the world's supply, is crucial to the American aviation and defense industries. Its copper and diamonds are crucial, too. Not least, this technically bankrupt nation is in hock to Western governments, international organizations and Western banks to the tune of a staggering \$6 billion or so.

There is a vivid consciousness of the Western role in Zaire. "Of course you killed Lumumba," says the "brigadier" for striking architectural students in Kinshasa. Patrice Lumumba, the country's first premier after independence from Belgium in 1960, was murdered in 1961 and has become the national hero. Many look to his exiled sons for eventual leadership.

The Senate Intelligence Committee, in 1975, did in fact report an abortive plot by the Central Intelligence Agency to kill Mr. Lumumba—to the extent of having delivered poison for the plot to Kinshasa. The committee also uncovered ties between the CIA and the Zairians who actually did murder Mr. Lumumba, though it was never proved that the murder resulted from an American plot.

There is evidence also that the CIA helped put Mr. Mobutu in office in 1965 (and had him on its payroll before that), and students here say they have seen American troops training the Zairian army (the Pentagon says the U.S. military presence is limited to two dozen U.S. soldiers).

When Zairian exiles invaded mineral-rich Shaba Province in 1978, it was French Legionnaires and Belgian paratroopers who came to the rescue and retook Kolwezi, transported in American planes. Western troops staged a similar "rescue" in Kisangani in 1964, while, according to Senate-committee evidence, U.S. planes manned by anti-Castro Cubans helped put down a revolt against Mr. Mobutu's group.

EXCERPTED

Approved For Release 2009/06/05 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000501390001-6

LEGISLATION

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LOUISVILLE COURIER-JOURNAL (KY)
8 JUNE 1980

CIA charter: The 'roaring' mouse that whimpered

WASHINGTON — The lightning flashed, the thunder roared, the winds blew, and the rain fell in torrents around the U.S. Senate chamber late one afternoon last week.

With this dramatic backdrop, the Senate brought forth a mouse of a bill that is grandly entitled, "Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980."

It is a four-page document that establishes what is described as "a statutory basis for the national intelligence activities of the United States."

In reality, this bill is a severely watered-down version of what was going to be a comprehensive charter regulating the Central Intelligence Agency and the other diverse intelligence operations in this country.

What began as a 172-page document painstakingly put together under the leadership of Kentucky Sen. Walter "Dee" Huddleston ended as a shadow of itself. The major point in the four-page bill requires the president to give prior notice of covert CIA activities to Congress' two intelligence committees.

Indiana Sen. Birch Bayh, chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, acknowledged that his committee has consistently received such prior notice during the past years. He noted that the bill simply codifies the congressional "oversight" process, and ensures that it isn't subject to the whim of a future president.

But even under the abbreviated bill — passed by the Senate 89-1 — the president could invoke his constitutional powers and not inform anyone in Congress beforehand of covert activities.

While setting down the congressional oversight function into law may provide a cornerstone for a future CIA charter, as Bayh maintained, a 3½-year effort to place controls over U.S. spy agencies produced little when it came time to present a bill that could survive in the Senate.

Discarded, for example, was a prohibition of use of American journalists, academics or clergy as spies, and letting intelligence agents pose as members of those professions.

According to Bayh, "the pressures of events and the limitations on the legislative calendar this year have made it impossible to proceed further with comprehensive charter legislation."

Sen. Patrick Moynihan, D-N.Y., had a more specific explanation of how the charter died this year — an explanation that apparently goes to the heart of the matter.

"It is simply because in the course of the past 3½ years, the (Carter) administration, which began with a commitment toward the enterprise and an enthusiasm for it, changed its position and gradually withdrew from active participation. In the end, in certain ways, it even began to be obstructive," Moynihan told his colleagues on the Senate floor.



Analysis by

Ed
Ryan

Courier-Journal
Washington
bureau chief

Moynihan talked of what he had heard — "White House meetings (on the charter) which would end with an agreement at the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue that they would respond to our colleagues' queries in a week or a week and a half. I think a week and a half was about the average."

At this point, the voluble New York senator noted that Huddleston was "knowingly" nodding in agreement.

"Usually, however," Moynihan went on, "after three months, in answer to an inquiry by the senator from Kentucky, they (White House officials) would say, 'Well, it will be another week and a half.' The fact is, however, the cooperation was withdrawn."

In the end, that was the nut of it: The White House didn't want the charter and suddenly became something less than cooperative with Huddleston, who as chairman of the intelligence charter subcommittee carried the brunt of the burden to develop the comprehensive document.

Huddleston isn't inclined to publicly speak to these matters in the manner of Moynihan, who delights in sniping at Carter and what he considers to be an inept White House.

There were times in the past several years when Huddleston had ready access to the president on the charter issue. That cooperation began to evaporate after the hostages were seized in Iran, and the Russians invaded Afghanistan. The impetus to protect the country, by law, from the once-prevalent CIA abuses was lost. Instead, the election-year feeling came to be: don't hamstring the CIA with a legislative charter just when we need a strong intelligence operation.

The rather sudden withdrawal of cooperation from the White House never has been acknowledged, Moynihan explained.

"But the reality is here with us, and it is one to be commented upon and to be regretted. Because, if the administration has changed its mind on something so central, it is of elemental importance that it should expound its purposes and explain the change to those who were cooperating in good faith and with rather large expectations."

Huddleston, one of those who cooperated in good faith with the White House, believed his proposed comprehensive charter would provide for a strong intelligence community, and at the same time, make the spy agencies more responsive to the representatives of the people.

When the Senate finally brought up the scrawny, four-page "oversight" bill for a vote last week, Huddleston was the recipient of lavish praise from his colleagues.

Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd, calling Huddleston's efforts "herculean," put the Kentucky senator's struggle for a CIA charter in the best light.

"For more than two years," Byrd said, "Mr. Huddleston has pursued the goal of a comprehensive intelligence bill. (The four-page bill) represents the first installment of that effort... The Senate and the nation owe Senator Huddleston a debt of gratitude."

PUBLISHERS WEEKLY
20 June 1980

Two Authors Urge Congress To Keep FOIA Restraints

A pair of authors urged Congress May 29 to reject proposals to free the various U.S. intelligence agencies from the disclosure rules of the Freedom of Information Act.

"I come before you as a citizen who is deeply concerned that the CIA's attempt to further restrict FOI access to its files, indexes and documents is a bureaucratic Trojan Horse," said William R. Corson, author of "The Armies of Ignorance" (*Dial*), which traces the rise of the American intelligence community since the Revolutionary War.

Corson and Athan Theoharis were among a group of witnesses who testified before a House Government Operations subcommittee on legislation proposed by the administration to free the intelligence agencies from FOI strictures.

Theoharis, author of "Spying on Americans" (*Temple University Press*), an examination of U.S. political surveillance from 1936 to 1970, listed several allegedly illegal actions or political activities by the CIA and FBI that would not have been disclosed if the administration's proposal had been in effect.

Sought by the Justice Department and the CIA, the proposal would eliminate the requirement that courts be allowed to review decisions by intelligence agencies to deny information sought by citizens under the act. The proposal also would allow the CIA or FBI to withhold almost all information about its activities, requiring them only to release information to persons who request it about themselves.

A much milder bill, introduced by Rep. Richardson Preyer (D., N.C.), chairman of the Information and Individual Rights Subcommittee, as a "talking piece," would add to the categories of material now exempted from coverage by the FOIA information that is "obtained under an express promise of confidentiality by the Central Intelligence Agency either from a secret intelligence source or from a foreign intelligence service." The bill would not alter current procedures allowing judicial review of agency refusals to release such information.

Corson said in his testimony that recent books such as Peter Wyden's "Bay of Pigs" (*Simon & Schuster*) and David Martin's "Wilderness of Mirrors" (*Harper & Row*), which deals with the CIA's fruitless search for a "mole," "underscore the worth of the FOI act in providing our people with a more accurate rendition of events and the roles of those involved."

The witnesses noted that in an appearance before the same panel in February, Frank Carlucci, the deputy CIA director, acknowledged that the CIA has not had to give out any information under the FOIA that was potentially dangerous to the national security. Carlucci and the CIA are arguing now that it is the perception by potential sources abroad that the CIA must divulge many of its activities that is having a chilling effect on their cooperation with the CIA.

Theoharis and other witnesses said they would prefer no changes in current law, but if either proposal had to survive, it should be the milder Preyer measure.

HOWARD FIELDS

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 48THE WASHINGTON POST
22 June 1980

Republican Riders May Derail CIA Oversight Bills

By George Lardner Jr.

and Charles R. Babcock

Washington Post Staff Writers

The House Intelligence Committee has run into a partisan dispute over legislation aimed at strengthening congressional oversight of the CIA and other intelligence agencies.

Republican members served notice at a closed-door meeting last week that they want to add riders that would satisfy CIA demands for less public scrutiny and would provide criminal penalties for some unauthorized disclosures.

The move could derail any intelligence legislation until after the elections, according to several sources.

At the same time, several Senate Republicans allied with GOP presidential candidate Ronald Reagan are preparing their own version of a comprehensive charter for the intelligence community.

It would split the CIA in two, setting up one agency to carry out espionage and covert operations abroad and the other to provide intelligence analysis.

The senators have already drafted a separate charter to govern the FBI's criminal investigations that would impose scarcely any of the restrictions proposed in an FBI charter bill endorsed by the Carter administration and by the FBI itself. The administration bill is languishing in the Senate Judiciary Committee.

GOP Senators Malcolm Wallop and Alan Simpson, both of Wyoming, said in telephone interviews that they do not expect either of their charter bills to pass this year.

They said the proposals weren't conceived as a preview of a Reagan administration stance on the intelligence community or the FBI. But other sources familiar with the drafting said the bills clearly reflected the thinking of key Reagan advisers, including Sen. Paul Laxalt (R-Nev.), his national campaign chairman, and Richard Allen, one of his leading national security advisers.

Republican platform drafters have reviewed the bills, sources said.

A limited intelligence-oversight measure sailed through the Senate this month by 89 to 1, largely on the strength of a bipartisan agreement in that chamber to keep it free of any controversial riders.

The Democratic majority of the House Intelligence Committee then agreed in caucus on a somewhat

stronger oversight bill. It would give the executive branch less leeway to withhold information from Congress. It would also require disclosure to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees of any allegedly improper activities that come to high-level attention within the executive branch. The Senate bill would require the disclosure only of confirmed violations of law or of intelligence agency rules.

House committee Chairman Edward Boland (D-Mass.) had been planning to introduce the Democratic proposal last week, but GOP members voiced their objections at an closed session Wednesday afternoon.

According to several sources, the Republicans said they want to expand the bill to include criminal penalties for unauthorized disclosure of the names of CIA operatives abroad and of FBI counter intelligence agents in this country.

Some GOP members also want to exempt the intelligence agencies from most of the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act.

Anxious to report out a bill with bipartisan backing, Boland ordered staff-level meetings to seek a compromise. "The resolve the Democrats had [for the Boland bill] vanished," a source said.

The Democrats offered to dilute the oversight provisions with language emphasizing the need of the executive branch to protect "classified information and information relating to intelligence sources and methods" from unauthorized disclosure. Those provisions were already in the Senate bill.

The House Republicans were also promised markup sessions on separate legislation making it a crime to disclose names of agents. The Senate Intelligence Committee will start its own hearings Tuesday on the same issue.

So far, however, the GOP contingent on the House committee has refused the offer, feeling that the oversight bill is the only intelligence legislation with a chance of enactment this year.

The Democrats, in turn, are afraid that the addition of any riders by the committee will simply open the floodgate to a rush of other amendments on the floor.

"We can't put the names of agents on there and get a bill through this year," maintained Rep. Les Aspin (D-Vis.). "Other people will want to add on protections for the rights of Americans and things like that."

The House committee is scheduled to resume the debate Tuesday afternoon.

In the Senate, meanwhile, the GOP senators have been circulating copies of their separate Intelligence and FBI charters seeking cosponsors. Sources familiar with the drafting said the two proposals were designed as "statements of principle" growing out of a Republican National Committee policy statement last August.

Simpson said he became concerned about the limitations in the FBI charter when he attended hearings on the proposal. "We have to address the concerns of the civil libertarians and all that, but I was frustrated by what I was hearing," he said.

The GOP's FBI charter junks the administration's proposed requirement that the bureau have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before starting an investigation. "We don't want the FBI to be restricted more than other law enforcement agencies," said an aide who worked on the draft. "You have to have some faith the FBI won't violate rights as it sometimes did in the old days."

Jerry Berman, lobbyist for the American Civil Liberties Union, not surprisingly disagreed. He called the Republican proposal an effort to "return to the Hoover era."

CONTINUED

He criticized the broad definitions of allowable FBI activity and said the proposal appears to give the bureau free rein to spy on peaceful demonstrations.

Another clause would allow an incoming president to remove the FBI director without cause during the chief executive's first six months in office. Berman said this could be viewed as an attempt to clear the way for Reagan to dump FBI Director William H. Webster—a Republican appointed by President Carter in 1978 to a single 10-year term.

John Hotis, an FBI attorney who worked on the administration bill, said the bureau hadn't contributed to the GOP proposal. He added, though, that its introduction might revive flagging interest in getting some kind of FBI charter this year.

Wallop said the GOP intelligence charter proposal is designed to "simply shift the stage of argument from what the intelligence community shouldn't do to what it should do."

One of the Republican proposals would establish a U.S. Counterintelligence Office in the Justice Department that would be allowed "under strictly limited circumstances to ask any entity of the intelligence community to initiate an investigation of a U.S. person."

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ON PAGE D-14

NEW YORK TIMES
26 JUNE 1980

Bill on Agents Opposed

WASHINGTON, June 25 (AP) — A bill aimed at preventing publication of spies' identities is "absolutely unprecedented and terribly dangerous," a Senate committee was told today.

Floyd Abrams, who represented The New York Times in the Pentagon Papers case, told the Intelligence Committee that the bill went much too far in ordering criminal penalties for anyone who publicly disclosed an agent's name or "any information" that could lead to identification.

In recent testimony, the Central Intelligence Agency strongly supported the bill, sponsored by Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Democrat of New York.

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ON PAGE A-16

NEW YORK TIMES
25 JUNE 1980

C.I.A. Seeks Jail Terms For Disclosure of Agents

WASHINGTON, June 24 (Reuters) — The Central Intelligence Agency today asked Congress to pass a law providing criminal punishment for unauthorized disclosure of the identities of its agents.

Hundreds of agents have been compromised by the publication of their names in books and magazines, the agency's deputy director, Frank C. Carlucci, said.

"It is imperative that the Congress clearly and firmly declare that the unauthorized disclosure of the identities of our intelligence officers and those allied in our efforts will no longer be tolerated," he said.

Mr. Carlucci told the Senate Intelligence Committee that the disclosure of identities of undercover agents and the C.I.A.'s foreign sources of information had had a harmful effect on the United States intelligence program.

"Our relations with foreign sources of intelligence have been impaired," he said. "Sources have evinced increased concern for their own safety. Some active sources, and individuals contemplating cooperation with the United States, have terminated or reduced their contact with us."

Mr. Carlucci, who advocated prison terms and fines for offenders, was speaking at the first of a series of public hearings by the committee.

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AM-Intelligence

WASHINGTON, June 24, Reuter - The Central Intelligence Agency today asked Congress urgently to pass a law providing criminal punishment for the unauthorized naming of U.S. spies.

Hundreds of agents had been compromised by the publication of their names in books and magazines, CIA Deputy Director Frank Carlucci said.

"It is imperative that the Congress clearly and firmly declare that the unauthorized disclosure of the identities of our intelligence officers and those allied in our efforts will no longer be tolerated," he said.

Mr Carlucci, a former Ambassador to Portugal, told the Senate Intelligence Committee the disclosure of identities of undercover agents and the CIA's foreign sources of information had had a harmful effect on the U.S. intelligence program.

"Our relations with foreign sources of intelligence have been impaired," he said.

"Sources have evinced increased concern for their own safety. Some active sources, and individuals contemplating cooperation with the United States, have terminated or reduced their contact with us." MOPE 1350 AM-Intelligence 2 Washington

Mr Carlucci said foreign sources had questioned how the U.S. government could expect its friends to provide information in view of continuing disclosures of information that might jeopardize their careers, liberty and very lives.

"Many foreign intelligence services with which we have important liaison relationships have undertaken reviews of their relations with us," he said.

Contacts were reduced and there was less sharing of information, the CIA official said, adding:

"We are increasingly being asked to explain how we can guarantee the safety of individuals who cooperate with us when we cannot protect our own officers from exposure."

Mr Carlucci, who advocated prison terms and fines for offenders, was speaking at the first of a series of public hearings by the committee. It is looking at a number of suggestions for legislation to stop the naming of names in the U.S. intelligence community.

The legislation is informally known as "the Agee Bill" after Philip Agee, a former CIA operative now living in West Germany, who has published the names of people said to be U.S. intelligence agents and their foreign sources. MOPE 1353

AM-Intelligence 3 Washington

Last year, in a book titled "Dirty Work 2: The CIA in Africa," Mr Agee disclosed the names of 729 people identified as CIA officers who had served or were serving in Africa.

The Washington magazine "Covert Action Information Bulletin", which exposes clandestine U.S. operations abroad, regularly prints the names and countries of assignment of people it identifies as CIA spies.

(OVER)

Mr. Carlucci would not discuss publicly which disclosures had been most damaging, but he acknowledged that a substantial number of the magazine's identifications were accurate.

Provisions for prison terms and fines for such disclosures were contained in a wide-ranging "Intelligence Charter" drawn up earlier this year. Among other things, it would have banned the use of journalists, clergymen or academics as cover for clandestine intelligence work abroad.

But the measure was defeated before it reached the floor of the Senate.

All that survived in the charter was a requirement that the President report on covert intelligence operations overseas to just two Congressional committees instead of eight as before.

REUTERS 1356

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A12THE WASHINGTON POST
25 June 1980

Ex-Agent Criticizes CIA Identity Shield, Antagonizes Senator

Associated Press

Legislation that would make it a crime to publicly identify secret agents is an unnecessary threat to freedom of speech, a CIA official-turned critic told senators yesterday.

Most such agents "work out of embassies and everyone around them knows they are CIA," former agency official John Stockwell told a Senate intelligence Committee hearing.

In fact, Stockwell said, he was told early in his 12-year agency career that "you want people to know you're CIA so they will come to you with information."

He said the agency's aim in seeking criminal penalties "is clearly not to protect the safety of secret agents, but rather to gain an important weapon for the CIA to use in silencing its critics in its domestic fight for existence."

Sen. John Chafee (R-R.I.) told Stockwell his statement "flies in the face" of testimony from current CIA officials.

"You have been deceived," Stockwell said.

Chafee said agents overseas had told him that a non-CIA "cover" was valuable to their work and sometimes even to staying alive, and asked whether their statements were part of "a massive plot."

No, Stockwell replied, "just the party line."

Stockwell is author of the book "In Search of Enemies," which is highly critical of agency operations but names no agents.

Sen. Jake Garn (R-Utah) said he found it hard even to talk to Stockwell because he felt "such disgust for your activities and your book and your loyalty."

Stockwell told Garn he'd been awarded medals for serving his country and added, "I can't let anyone challenge my loyalty to this country."

"I just did," retorted Garn. "I have my freedom of speech, too."

Chafee said Stockwell's opinion of the CIA made his observations on agent identification worthless. Garn agreed.

Deputy CIA Director Frank Carlucci said earlier that other agency critics have publicly identified "substantial numbers" of secret agents. Besides occasionally endangering their lives, such public identification means an end to these agents' effectiveness, he said.

"As a result, the pool of experienced CIA officers is being reduced," he said.

Carlucci repeated the agency's plea for legislation that would make it a crime to name agents in public. A number of bills are pending on the subject. All are aimed at current or former agency personnel; some also are directed at journalists and others.

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STOCKWELL

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THE DAILY TEXAN
UNIVERSITY of TEXAS
10 JUNE 1980

Civil liberty groups aid

By JOHN WILLIAMS

Daily Texan Staff

Former CIA case officer John Stockwell, author of a book detailing CIA activities in Angola and Vietnam, has banded together with three Austin civil liberties groups in his First Amendment legal battle with the CIA.

The American Civil Liberties Union, New American Movement and American Citizens for Honesty in Government are sponsoring events Thursday and Friday to expose what they claim are CIA abuses and to assist in defraying the costs of Stockwell's defense.

Their main theme is to articulate the need for a specific CIA charter curbing

ex-CIA officer

the agency's powers, including a re-evaluation of the Freedom of Information Act, Stockwell said.

Scheduled events are as follows:

- A panel discussion with Stockwell, Morton Halperin, Sy Hersh and John Henry Faulk at 2 p.m. Thursday in Townes Hall 122.

- A cocktail reception fundraiser from 5 to 6:45 p.m. Thursday at the Club Room of the Villa Capri Motor Hotel. A \$10 donation is requested.

- The premier of the film, "On Company Time," at 7 p.m. Thursday in Townes Hall 122.

- Seminar discussion with panel speakers Halperin and Stockwell at 10 a.m. Friday in

Townes Hall 122.

Stockwell's book, "In Search of Enemies," documents CIA covert and paramilitary actions in Angola. Stockwell claims the CIA systematically misled Congress and the American people about the U.S. role in Angola, a charge former CIA Director William Colby denies.

Colby claims CIA agents were in Angola to train citizens in military tactics, while Stockwell's book asserts the men were in Angola to gather information and weaken Angolan factions hostile to the United States.

CIA Director Stansfield Turner said the book was "circumspect" and loaded with classified information about a misadventure called "Operation Failure" — the CIA's secret war in Angola.

The CIA has filed suit against Stockwell claiming he broke vows of secrecy to the agency when he wrote the book.

Stockwell counters that his oath to the agency was "illegally, fraudulently obtained" by CIA recruiters who did not warn him beforehand of the agency's covert activities.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A2

THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
26 June 1980

Today's People

■ CIA Book Suit Settled



STOCKWELL The Justice Department has reached an out-of-court settlement of its suit to obtain the profits from former CIA agent John Stockwell's book about the agency's activities in Angola. Under the agreement announced yesterday by the Justice Department, Stockwell, who now lives in Texas, is required to turn over to the government any future profits from the sale, serialization, republication or movie rights to his 1978 book, "In Search of Enemies, A CIA Story." In the civil suit filed March 3, the government had sought all the profits from the book. But Stockwell has said that he made considerably less than \$50,000 on the book and that the money has all been spent. Under the agreement Stockwell agreed to submit any future writing about the CIA to the agency for advance review and the government agreed to complete the review within 30 days and to delete only classified material.

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ON PAGE A9

THE WASHINGTON POST
26 June 1980

Settlement With CIA

Ex-Agent to Yield Profits From Book

Associated Press

The Justice Department has reached an out-of-court settlement of its suit to obtain the profits from former CIA agent John Stockwell's book about the agency's activities in Angola.

The department yesterday released a consent agreement entered in U.S. District Court in Alexandria. The judgment was approved Monday by Judge Albert V. Bryan, officials said.

Under the agreement, Stockwell, who now lives in Texas, is required to turn over to the government any future profits from the sale, serialization, republication or movie rights to his 1978 book, "In Search of Enemies, A CIA Story."

In the civil suit filed March 3, the government sought all the profits from the book. But Stockwell has said that he made considerably less than \$50,000 on the book and that the money has been spent.

The government's case was based on a secrecy agreement Stockwell signed when he joined the CIA in October 1964. The government contended that agreement required him to submit any writings about the CIA to the agency before publication, so that it could delete classified material.

Stockwell, who headed the CIA's Angola task force during part of 1975-76, did not submit his book for CIA review.

Under the consent judgment, Stockwell agreed to submit any future writing about the CIA to the agency for review.

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ON PAGE D-14

NEW YORK TIMES
26 JUNE 1980

Former C.I.A. Agent to Give U.S. Future Earnings From His Book

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 25 — John R. Stockwell, a former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency, agreed today to pay the Federal Government whatever profits he earns in the future on his book about the agency, published in 1978 without its clearance.

In a consent judgment filed with the Federal District Court in Alexandria, Va., lawyers for the Justice Department and for Mr. Stockwell, former chief of the agency's task force for Angola, agreed that the Federal Government would receive all his future gains from the book, "In Search of Enemies, a C.I.A. Story." The book accused the agency of lying to Congress and the public about its covert military operations in Angola in 1975-76.

A Justice Department spokesman said that the judgment was based on relief the Government had won in a breach-of-contract suit filed against another former agency employee, Frank W. Snepp 3d, for violation of his secrecy agreement with the agency. The Supreme Court required Mr. Snepp to turn over to the Government all earnings from his book, "Decent Interval."

Mr. Stockwell did not admit violating his secrecy agreement, but he agreed to submit his manuscripts to the agency for review in the future.

Mark H. Lynch, a lawyer for Mr. Stockwell, said that the Government had agreed to forgo its claim to approximately \$40,000 that Mr. Stockwell has earned on his book. Mr. Stockwell no longer has the money and is not likely to make additional profits because sales have tapered off, Mr. Lynch said.

The civil division of the Justice Department is drawing up guidelines to help its attorneys determine which cases alleging violations of employee secrecy agree-

ments should be pursued by the Government in the future.

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EDITORIALS

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INDIANAPOLIS STAR
30 May 1980

Untapped Resources

Tremendous untapped oil and gas deposits underlie the United States, making dependency on foreign sources a "suicidal myth," argues Sen. Harrison H. Schmitt (R-N.M.), a geologist and astronaut who is the son of Harrison A. Schmitt, famed in the petroleum industry for his discoveries.

Schmitt told his fellow senators last week they would be unwise to accept the view of Adm. Stansfield Turner, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, that domestic oil and gas resources are very limited.

U.S. oil and gas resources are sufficient to supply the nation far into the future, Sen. Schmitt contends.

"Giant and supergiant fields are not a thing of the past," he said.

A potential for such discoveries, he said, exists on the Pacific and Atlantic coasts, the Arctic, Bering and Beaufort seas and presently locked-up federal lands in the lower 48 states. Of the 13 most promising areas in Alaska, only one has been explored, he said.

Present oil and gas production in the U.S. has extended over only some 50,000 miles or less than 2 percent of the 3 million square miles identified with oil and gas potential.

Why aren't the potential new areas being developed?

Sen. Schmitt said that for the last 25 years federal, corporate and international policies have discouraged U.S. exploration, starting in 1954 with the regulation of natural gas at artificially low prices. Some of the potential energy basins are protected as wilderness or by other categories of public ownership.

With more rapid development of such potential domestic oil and gas resources, Sen. Schmitt said it would be possible to reject "the myths" that we cannot depend on domestic crude oil and natural gas for independence from imports, that national growth must be stopped and that energy must always cost more than it does now.

Sen. Schmitt's positive outlook and vigorous proposals make most U.S. energy experts seem as if they are wearing blindfolds. A strong national administration would act on some of his recommendations.

INDIANAPOLIS STAR
1 JUNE 1980

Snitching On CIA

What some call snitching and some call ratting is making life tough for American spies in assignments that are dangerous enough without such treachery.

Too many American agents overseas have been assassinated. Marking them — disclosing their names — smacks of treason.

Anyone caught doing this kind of thing in a communist country would be punished with death.

In the United States a group is doing it and getting away with it.

An outfit that calls its periodical the Covert Action Information Bulletin published, on Wednesday, the names and some biographical details on what it described as 40 Central Intelligence Agency officers and agents operating in 31 countries.

The list purportedly named 13 chiefs of station, eight deputy chiefs and 19 senior "case officers," officers who supervise local agents. One of the deputy chiefs working in a foreign assignment was identified as a woman.

Among those named were CIA personnel said to be operating in such potentially dangerous posts as Algeria, Guatemala, Jerusalem, Libya and Zaire.

The periodical remarked that legislation is pending in Congress to make a criminal offense of the unauthorized identification of intelligence personnel.

It stated that it would continue to do so even if the practice were outlawed.

"We do not believe that it can be constitutionally suppressed by the government," it stated. "If any of the proposed laws designed to censor this column out of existence are passed we can assure our readers that we will fight them in the courts."

Perhaps in some courts this twisted and degraded conspiracy will find sympathy. Much of the United States anti-espionage apparatus was dismantled by ill-conceived and misguided court decisions during the late 1950s.

Considering the peril and difficulties faced constantly by many U.S. intelligence agents overseas, disclosing their identities and posts is comparable to giving an enemy defense and troop movement secrets in wartime. It is treacherous and potentially deadly. Those guilty of such misdeeds should be punished.

The authors of the bulletin state their object to be the destruction of American intelligence agencies. It is a purpose which coincides with those of the KGB, GRU and other hostile and dangerous espionage and assassination forces.

If those responsible for the bulletin meant to wage a campaign in behalf of the friends of freedom instead of the enemies of freedom, they would disclose the identities of totalitarian secret agents operating in the United States.

ALBANY TIMES-UNION (N.Y.)

1 JUNE 1980

'Intelligence' in a democracy

In a nation where individual rights, self-government and freedom are precious and fought for, the very concept of secret spying — by anyone, on anyone, for any reason — is distasteful.

Yet most Americans are wise enough, realistic enough, to recognize the national need in today's world of a strong and capable intelligence gathering apparatus. The Senate is pondering, and has been since the first of the year, not whether there should be a Central Intelligence Agency, but the nature of its responsibilities and the extent of controls over its operations. We know the sordid tasks that must be undertaken, but we don't want to repeat the mistakes of past years in which the CIA functioned as a political tool of the White House in ill-considered, mismanaged and discrediting foreign adventures aimed at destabilizing a variety of foreign regimes, as well as a few appalling experiments with mind-altering drugs and other exotic paraphernalia.

Last October, in a *New York Times* review of a book about Richard Helms and the CIA, John le Carre, British author of *The Spy Who Came in From the Cold*, *The Honourable Schoolboy*, and *Smiley's People*, wrote of "three fatal ills" that "brought the CIA to its knees."

— Its "disgraceful history of 'covert' intervention, often in areas where American interests were scarcely involved, where there was no independent information available to the administration, and always on a scale so subtle that it could not be hidden even if it was denied: Tibet, Angola, the Congo, Indonesia, Guatemala, Chile, Laos, Vietnam, to name a few..."

— The agency's "preposterous position in the Washington hierarchy, which makes sane control of its operations impossible so long as it remains within the private duchy of the president and at the mercy of every fashionable wind that blows through town..."

And finally, "the American political romanticism that one moment espouses openness at any price, and the next revels in the high alchemy of secret

panaceas and swift, unconventional, totally illegal solutions..."

An example of the latter condition might be the shifting sentiment in Congress and the Carter administration within the last three or four years. A hard line favoring strict CIA control following revelations of gross misconduct has given way, generally, in the wake of Iran's hostage seizure, particularly, to a softer line that CIA critics have labeled an incipient "unleashing" of the CIA again.

The crucial point appears to be the degree, and timing, of congressional oversight authority, including whether there be any prior notice to congressional authorities and, if so, at what point in consideration of some intelligence project.

What appears to be needed here is a basic new approach to this nation's international intelligence services. The British model might provide a clue as to the direction in which to move, with top authority, rather than in the executive office itself, in an executive intelligence council composed of the essential military, political and economic advisers to the White House, including congressional representation. Such a council should have the only authority for assigning intelligence operations, acting with, not for, the president, while the CIA director would have the responsibility solely for efficient functioning of the organization in doing the jobs assigned. He would not, as now appears to be the case, act in concert with the president and secretary of state in selecting objectives and taking action.

Congress, the executive branch, State Department and armed services could provide experts to such an intelligence council. Its mission should be purely professional. Congress should create it and leave it alone as such; every president should sit in on it but not run it; and the CIA director should obey it.

By some such removal of the intelligence operation from politics and the shifting currents of fashion — by truly professionalizing the control over the CIA — we may achieve a sensible and effective intelligence operation.

COLUMBUS DISPATCH (OH)
6 JUNE 1980

Intelligent CIA Bill

IT IS JUST AS WELL that the U.S. Congress has taken four or five years to get around to voting on a measure designed to write guidelines for the Central Intelligence Agency.

It has taken that long for emotions to cool and reasoned intelligence to return to the subject of providing two necessary ingredients — a cloak of secrecy and the discipline of oversight to the nation's intelligence agency.

This week the Senate passed a bill with a single dissent setting up guidelines not only for the CIA but for all of America's spy operations, both at home and abroad.

Until this measure was fashioned, Congress had become almost frenetic on the subject. It one

time called for the CIA to strip itself of all of its 800 covert aides and most of its senior operatives. Worse, it demanded all CIA planning and actions be reported to the intelligence, defense, appropriations and foreign affairs committees — and their staffs — of both House and Senate. That is half of Capitol Hill.

The Senate-passed measure reflects both reasonable secrecy and oversight. Only the intelligence committees are to be privy to this most crucial area of national defense. A nation such as America, subject to constant pressures of known foreign espionage, must have a responsible counterespionage agency that is dependable. Five years in the making, this new measure gives reasonable assurance of that reality.

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RICHMOND NEWS LEADER (VA)
19 JUNE 1980

Intelligence Failures

Given Jimmy Carter's amateurish response, the Cuban boat people took everyone in official Washington by surprise. Well, not quite everyone. The Central Intelligence Agency suspected the Cubans were coming.

In January, the CIA advised Mr. Carter that a flood of refugees from Cuba seemed imminent. The agency predicted Fidel Castro would resort to mass emigration to rid Cuba of political dissidents and to relieve strains on Cuba's failing economy.

Did Mr. Carter heed the CIA's prescient report? Apparently not. The Cuban exodus caught him off guard. Not only has he failed to translate the freedom flotilla into a propaganda plus for the West, but his policy regarding the refugees changes by the minute.

By ignoring the CIA's Cuban infor-

mation, Mr. Carter repeated past mistakes. The CIA also anticipated the hostage crisis. A month before Iran attacked the U.S. embassy in Tehran, the CIA: (1) predicted Iran would commit "acts of violence" against U.S. interests; (2) recommended increasing the detachment of the embassy's Marines from 16 to 200. If Mr. Carter had listened to the CIA, the hostages might never have been seized.

Thus Mr. Carter continues to ignore the warnings of America's intelligence experts. Evidently he prefers the rose-colored views of the adolescents at the State Department and on the White House staff. The CIA has endured a barrage of body blows for alleged intelligence failures. But regarding Cuba and the hostages in Iran, the failure of intelligence belongs to Jimmy Carter alone.

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MISCELLANEOUS

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CHICAGO TRIBUNE
22 June 1980

Superspy Helms: U.S. must act tough

By Saul Pett

WASHINGTON [AP]—In the days following the missile crisis of 1962, two men—one American, the other Russian—were negotiating the details of the withdrawal of Soviet weapons from Cuba.

In an informal moment, out of the earshot of others or the reach of hidden microphones, they were sitting on a fence at a Connecticut farmhouse and talking. It was a moment for candor, and Vasily Kuznetsov of the Soviet Union said to John McCloy of the United States:

"All right, Mr. McCloy, we withdraw the bombers, just as we've withdrawn the missiles, but I want to tell you something. This is the last time the United States is going to be able to act like this toward the Soviet Union."

A few years later, McCloy told the story to then President Johnson. The third man in the room was Richard C. Helms, then director of American Central Intelligence and head of the CIA. Now retired from government service, Helms tells the story to illustrate what he regards as the central fact of danger in the world today: the relative decline of American military power.

HE QUESTIONS whether the United States could force the Russians to turn back their missile-carrying ships now as it did in 1962. The Soviets turned back then, he says, because the U.S. was first in nuclear missiles and conventional military equipment, and they knew it, and we knew it.

"But now that the Russians have a very large strategic force the shoe may be on the other foot. . . . President Carter said he's going to see to it that the Russians don't take over the Persian Gulf; where our oil lifeline is attached, but I don't know what he's going to protect the Persian Gulf with."

Helms is quick to point out that he is "not entirely up to date on what the U.S. has and what the Soviet Union has." He says he has no continuing connection with the CIA (which he left in 1972), that his information these days comes from newspapers and "some friends around town."

One assumes that a man who worked in intelligence 25 years, headed the CIA for six, and served as U.S. ambassador to Iran for five years has well-informed "friends" here and abroad. He says little about his CIA work, but he projects the special, tight-lipped aura of a man who has been on the inside, who has seen the figures that could mean Armageddon, who has been involved in much of his country's high strategy and many of the plots and counterplots of the Cold War.

IN A RECENT interview Helms spoke passionately about the American condition at home and abroad, the decline of strong leadership in the White House, a society fragmented by vested interests and special pleaders, about "false prophets" in government and industry, the weakened state of the CIA, and the aborted rescue of the hostages in Iran.

The rescue, if tried at all, should have been tried in the first month of their captivity, he said, when much of the world was outraged, "when most governments would have understood our efforts to get them back, when even the Russians were saying it was terrible to take diplomats as hostages."

In the ensuing weeks and months, he says, we should not have made the hostages the prime preoccupation of our foreign policy every day at the White House and State Department and every night on television.

"We gave the Iranians an opportunity to bargain with us, to denigrate and humiliate and deceive us. We gave them a tool to beat us with.

"It seems to me the better way—it's hard to say but I don't know another way to say it—would have been to seem to turn our backs on the hostages, to regard them as prisoners of war and simply left them with no value to the Iranians. If they had no value, I think the Iranians eventually would've come up with some device for letting them go."

HELMS THINKS THE rescue attempt, while risky, might have worked, might have freed "a lot of the hostages," but some people probably were going to get killed. In such matters, said the man who specialized in clandestine operations, "you can't believe in the Immaculate Conception."

He recalled that During World War II, the British made a study of the ingredients essential to successful commando operations.

The study stressed three factors: overwhelming strength against the objective, more than enough backup in case of mechanical failures, and a leader in complete charge on the scene, who tells the commandos "when to attack, when to withdraw, when to go left, when to go right." Helms seems to think the American operation in Iran fell short on all three counts.

Richard McGarrah Helms is now 67, fit, tall, thin, carefully groomed, carefully controlled, a polite man who invites neither small talk nor familiarity. Master spies in fiction are frequently brooding men suffering from bad memories. Helms seems content with his past and his principles. Others are not. They see him as a man of shadows and controversy who lied to Congress.

HE RUNS A one-man consulting firm in which he advises American companies on business prospects in the Persian Gulf area. Casting about for a name, he didn't think "Helms Associates" sounded particularly good. He called it the Safeer Co., using the Persian word for ambassador.

On the broader scale of his concerns, Helms sees the 1980s as a time when the Soviet Union will be stronger than the U.S. in nuclear and conventional weapons.

"And that is a period of danger, at least to those of us who have spent our lives at this and understand that that kind of primacy can be translated into aggression, movement, takeovers of countries," he said.

Helms said President Carter's human rights crusade was "ham-handed," futile, and wrong, because "we can't run our own affairs, so why should we be telling others how to run theirs?"

"I think the best way to influence others is by example. I think you should tune up the Statue of Liberty once in a while, but you don't go around telling people if you don't do such and such, we won't do this for you."

IN THE DAYS that he ran the CIA, didn't the United States try more of that? Wasn't it trying to be policeman to the world?

CONTINUED

"That's different," he said. "That is attempting to handle events in the world so they are favorable to us rather than the Soviets. I still think that's a good idea. I think that if we don't fight for our side, we're not going to have any side to fight for."

Accordingly, he said he hoped American intelligence would revive covert action abroad: "It's a useful tool. We should have it in our armory. It would help us in the control and shaping of certain events, with a little influence, a little money, a little of this and that."

"A little of this and that" is what has troubled some members of Congress, who have tried, so far futilely, to write a charter that would keep CIA operations within proper legal limits without emasculating the agency. In the great uproar over the CIA in 1975, many of the "abuses" laid at its door were said to have occurred during Richard Helms' tenure.

IN 1973, HE told a Senate committee that the CIA had made no attempt to influence the Chilean elections of 1970. In 1975, it was disclosed that the CIA had supplied the opponents of Salvador Allende with \$8 million. In 1977, Helms pleaded no contest, was fined \$2,000, and given a suspended prison sentence for failing to testify fully and accurately. He said he couldn't because of his CIA oath. He since has said he would do the same thing again if the "national security" required.

Helms said a detailed charter would hamstring the CIA. He said, instead, that the skeletal act of 1947, which established it, should be amended "as necessary." Beyond that, he said, we should rely on the President to keep the agency within bounds. "You've got to trust somebody in your government," he said. "If you don't, what kind of government have you got?"

So does Helms think we can have an effective CIA that operates legally, that keeps Congress informed, that doesn't spy on American citizens or open mail and forewears assassination?

"Why not?" he said. "I promise you that after seeing what happened in 1975 and having been beaten up for all those abuses, which didn't turn out to be that much, there isn't a single fellow in the agency today, I'll bet, who has the slightest intention of getting into that trouble again."

"CIA PEOPLE ARE carefully chosen. They get intelligence tests, psychological tests, medical tests, lie detector tests, security investigations to be sure they are as good as we can find in this country. They're your neighbors. They're not people who want to abuse the U.S. They are citizens who have been trying to defend our freedoms and our system."

"In 25 years the CIA assassinated no one. Nobody got killed or was close to being killed. I would think they could go 25 more years without assassinating anybody."

There was no plan to assassinate anybody?

"Obviously there had been discussions at various times, but then there are always discussions in government about that, in everybody's government as to whether it would be desirable to eliminate X, Y, or Z."

"That doesn't necessarily mean they're going to end up doing it. One discusses a lot of rough stuff, because it's a rough world, but the important thing is what happens in the end and not what's talked about."

"Let's face it... the American people want an effective, strong intelligence operation. They just don't want to hear too much about it. I've talked to a lot of people about this, and they said, why

did you do so and so? When you explain it they understand, but it makes them a little uncomfortable, because they like to feel righteous."

What, one wonders, are Helms' politics?

"I always voted as an independent." Did he ever find himself voting against the man he was working for in the White House?

"I might have, but I don't remember," Richard Helms says, with almost a straight face.

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THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
23 June 1980

THE EAR

SIGHTS OF THE CITY . . .

CIAMEISTER Stansfield Turner is spotted lurking 'round antiques auctions, quite suddenly. There he perched at Weschler's the other day, nodding in all the wrong places. "Is it a secret code, or what?" auction-going regulars nudged . . .

EXCERPTED

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ON PAGE A-3

NEW YORK TIMES
21 JUNE 1980

300 South Korean Intelligence Agents Are Purged

Special to The New York Times

SEOUL, June 20 — The South Korean Central Intelligence Agency announced today that it had dismissed or otherwise removed over 300 of its agents in its biggest shake-up.

Shortly after Lieut. Gen. Chon Too Hwan, who is also head of military security and the country's strongman, assumed leadership of the agency in April, he told reporters that he would reform and streamline it. He said that the agency was so corrupt and alienated from the people that it was coming to resemble Savak, the Iranian secret police agency under Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlavi.

Announcing the shake-up, the agency said that the changes were effective June 1, the day before General Chon submitted his resignation as director of the agency. That resignation has not been accepted, but there are indications that the appointment of a successor is imminent.

The agency announcement said that many of those ousted had been senior agents and that their retirements were partly intended to make way for more junior employees.

It also made it clear that the unusually

extensive purge was engineered to rid the agency of those described as "corrupt or incapable" and those who had been criticized for abusing their authority.

Agents connected with "outside" political influences were also dismissed, the statement said.

After the agency was founded in 1962 with the help of the United States Central Intelligence Agency, it was used as an instrument of political suppression against opponents of the Government of President Park Chung Hee, who was assassinated last October.

With thousands of agents on its payroll and thousands of nonpayroll "agents of influence," the agency made its presence felt in almost every aspect of the daily life of the 37 million people. Its budget is known only to the President, to whom it directly reports, and to a few of his aides.

Suppression of Espionage

Its legal task of suppressing espionage has often been overshadowed by its political operations against dissidents. As a result of the purge, the announcement said, the original security function has been "enhanced and strengthened in terms of quality."

"Vacancies inside the agency have been filled with recruitment from inside with capable officials being appointed to the right positions," it said. The emphasis was on "reinforcing the tasks dealing with anti-Communist stance."

The agency caused an international uproar in 1973 after its operatives allegedly kidnapped the opposition leader Kim Dae Jung from Japan; in 1967 West Germany nearly broke diplomatic relations with Seoul after agents were suspected of abducting leftist South Korean students from West Berlin and other places in Europe.

Despite the agency's power, many of its leaders' careers ended disastrously. One of them, Kim Jae Kyu, was hanged last month after he assassinated President Park. Former Prime Minister Kim Jong Pil, the agency's first director, and Lee Hu Rak, the sixth, are being held on charges of corruption. Kim Hyong Wook, the third head, disappeared in Paris last year after years of exile in the United States. Kim Kae Won, the agency's fourth chief, is serving a life term in prison in connection with the assassination of Mr. Park.

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ON PAGE A-9

NEW YORK TIMES
22 JUNE 1980

Aspin Says U.S. May See Another Flood of Cubans

By RICHARD BURT

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 21 — Representative Les Aspin has warned that the Castro Government may be preparing to push another wave of refugees out of Cuba, and officials in Washington say this view is shared by intelligence officials in the Carter Administration.

Mr. Aspin, a Wisconsin Democrat and a member of the House Intelligence Committee, said in a statement that there were "several kinds of evidence" to suggest that President Fidel Castro was

preparing to send more Cubans abroad. About 115,000 Cubans entered the United States in April and May.

Noting that the Administration had clamped down on American skippers bringing refugees into the country, Mr. Aspin said Mr. Castro could send refugees to the American naval base at Guantánamo.

An intelligence subcommittee headed by Mr. Aspin asserted in a report this month that the Central Intelligence Agency had predicted as early as January that there might be a flood of refugees from Cuba and that the White

House and State Department had ignored the warnings.

In his statement Mr. Aspin said a worsening economic situation in Cuba made it likely that Mr. Castro would try to get rid of additional "undesirables" who could make trouble for his Government.

"There is evidence that Castro has been improving the departure port of Mariel, giving it the look of a permanent installation," he said. Most of the Cubans left from Mariel.

Mr. Aspin added: "There is evidence that Castro has aligned himself with a hard-line faction that favors a policy of confrontation with the United States."

Mr. Aspin is known to have recently discussed the possibility of a new wave of refugees with intelligence officials. Administration officials confirmed that the Central Intelligence Agency expected further problems.

Proposes More Thoughtful Policy

Reiterating charges that the Administration was unprepared for the arrival of refugees in April and May, Mr. Aspin said, "The nation had better give more thought to what policy we will pursue if there is another refugee flood, because the chances are very good that Castro isn't finished cleansing his island of elements he doesn't like."

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ON PAGE A-7

WASHINGTON STAR
22 JUNE 1980

Delays in Space Shuttle Program Giving Military Intelligence Jitters

BY JOHN J. FIALKA

VANDENBERG AIR FORCE BASE, Calif. — One of the nation's most critical defense programs is under way here as earth movers claw at the rolling terrain of this windy, often fogbound piece of land jutting out into the Pacific just above Los Angeles.

The construction crews call the area "Slick 6," short for Space Launch Complex Six. When it is ready in 1984 it will be the fulfillment of what has been a 20-year dream for the Air Force: the first defense-controlled space launching facility.

While it has been overshadowed by the preparations under way for the space shuttle at the Kennedy Space Center in Florida, Vandenberg will be the second launch facility for the shuttle. The Department of Defense will be one of the shuttle's major customers, and many of the most militarily sensitive payloads for the shuttle will be launched from here.

The payloads will include the intelligence and communications systems necessary to protect and defend the nation during a nuclear war. "Over the next five years, our dependence on the shuttle to support our space systems will become critical," Secretary of Defense Harold Brown has told the Senate Commerce Committee.

While Brown did not elaborate, Air Force sources watching the shuttle program have become increasingly concerned as the schedule for launching the shuttle, which is being developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, has continued to slip.

At the moment, the first shuttle launch is planned at Kennedy next February, almost two years later than it was originally planned. "What has happened is that we have lost nearly all the margin that we had in this program," one Air Force shuttle manager said. "If it slips any further we have real trouble."

The "trouble," as he and others explained it, is that some of the military satellites now in orbit are degrading and some of the satellites being built to replace them have been designed as shuttle cargo. They

are too big and heavy to be launched by the conventional Titan III rockets now used for launches.

As an "insurance policy" for lighter-weight military cargos, the Air Force is keeping five aging Titan III rockets with special upper stages in reserve. It is also making provisions to make more Titans in case the shuttle delays continue.

Big satellites have many military uses in space, especially when they are propelled into what is called geosynchronous orbit, a height of over 20,000 miles, where they can orbit in harmony with a fixed point on the earth. Some of the most crucial satellites, from a military standpoint, are those positioned to watch for the telltale bursts of light and heat that would accompany a launch at a Soviet ICBM site.

Because of its geographic position, Vandenberg is the only U.S. space facility where payloads can be placed into polar orbit, the pathway that would take them most regularly over the Soviet land mass. Polar launches from Kennedy are not attempted for a variety of reasons, one of which is that the initial launch would have to take place over populous areas of the U.S. East Coast or over South America. From Vandenberg there is a clear shot southward over the Pacific to Antarctica.

Expressed in financial terms, the Defense Department's interest in space now rivals NASA's for the first time in two decades. This year the Pentagon's space-related budget came to almost \$4 billion, within a few million of NASA's. Much of that budget is being spent here where facilities once designed to launch a military Manned Orbiting Laboratory project — scrapped — in the early 1970s, are being converted and enlarged for shuttle use.

While some military proponents and some Air Force critics have written that the shuttle will have a direct weapons potential, the Air Force denies this. "When the program gets underway we will have only four launchers. You'd be extremely judicious how you'd use them in a wartime scenario," said one spokesman.

Perhaps the best public view of the overall defense potential for the shuttle was given a few months ago

in a speech by Maj. Gen. William R. Yost, director of Space Systems for the Air Force. Among the uses he described were:

- Communications. Two thirds of the military's long range communications, he explained, are now carried out by satellite. Satellite communications, because they are of high quality and relatively jam-proof, were critical to two recent special military operations: the recovery of the U.S. merchant ship Mayaguez after its seizure by Cambodians in 1975 and the aborted raid on Iran to rescue the American hostages held in Tehran. The shuttle, Yost explained, will be used to "proliferate" the number of existing satellites to make it more difficult for an enemy to totally destroy U.S. communications systems.

- Better defense of existing satellites. Some new satellites, he said, will have to be heavier because they will be shielded against various forms of radiation. Some will carry more fuel to allow them to maneuver more in orbit. And some will have to be placed in much higher orbits to escape the reach of potential anti-satellite weaponry. One new satellite system, being designed for command and control of U.S. nuclear forces, will be put into an orbit that is 130,000 miles high.

- Pinpoint navigation. Another planned system, the Global Positioning Satellite System, will allow a user to determine his position and the enemy's position to within around thirty feet. Among the uses for this, Yost explained, will be precision night bombing capability, "first shot accuracy" for artillery rounds, and the ability to land military forces in perfect darkness at "any airfield or any properly surveyed super highway or cow pasture in the world."

- Total Control. While some critics of the U.S. military say that it has become far too dependent on decisions by higher officers far removed from the battle, Yost sees the idea of "total battle management" as the "most exciting and promising view of the future."

According to Yost, the battle commander, perhaps even the commander-in-chief, would be able to see and control an entire theater of war on a moment-to-moment basis via satellite.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 18NEWSWEEK
30 June 1980

New Light on the Rescue Mission

What caused the failure of the disastrous American attempt to rescue the hostages in Iran? NEWSWEEK's David C. Martin has unearthed previously unpublished details of the aborted mission. His report:

The placid waters of the Gulf of Oman were fading into twilight as the eight RH-53D Sea Stallion helicopters lifted off the deck of the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier U.S.S. Nimitz last April 24. The helicopters hovered briefly at 400 feet, grouping themselves into a loose, diamond-shaped formation, then swung north at 120 knots toward the Iranian coastline 50 miles away. On the Nimitz's bridge, an officer picked up a scrambler phone. In an instant, he was connected to an Egyptian air base about 300 miles south of Cairo where the task force's commander, Maj. Gen. James Vaught, was standing by. Operation Eagle Claw, he told Vaught, was under way as scheduled at five minutes past 7, local time.

The helicopters' initial destination was the staging area called Desert One—an abandoned salt flat in Iran's Dasht-e-Kavir desert about 600 miles north of the coast and 250 miles from Teheran. At Desert One, they would rendezvous with six C-130 transport planes that had left Egypt two hours earlier carrying men, equipment and the fuel for the next leg of their journey—a 270-mile dash under cover of darkness to a mountain hide-out code-named "Figbar" just 50 miles southeast of Teheran. They were supposed to arrive at Figbar before dawn and hunker down there for the day, waiting until nightfall to attempt the actual rescue. The mission had been in the works for more than six months. Early on, the planners had considered sending in the commandos by truck from Turkey. They also thought about launching the raid from a carrier task force in the eastern Mediterranean. But the back desert route was considered the best option.

The Odds: Planners figured the mission required a minimum of six Sea Stallions. According to their calculations, there was a 96.5 per cent probability that if eight choppers were dispatched from the Nimitz, at least six would make it to Figbar. Sending ten Sea Stallions would have raised the probability to 99.2 per cent. But that would have required an additional C-130 to refuel them, raising the risk of detection. In the end, the planners decided that the extra 2.7 per cent edge simply wasn't worth it.

The copters were twelve minutes behind schedule when they crossed the Iranian coast in a gap between two radar stations, at Jask and Chah Bahar. That was because the Nimitz had to steam further away from the coast than planned in order to keep

at least 200 miles away from a Soviet spy ship stationed near the Strait of Hormuz.


The first sign of trouble came about an hour into the mission, when the pilot of the No. 6 helicopter flashed a light indicating he was setting down. Operating under a prearranged buddy system, the No. 8 chopper landed with him. In the No. 1 helicopter, flight leader Lt. Col. Edward Seiffert had no way of telling what had happened. The only means of in-flight communication between the helicopters was a nonsecure high-frequency radio that was supposed to be used only in the direst of emergencies. Since no one broke radio silence, all Seiffert could do was to report over his secure scrambler phone to Vaught and deputy task-force commander Col. James Kyle, who was riding in the lead C-130, that two of his helicopters were down. The No. 8 chopper's tail had been damaged on the Nimitz—and it had spent so much time in the shop that it was known as the "hangar queen." But it was the No.

Even if the plan had worked, the Pentagon estimated casualties of up to 15 hostages and 30 troops.

6 chopper that had been disabled by a loss of pressure in one of its rotor blades. Its crew and classified material were transferred to the No. 8 chopper, which took off and soon caught up with the formation.

The mission's planners had expected at least one chopper to break down. From the beginning, the Sea Stallion was something of a compromise choice for the rescue mission. The Army's CH-47 helicopter might have been better suited for the long, arduous overland journey to Desert One and beyond. But preparing the CH-47 might have raised suspicions: why were eight Army choppers being transferred to an aircraft carrier?

As the remaining seven choppers were nearing "Turnpoint Four," a navigational point near the town of Bam, they ran into a strange floating fog of dust. Normally, dust storms are sand swirls accompanied by strong winds. But this dust storm was different. "There was no blowing sand, no wind, no significant turbulence or any other indications of a sandstorm," reported a later Pentagon paper. "The phenomenon was suspended dust." A fine talcum-like powder, it sifted into the cockpits, coating



Manoecher—Sipa-Black Star

The Pentagon anticipated that the mission might have to be called off. But the rescue team never practiced executing an order to abort—and that may have contributed to the final tragedy.

the pilots' lips and raising the temperature from an already uncomfortable 88 degrees to a nearly intolerable 93 degrees.

As soon as they hit the dust, Seiffert's lead chopper and its buddy landed. The other five helicopters didn't see them. Instead, they flew on. Realizing he had been left behind, Seiffert took off again. Technically, the mission could have been aborted at that point, since the dust cloud had reduced visibility so badly. But because the dust cloud resembled no sandstorm the pilots had ever experienced—and because the C-130s ahead of them had radioed back no warnings—they pressed on, convinced they would emerge from it at any moment.

'Haboob': What they had encountered was a *haboob*, a rare though hardly unknown meteorological phenomenon in which gusts generated by thunderstorms kick up great masses of dust many miles away. *Haboobs* occur in the southwestern United States, where the dust usually settles back to earth within ten minutes. But in Iran, where the dust is much finer, a *haboob* can linger in the air for hours. The 1970 CIA intelligence summary that the mission's weather forecasters used mentioned *haboobs* only briefly and said nothing about their duration. Had the planners searched through the archives of weather satellite photos at the University of Wisconsin, they might have turned up evidence of long-lasting Iranian *haboobs*. But the mission's urgency—as well as security requirements that kept personnel to a minimum—did not permit such in-depth research. Security concerns also nixed an idea to set up a clandestine weather station in the Iranian desert that might have detected the *haboobs*. (As many as 1,000 people knew enough about the mission to compromise it—and one loose-lipped sailor on emergency leave almost did.)

In any case, no one thought to brief the

pilots about *haboobs*. And when a photograph of Iran taken by the NOAA 6 weather satellite just two minutes before the mission began showed no storms within 50 miles of the flight plan, the experts concluded that weather would not be a problem. The pilots, totally unprepared for the experience of flying through a *haboob*, thus began their mission in a state of much confusion and consternation.

Disoriented: In the midst of the *haboob*, the No. 5 chopper lost its gyro when a blower that cooled the gyro's power source burned out. Unable to see the ground through the dust, the chopper's pilots became so disoriented that they nearly crashed. Rather than try to negotiate a 9,000-foot ridge that lay between them and Desert One, they decided to turn back—even though they didn't have enough fuel to reach the Nimitz. Breaking radio silence, they told Seiffert of their decision. He relayed it to Vaught, who relayed it to the carrier, which reversed course and began speeding toward the Iranian coast to cut the distance the stricken helicopter had to cover. They barely made it. One of the choppers ran out of fuel moments after setting down on the Nimitz's deck.

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ON PAGE 25

TIME
30 June 1980

Wipe Out

Protecting embassy secrets

When the Communists stormed the U.S. embassy in Saigon in 1975, they captured files and computers laden with secret material, including the names of informants in North Viet Nam. In 1979 the mobs of students who seized the U.S. embassy in Tehran found secret material presumably showing the intimate links between Washington and the Shah—there had not been time to destroy it.

At last, the National Security Agency is developing safeguards to make sure such accidents never happen again. Working with a private firm, NSA is designing a system of special minicomputers for U.S. embassies around the world. Standard computers would still store normal messages, but sensitive data would be fed into the new machines. Unlike the material in regular computers, this information—millions of words—could be erased in a matter of moments.

To give the operators time to act, the State Department has installed heavy steel doors that can be slid into place to block the stairways to the upper floors of embassies, where the code rooms are located. Another new security ploy: nozzles in the corridors that at the push of a button spew tear or nausea gas on invaders. ■

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NEW YORK TIMES
22 JUNE 1980

SOVIET COAL TERMED POOR PROP IN CRISIS

According to C.I.A. Report, It Will
'Not Be a Solution to Energy
Crunch' Facing Moscow

By DREW MIDDLETON

The debate among Administration officials, politicians and scholars over the military intentions of the Soviet Union focuses sooner or later on energy.

The Central Intelligence Agency, which provoked discussion with a report that Soviet oil production would fall by the mid-1980's, has added to the debate with a study saying that "coal will not be a solution to the energy crunch" facing Moscow.

Some Administration military planners conclude that Soviet energy requirements, particularly oil, could motivate military adventures in the Persian Gulf or elsewhere in the third world.

Other experts maintain that the C.I.A. estimates of a Soviet "energy crisis" are exaggerated and that the Russians will have sufficient coal and oil without seeking control of foreign resources.

Drop in Output Forecast

The C.I.A. study concludes that "with oil production expected to decline beginning in the early 1980's, Moscow will want to use coal rather than oil" in areas where natural gas is not available. But the study adds, "Supply constraints will limit how much offset to declining oil production coal can provide."

The agency forecasts a decline in the supply of coal for all uses of more than 20 percent by 1985. The report adds that to meet the demands of the energy industry and to maintain coal shipments to other sectors of the economy, production would have to increase to 550 million tons of cleaned coal by that year, the equivalent of 870 million tons of raw coal. "We feel that this level of output is clearly beyond Soviet capabilities," the report said.

It finds that during the 1976-80 five-year plan coal fell well behind schedule, with 1979 production of 719 million metric tons, 5 million tons below 1978 and 33 million tons short of the revised goal for 1979. The study predicts that output this year will be 80 million tons short of the goal of 805 million.

Siberian Reserves Noted

The study also emphasizes that production could be significantly expanded by exploitation of resources in Siberia, where costs are from a seventh to a half those in the Donets Basin, in the European part of the Soviet Union. However, these low costs are offset by transportation costs 10 times higher than oil pipelining and twice those of gas pipelining.

In the last 20 years, as the production of oil surged to put the Soviet Union in first place among world producers, there was a relative decline in the contribution of coal to overall Soviet energy output. This contribution fell from 50 percent in 1960 to 25 percent in 1978, and the C.I.A. expects the decline to continue through the middle of this decade. But as the Russians attempt to limit the use of oil, coal should provide a larger share of thermal power.

The problems in the coal industry are apparently most critical in the Donets Basin, which supplies 30 percent of the coal as well as almost half of the coking coal vital to iron and steel smelting. The output of coking coal in the Donets in 1978 was about 7 percent below the 1975 figure. If this decline continues it could have a direct bearing on steel output later in this decade, the analysts suggested.

Working Conditions Improved

Two hundred years of mining have exhausted easily exploitable coal seams the Donets Basin. The average depth of mines is expected to increase and thin seams impede the use of mechanized technology.

One consequence is that mining in the Donets is labor-intensive; 55 percent of the industry's labor force produces 30 percent of the coal. The Government has made every effort to hold miners on the job and attract new labor to the region. The average workweek has been cut to 30 hours and wages for underground workers have been increased substantially.

The situation in the Donets Basin and the expectation of an overall energy problem in the next five years have emphasized the importance of raising production in the Asian fields, particularly those in the Ekibastuz and Kuznetsk Basins.

The C.I.A. does not believe that major increases in output from the huge Kansk-Achinsk lignite basin in Siberia can be expected before the 1990's.

This view is borne out in a recent study by Leslie Dienes of the University of Kansas in a study titled "The Soviet Energy System." According to Professor Dienes, Kansk-Achinsk lignite poses technical problems as a power-station fuel and "research and development work is proceeding slowly."

Transportation Problem Is Crucial

The crucial factor in the exploitation of the eastern fields from Moscow's standpoint is the transportation of coal or energy produced from coal to centers of heavy industry.

The construction of power plants at the mines and of ultra-high-voltage direct-current lines for the transmission of power are a long-term project. According to the C.I.A. study, it would require technology not yet available to Soviet or Western industry. The costs would be high and the power losses over the lines to the western areas of the country would be unacceptable.

The agency suggests that the most feasible policy is to improve the shipment of coal by rail from Siberia to major industrial centers in the Ural Mountains. This would involve a significant investment for expansion of existing rail lines.

Although conceding that the judgments must be "considered highly tentative," the C.I.A. says that on present information "increased coal production clearly is unlikely to contribute much to relieve the Soviet energy problem through the 1980's at least."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 18U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
30 June 1980

On the Home Front, a Creaky Soviet Economy Bedevils the Kremlin

MOSCOW

Kremlin leaders fretting over troublesome allies can find little to cheer about at home either.

The Soviet economy, second largest in the world, is sick, and many experts predict it will get far worse before it improves.

The problem was underscored most recently in mid-June by reports of strikes at the Soviet Union's two largest automobile factories. As many as 170,000 workers walked off their jobs, idling the plants for three days in early May.

Food shortages were cited as a main grievance of striking workers at both the Tolyatti and Gorky plants on the Volga River in Central Russia.

But current economic problems go beyond lagging agricultural production. An energy crisis is looming, antiquated industrial machinery is creaking, and labor productivity is declining.

Few Western diplomats in Moscow believe the walkouts will spread, but the strikes have drawn unwelcome attention to acute shortages throughout Russia of meat and dairy products.

Supplies are dwindling because of a poor harvest, a cutback on U.S. wheat exports to Russia and feed scarcities that led to the premature slaughtering of cattle, poultry and other animals this year. Further depleting stocks are food shipments to Afghanistan, Vietnam and other countries where Russia is busy establishing a presence.

For years, the Soviets' energy self-sufficiency was one of the few

bright spots in an otherwise bleak economic picture. Not so any more. In fact, says the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, the country could easily become a net importer of oil within the next five years, causing difficulty not only for the Russians, but for allies and customers in Eastern Europe.

The main reason for the developing Soviet energy crisis: A lack of high technology needed to exploit vast oil and gas resources. Crucial American technological help was lost when the Russians marched into Afghanistan.

Lowering sights. Even under the best of circumstances, the slowdown in economic-growth rates is almost certain to continue in the early 1980s. The Kremlin's once optimistic state planners already have been forced to trim their goals for economic expansion.

The reasons are many. Russia is immensely rich in raw materials, but they are costly to exploit and, in the vast reaches of Siberia and the far north, are difficult to get at.

The Soviets have a huge accumulation of plants and machinery, but much of its industrial hardware is obsolete. Agricultural methods and food transport are equally inefficient and wasteful.

Labor output, likewise, is poor. So far, the increase in worker productivity has been just half the 20 percent improvement called for in a five-year development plan. Alcoholism and absenteeism among workers have reached chronically high levels.

It will take a long time for the Soviets to reverse a situation that has been many years in the making. Says one Western analyst working in Moscow: "The 1980s are going to be rough on the Soviets unless they get good weather five years in succession, which would end their agricultural shortages, or unless they make their peace with the U.S., which would help put steam in their industrial machine."

This report was filed by Robert P. Martin, our Moscow bureau chief.

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ON PAGE 15

NEWSWEEK
30 June 1980

PERISCOPE

More Books by CIA Men

Former CIA agents are still rushing into print to tell all—or as much as the agency's censors will allow. So far this year, the CIA has scrutinized 22 manuscripts to make sure that the authors don't spill any important secrets. The books submitted include novels by E. Howard Hunt Jr. of Watergate fame and Frank Snepp, whom the government successfully sued for failing to clear his previous book with CIA reviewers. Among the non-fiction books in the works are the memoirs of two CIA legends: Cord Meyer and Theodore Shackley. Meyer directed the CIA's secret funding of student organizations in the 1960s. Shackley served in Berlin, Vientiane and Saigon, among other hot spots.

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THE SHARON HERALD (PA)
11 JUNE 1980

CIA is trying to clamp down on writings

By PAMELA GLASS
Ottawa News Service

WASHINGTON — How much should the public know about America's secret operations in foreign countries?

The CIA thinks only certain "unclassified" information should be released to the public, claiming that publication of secrets will endanger the lives of agents abroad and jeopardize CIA operations.

But scores of current and former CIA employees, as well as journalists, think the public has the right to know more about what American intelligence operatives have been doing abroad and what kinds of information they uncover about foreign countries.

Books about the CIA are hitting the bestseller lists as fast, and as frequently, as those about fad diets and movie stars' sex lives.

Authors have exposed names of hundreds of undercover agents living abroad, released details about "classified" operations and spilled their guts about the inner workings of one of the nation's most intriguing but least publicized government agencies.

The CIA at present has no control over books written by authors who have never had any professional connection with the CIA.

But a four-year-old CIA Publications Review Board is trying to clamp down on the writings of present and former employees by requiring them to submit all manuscripts to the seven-member board for review.

In fact, this review requirement forces current and past CIA employees to honor a pledge they sign that binds them to silence about classified CIA information.

Of the 225 manuscripts submitted by employees since 1976, the board has "disapproved" only five, according to Herbert E. Hetu, review board chairman and director of public affairs.

"We look at the sources and methods of gathering information for the manuscript," Hetu said in a recent interview at CIA headquarters, which is nestled among a forest of tall trees in Langley, Va., a Washington suburb.

"We might ask the author to make changes in the manuscripts if he has described a person or an operation in a way that it could reveal an agent's identity or expose a (classified) CIA operation," Hetu said.

If an author refuses to make the revisions, "we can use a court injunction to get the book stopped," added Hetu, a native of Sharon, Pa., and a 27-year veteran of the Navy.

As an example, Hetu cited the recent incident involving Frank Snepp, a former CIA officer, who wrote a book detailing CIA involvement in Vietnam.

"Snepp said he would submit the book for review before going to publication, but he then appeared on '60 Min-



Herbert E. Hetu

utes' (TV program)," Hetu said. "We took him to court on breach of contract and we won. He had to hand over his profits to the government."

It also works the other way around, too. "Anyone who disagrees with our review can take us to court," Hetu added. "We're not the final word."

But, Hetu admits, the CIA usually wins.

Hetu denies that this review is conventional censorship and a violation of First Amendment rights that guarantee freedom of speech.

"It's not censorship in the common usage of the term. We don't take out things that are critical of the agency," Hetu said, pointing to a row of recent books on the CIA behind his desk, many of which he says are critical of the agency.

"But we do ask them to take things out that are classified. We sit down with a lawyer and determine if it's classified information."

"The CIA is hard to write about," Hetu added. "Everyone wants to write about the wild (spy) things. But the real story is that we collect information all over the world in a variety of different ways — open sources, newspapers, photography, satellites and American intelligence officers as well as (foreign) spies."

Nonetheless the "spies" are "very important to what we do," he emphasized. "The more technical information we gather, the more we need the spies. If you find out there's a launching pad, it makes you more interested to find out why its there."

This is where the foreign agent comes in. Acting under the direction of an American intelligence officer, he agrees to pass on information about his country's government.

These agents cooperate mostly for ideological reasons, Hetu said. "They believe in our system, or they believe that theirs should be changed."

Hetu believes there are adequate safeguards to assure the public that the CIA isn't overstepping its bounds.

Under the present system of reporting, the CIA must inform eight congressional committees and the president of any plans for undercover operations.

Congress forced this oversight system on the CIA a few years ago, after criticism of the agency's role in the overthrow of Chilean President Salvador Allende and after press revelations that the CIA, in violation of its original charter, maintained dossiers on politically active American citizens.

A proposed new CIA charter, however, which was dropped from consideration this year by a Senate committee, would require informing only the House and Senate Intelligence Committees. The new charter has been pushed by legislators who feel, in light of the currently beleaguered state of American foreign policy, that Congress may have tied the hands of the CIA too much.

"I think the people can be adequately assured that we're not doing anything illegal or immoral. The oversight procedure is working quite well," Hetu said. "Besides, covert action is so little of what we do. After (congressional) hearings in the early 1970s, the country said no more."

In addition, the CIA's interest in foreign countries has changed greatly since the agency was founded by President Truman in 1947, Hetu explained. The CIA was born primarily as a response to nation's failure to learn of and head off the bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941.

"In the 1940s, we were concerned (mostly) with the Soviet Union and its sphere of influence and military operations, but now virtually every country in the world can influence world events," Hetu said.

"Now we're interested in all the socio-economic influences — energy, terrorism, narcotics, ecology and politics — that influence the world."

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LEGISLATION

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WALL STREET JOURNAL
4 June 1980

Senate Bid to Leash Intelligence Activity By U.S. Ends With 89-to-1 Vote Against

By DAVID IGNATIUS

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON—A Senate effort to devise a charter for the U.S. intelligence community, which began with a bang four years ago, ended yesterday with a whimper.

In place of the broad, 172-page statute that the Senate Intelligence Committee had drafted to limit intelligence activities, the Senate overwhelmingly adopted a four-page bill that would leave the intelligence agencies more or less alone. The vote was 89 to one, with Sen. William Proxmire (D., Wis.) casting the only negative vote.

The measure is similar to one already passed by the House, so the final version is likely to be along the same lines.

The vote signaled the degree to which attitudes have changed since 1976, when Senate investigators were blasting the Central Intelligence Agency for past abuses and demanding strict limits on its activities.

Yesterday, most Senators seemed to share the view of Sen. Daniel P. Moynihan (D., N.Y.) that the years of exposes have left the CIA a "seriously injured institution," its vulnerability a contributing factor in recent U.S. foreign-policy reversals.

The Senate bill would abolish a requirement, enacted in 1974 as the wave of CIA criticism was beginning, that the agency report covert activities to as many as eight congressional committees. The bill slashes this to just two committees—the House and Senate intelligence panels.

Senate Intelligence Committee leaders also gave way on what had been their last major demand—for "prior notice" to the intelligence committees of covert operations. Instead, the intelligence community would keep the two committees "fully and currently informed" about its activities and explain later, "in a timely fashion," why it suppressed details of any specific operations.

Despite its stress on congressional supervision, rather than elaborate rules and restrictions, the Senate bill allows wide latitude for the President to withhold intelligence information from Congress.

The measure notes, specifically, that committee actions must be "consistent" with the Constitution's separation of legislative and executive powers, and that, in releasing information to Congress, the Executive Branch must pay "due regard" to protection of "intelligence sources and methods."

Backers of the intelligence charter had hoped for much tougher congressional powers. But as the intelligence debate progressed, they found that the political constituency for harsh controls had almost disappeared. Indeed, the broad charter, in its most recent draft, had failed to win support from either the intelligence establishment or from civil libertarians.

The House already has adopted, in an amendment to a foreign-aid bill, a similar proposal dealing with congressional supervision of intelligence. A final version of the legislation is likely to be ready for President Carter to sign before Congress adjourns this fall.

Congressional aides say there aren't likely to be other intelligence proposals enacted this year. One such measure, which would prohibit the CIA from employing reporters, clergy and academics, or from using these professions as covers for spying, was briefly introduced yesterday by Sen. Moynihan. But the New York Democrat quickly withdrew the amendment, noting that even this simple limit on the intelligence community might doom the bill.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-16NEW YORK TIMES
4 JUNE 1980

Senate Approves Bill on Oversight For Intelligence

Congress Would Get Prior Notice of Operations

By PHILIP TAUBMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 3—The Senate today overwhelmingly approved legislation that would establish Congressional overseeing of United States intelligence agencies and require, except in rare circumstances, that Congress be notified before covert espionage operations could begin.

The bill, which passed by a vote of 89 to 1, would give Congress, for the first time, statutory authority to oversee the activities of all American intelligence agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The House passed similar legislation earlier this year as part of a foreign aid bill. However, to facilitate a conference committee's consideration of the Senate bill, House leaders are expected to introduce additional legislation nearly identical with the Senate bill approved today. Passage is expected in the House later this year.

Charter Legislation Trimmed

The Senate bill represents only a small portion of the comprehensive "intelligence charter" that was considered this year by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

Previous oversight authority, contained in the Hughes-Ryan Amendment passed in 1974, was limited to monitoring of covert operations conducted by the C.I.A. That legislation was named after former Senator Harold Hughes, Democrat of Idaho, and the late Representative Leo J. Ryan, Democrat of California.

The new legislation, known as the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980, reduces from eight to two the number of Congressional committees that must receive prior notification of covert operations. The previous oversight measure, which stipulated that eight committees receive such notification, has been criticized on the ground that it permits dissemination of sensitive intelligence information to nearly 200 members of Congress.

The lone dissenting vote today was cast by Senator William Proxmire, Democrat of Wisconsin, who did not give an explanation.

The bill would establish procedures for "limited" prior notification when the President determines that notification of two committees might compromise covert operations. In such "extraordinary circumstances," prior notification could be limited to eight Congressional leaders.

The committees to be notified under the new measure are the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

Provision for No Notification

The bill anticipates cases in which the President decides against any notification. If the President chose to assert his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief to create a covert operation without Congressional notification he would be required under the measure to inform Congress afterward about the operation in a "timely fashion" and provide reasons for withholding prior notice.

The comprehensive charter considered earlier was set aside by the Senate intelligence committee when its members could not reach a consensus on how far such legislation should go in controlling and limiting the activities of intelligence agencies. The impetus for a charter, which developed in the mid-1970's after disclosures about C.I.A. abuses, faded this year after the Soviet incursion in Afghanistan and amid mounting pressure to "unleash" the C.I.A.

The legislation passed today does not deal with most of the controversial issues raised in the charter debate, and thus satisfied both liberal and conservative critics of a comprehensive charter.

The bill, for example, does not approve or prohibit the use of academics, journalists or clerics by intelligence agencies. Nor does it release the C.I.A. and other intelligence agencies from provisions of the Freedom of Information Act, as the Carter Administration would have liked.

Criminal Penalties Not Included

The legislation also does not include criminal penalties for disclosure of the identities of intelligence agents, another measure promoted by the Administration.

Instead, the four-page bill deals with what several senators today called the "narrow" subject of Congressional oversight. On this issue it represents a compromise between those who wanted the C.I.A. freed from any requirement of prior notification and those who wanted the law to require advance notice of all covert activities.

To lay the groundwork for notification, the bill states that the Director of Central Intelligence and the heads of all agencies must keep the Senate and House intelligence committees "fully and currently" informed of all but a few intelligence activities.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A3THE WASHINGTON POST
4 June 1980

Senate Passes Rule Change on Intelligence Reporting

On Capitol Hill

The Senate yesterday passed, 89 to 1, and sent to the House a bill that had started out as a 172-page charter for the U.S. intelligence community and ended as a four-page change in the rules on keeping Congress informed of intelligence activities. Only William Proxmire (D-Wis.) voted against the bill.

The spying community now is subject to the Hughes-Ryan amendment to a foreign aid bill in 1974 that requires that the CIA report to eight congressional committees in "a timely fashion"—which could mean after the fact—on covert operations, which might include helping topple an unfriendly government.

The bill approved yesterday expands reporting requirements to include all U.S. intelligence agencies, but reduces the number of committees they must report to to the House and Senate Intelligence committees. The bill requires that prior notice be given of intelligence activities, but if the president determines it would be too risky to national security to give the information to such a

large group, the information may be given only to eight members—the four senior congressional leaders of both parties and the four senior members of the two committees.

Should the president claim some alleged constitutional power not to give any prior notice of covert operations, he is directed to "fully inform" the Intelligence committees in a timely fashion.

The intelligence agencies are directed generally to keep the two committees "fully and currently informed" of their activities.

The House has written into a foreign aid bill still pending before it a narrower provision which simply modifies Hughes-Ryan by reducing to two the number of committees to which the CIA must report on its covert operations.

Senate Approves New Oversight Bill on 'Spy' Activities

Prior Notification Is Measure's Key

By Lisa Myers

Washington Star Staff Writer

The Senate yesterday overwhelmingly approved legislation to relax certain restrictions on intelligence agencies but required that Congress be notified in advance of virtually all covert and significant counterintelligence activities.

The bill, approved 89-1, would give the CIA what it wants most — a reduction of the number of congressional committees with supervision over and knowledge of its operations. Instead of reporting to eight panels, as required under present law, the agency would be answerable only to the House and Senate Intelligence committees.

In y oversight authority. The 1974 Hughes-Ryan Act required that Congress be informed in a "timely" fashion of significant intelligence activities. That generally was interpreted as letting lawmakers in on the action after the fact.

The new bill, which has the administration's blessing, would require that the two intelligence committees be notified before any covert action, significant intelligence collection or counterintelligence activity is undertaken.

Senate Intelligence Chairman Birch Bayh, D-Ind., said that with one "extraordinary" exception, his panel has received such prior notice consistently over the past four years. The bill simply codifies the oversight process to ensure that it isn't subject to the whim of a future president, he said.

In future "extraordinary circumstances," the prior notification requirement could be fulfilled by informing eight members of Congress: House and Senate Democratic leaders and the chairmen and rank-

ing Republicans of the two intelligence committees.

In the most sensitive cases, the president could invoke his constitutional powers and not inform anyone in Congress beforehand. But he would have to notify Congress "in a timely fashion" of the activity and explain why prior notice was not given. Sen. Walter Huddleston, D-Ky., a key figure in negotiating the bill, said he believes the only constitutional basis for the president to withhold prior notice is "when time does not permit."

Another significant aspect of the legislation — which governs the FBI, National Security Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency as well as the CIA — would require the agencies to provide the intelligence panels with all intelligence information they want. That includes sources and methods.

The bill would go beyond present law by requiring the CIA to report any "significant intelligence fail-

ure" along with any corrective actions taken or planned. This would include major analytical errors, leaks to the press or enemy agents, technical failures and botched clandestine operations.

Also to be reported to Congress is any illegal intelligence activity or any action in violation of an executive order or CIA regulation.

The four-page bill, opposed only by Sen. William Proxmire, D-Wis., is the remnant of a 171-page "spy" charter that was killed by a political crossfire between those who want to "unleash" the CIA and those who seek more restrictions.

Similar legislation was approved by the House earlier this year as part of a foreign aid bill. But to facilitate a conference, a separate bill is expected to be introduced and passed by the House soon.

Bayh said it would serve as the "cornerstone" of a comprehensive charter that his committee again will try to formulate.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 10

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
4 June 1980

WHAT ELSE IS

NEWS

NATION

Moynihan to withdraw amendment to CIA bill

Washington (AP)—Under pressure from his colleagues on the Senate Intelligence Committee, Sen. Daniel P. Moynihan (D-N.Y.) said yesterday he would abandon his efforts to prohibit CIA employment of journalists and bar its agents from posing as journalists.

Moynihan released to reporters a letter signed by the panel's chairman, Sen. Birch Bayh (D-Ind.), and five other committee members which urged their fellow senators to defeat Moynihan's measure.

Saying he "could not hope" to overcome that kind of opposition, Moynihan said he would offer and then withdraw his amendment when a Central Intelligence Agency "oversight" bill comes to the Senate floor this week. He said he at least wanted the issue debated.

REUTER

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SEN-Intelligence

WASHINGTON, JUNE 3; REUTER - THE SENATE TONIGHT APPROVED LEGISLATION WHICH REDUCES CONGRESSIONAL ACCESS TO INFORMATION ABOUT SECRET, U.S. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS.

THE SO-CALLED INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT ACT, PASSED BY 89 VOTES TO ONE, REDUCES FROM EIGHT TO TWO THE NUMBER OF CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES WHICH MUST BE INFORMED BY THE PRESIDENT ABOUT UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS.

THE MOVE IS AIMED AT LIMITING LEAKS OF SECRET INFORMATION.

THE BILL WAS THE REMNANT OF A 172-PAGE INTELLIGENCE CHARTER DRAFTED DURING NEARLY FIVE YEARS OF DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT.

DROPPED FROM THE BILL WERE SUCH PROVISIONS AS CRIMINAL PENALTIES FOR THE DISCLOSURE OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENTS' IDENTITIES AND A BAN ON THE USE OF JOURNALISTS, CLERGYMEN AND ACADEMICS FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES.

SENATORS WHO WORKED ON THE BILL SAID THEY WOULD TRY TO GET THOSE PROVISIONS REINSTATED IN A COMPREHENSIVE INTELLIGENCE CHARTER NEXT YEAR.

REUTER 1848 BM

NEWHOUSE NEWS

CONGRESS COLUMN: SUGGESTED FOR MONDAY USE

BY NILES BENSON

NEWHOUSE NEWS SERVICE

WASHINGTON - IN YET ANOTHER SYMBOL OF CONGRESSIONAL FAILURE, THE SENATE AND HOUSE THIS WEEK ARE SCHEDULED TO VOTE ON LEGISLATION TO RE-ESTABLISH THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY BACK INTO THE BUSINESS OF COVERT OPERATIONS.

THE PROBLEM IS THAT THE BILL IS A BAND-AID APPROACH TO A PROBLEM BOTH CONGRESS AND THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION AGREED THREE YEARS AGO NEEDED MAJOR SURGERY. THE NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE, CONGRESSIONALLY APPROVED CHARTER FOR THE NATION'S INTELLIGENCE APPARATUS SETTING FORTH IN LAW WHAT THE AGENCY AND ITS AGENTS CAN AND CANNOT DO IN THE SHADY WORLD WHERE NATIONAL SECURITY AND SECRETLY DISTORTED PRINCIPLE AND LED TO TRAGIC ABUSES IN TIMES NOT LONG PAST.

EFFORTS TO WRITE THAT CHARTER COLLAPSED AFTER PRESIDENT CARTER, WHO CAME INTO OFFICE PROMISING REFORM OF EVERYTHING, INCLUDING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, SUDDENLY REVERSED HIS FIELD AND WARNED CONGRESS AGAINST PLACING "UNWARRANTED RESTRAINTS" ON THE CIA IN HIS STATE OF THE UNION SPEECH LAST JANUARY.

PRIOR TO THAT SWITCH, THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION, DISCUSSION AND DRAFTING A NEW CHARTER ALREADY HAD CONSUMED THREE YEARS WITH THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COOPERATING EVER SO SLOWLY IN DEVELOPING THE NEW GUIDELINES.

IN 1975, WHEN THE PANORAMA OF PAST CIA ESCAPADES, INCLUDING ASSASSINATION PLOTS AND ILLEGAL SURVEILLANCE OF AMERICAN CITIZENS, WAS UNFOLDING IN PUBLIC, CONGRESS ADOPTED THE SO-CALLED "HUGHES-RYAN ACT" WHICH PREVENTED THE USE OF FUNDS FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OTHER THAN THOSE INTENDED SOLELY FOR GATHERING NECESSARY INFORMATION UNLESS THE PRESIDENT APPROVED THE ACTION AND NOTIFIED APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.

SO BROAD WAS THE NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT IN THE ACT THAT AS MANY AS 175 MEMBERS OF CONGRESS COULD CLAIM THE RIGHT TO BE CUT IN ON SECRET PLANS FOR COVERT ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE ARMED SERVICES, FOREIGN RELATIONS, INTELLIGENCE AND APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES.

IN ACTUAL PRACTICE, THE NUMBER OF PERSONS BRIEFED HAS ALWAYS BEEN MUCH SMALLER.

Page 1 of 2

NEWHOUSE NEWS

CIA

HUGHES-RYAN HAD CERTAIN CONSEQUENCES. ON ONE HAND; THE REPORTING REQUIREMENT HAD THE EFFECT OF INSURING THAT SUBSEQUENT COVERT OPERATIONS WERE WELL THOUGHT OUT AND ADEQUATELY CONSIDERED AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH. ON THE OTHER HAND; THE BROAD REPORTING REQUIREMENTS SEEM TO INVITE CONGRESSIONAL INTERFERENCE IN INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS. THERE IS AN OBVIOUS INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE SECRECY REQUIRED FOR SUCH OPERATIONS AND THE RELATIVELY LARGE NUMBER OF PERSONS IN CONGRESS PRIVY TO THOSE SECRETS. ALLIED FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES BEGAN BACKING OUT OF COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY; FEARING THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF THEIR OWN PERSONNEL AND METHODS MIGHT BE JEOPARDIZED.

WHEN A PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE AND HIGHLY PERILOUS COVERT OPERATION WAS UNDERTAKEN RECENTLY - THE ABORTED MISSION TO FREE U.S. HOSTAGES IN TEHRAN - THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION FOUND IT UNNECESSARY TO NOTIFY ANY COMMITTEE ON CAPITOL HILL; SIMPLY BY CALLING THE ENTIRE EXERCISE A HUMANITARIAN RESCUE MISSION.

SO CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS; UNABLE TO DRAFT A NEW CIA CHARTER AFTER THREE YEARS OF TRYING; HAVE DECIDED TO REMOVE THE CHILLING EFFECT OF THE HUGHES-RYAN ACT BY CUTTING DOWN THE NUMBER OF COMMITTEES WHICH MUST RECEIVE REPORTS OF COVERT ACTION. ONLY THE SENATE AND HOUSE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES WOULD RECEIVE THESE REPORTS UNDER A BILL SCHEDULED FOR SENATE ACTION TUESDAY. THE BILL ALSO STRESSES "PRIOR" NOTIFICATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES WHEN COVERT ACTION IS PLANNED; BUT IT LEAVES A LOOPHOLE: IN "EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES" THE PRESIDENT MAY WAIVE THE REQUIREMENT FOR PRIOR NOTICE TO CAPITOL HILL.

A SIMILAR PROVISION IS PART OF THE 1981 FOREIGN AID AUTHORIZATION BILL NOW MOVING TOWARD PASSAGE IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. IF THE CHANGE IN THE LAW DOES WHAT ADVOCATES CLAIM IT WILL DO; THE DANGER OF LEAKS WILL BE REDUCED AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WILL BE ABLE TO MOVE WITH MORE CONFIDENCE IN THE AREA OF COVERT ACTIVITY. THAT MAY OR MAY NOT BE A SMALL STEP FORWARD; BUT CONGRESS PROMISED MUCH MORE THAN THAT AND FAILED TO DELIVER.

RB END BENSON

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PUBLISHERS WEEKLY
30 May 1980

What Publishers Can Expect from Pending Intelligence Legislation

Congress has given up efforts to write a comprehensive new charter for the U.S. intelligence community this year. For publishing interests, what is likely to emerge is preservation of the status quo.

Congressional leaders now intend to pass simple legislation spelling out House and Senate committees' rights to oversee the intelligence agencies, but leave alone the laws that guarantee the public's access to unclassified intelligence material and preserve the CIA's right to use journalists and scholars in undercover work.

Although the Senate Intelligence Committee had to limit the scope of its bill in order to get it to the Senate floor in this election year, several attempts to amend the measure are anticipated when the full Senate acts late this month or early in June. Some of the likely amendments will be of direct interest to the publishing community.

As the legislation stands now, there will be no tinkering with the Freedom of Information Act, which allows the public to obtain unclassified information on intelligence activities. Earlier proposals would have exempted intelligence agencies from the FOIA.

There will be no proscription on divulging the names of intelligence officers or operatives. The original charter proposal would have made disclosure a crime for persons with authorized access to the names and would have carried a possible penalty of five years in prison and a \$50,000 fine.

In some bad news for publishing interests, the new legislation makes no mention of the CIA's use of journalists, clergy and scholars in its intelligence-gathering work. That means those groups would continue to rely on the administration in power to formulate guidelines for the use of such groups or individuals as covers for the intelligence community.

Current CIA policy is that journalists cannot be used except when specifically authorized by Central Intelligence Director Stansfield Turner. Clergy may be used only on an unpaid basis. There are no limitations on the use of academics.

It became clear as the Intelligence Committee wrangled over what to include in the charter that the various proposed amendments were so controversial the bill stood no chance of passage this late in an election year.

Chairman Birch Bayh (D., Ind.) worked out an agreement with two committee members, Sen. John Chafee (R., R.I.) and Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D., N.Y.). They agreed not to offer their amendments in committee so that at least the oversight section of the legislation could have a chance for passage.

Chafee is sponsor of a proposal that would ban the divulging of agents' names. Moynihan is sponsoring an amendment that would prohibit the CIA from using journalists, clergy and academics in its operations and would not even allow its agents to pose as members of those professions.

Moynihan has said that he still intends to offer his amendment on the Senate floor. Neither Chafee nor Moynihan was expected to succeed on the Senate floor, however.

In the House, meanwhile, action on a charter has been held up pending final Senate action. House Intelligence Committee Chairman Edward P. Bolland (D., Mass.) indicated to PW that he was not sympathetic to the publishing industry's concerns with the charter.

"Our committee would be interested in the proposal to add the [ban on the] identification of agents" to the charter, he said, and also to exempt the CIA from FOIA. On the use of journalists, clergy and academics, he said, "I see no objection to using that class on a voluntary basis. They can be very important sources for intelligence gathering."

No champions appeared in the Senate Intelligence Committee to lead a charge for excluding the CIA from the FOIA. Heavy lobbying against such an exemption by academic and civil rights groups during hearings earlier this year may have convinced the committee not to exempt the CIA from the act.

The Authors League, Association of American Publishers, and P.E.N.'s Freedom to Write Committee were among groups testifying in favor of restrictions on the CIA's use of people in certain professions and against a CIA exemption from the FOIA.

HOWARD FIELDS

DES MOINES REGISTER

19 MAY 1980

Less than half loaf

The Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980, approved recently by the Senate Intelligence Committee, has merit only to those who believe that half a loaf — or, in this case, a thin slice — is better than none.

The proposed law is supposed to give Congress the right to monitor the nation's intelligence community, but it contains major loopholes.

The measure would establish a complex reporting formula requiring the president to keep the Senate and House Intelligence committees "fully and currently" informed about a range of intelligence activities. But it would allow the president, in undefined circumstances, to provide no advance notice of actions. Time and again, the White House is given veto power over the law's reporting requirements.

The proposed law contains no prohibition on the use of journalists, academics and clerics as spies for the Central Intelligence Agency or other government intelligence groups. Senator Daniel

Patrick Moynihan (Dem., N.Y.), says he will introduce such a prohibition when the measure reaches the Senate floor, but it has little chance of success, given the zeal on Capitol Hill to let the CIA do pretty much what it wants to do.

Jerry J. Berman, legislative counsel to the American Civil Liberties Union, says the measure is a "step forward." He notes that the bill does not exempt the CIA from the requirements of the Freedom of Information Act. Nor would it ban the publication of the names of former intelligence agents.

Berman argues that, in an election year dominated by conservatives, an imperfect measure is better than none. He hopes that a more comprehensive charter might get on the books next year.

Maybe and maybe not. The danger is that enactment of this puny law will take the wind out of the sails of those who might otherwise have pressed for more meaningful legislation. That mustn't be allowed to happen.

MILWAUKEE JOURNAL (WI)
17 May 1980

Don't forget the CIA's abuses

When the misdeeds of the Central Intelligence Agency were spread on the public record several years ago, the lesson was plain: Sturdy checks on and consistent oversight of the CIA are essential.

Unfortunately, there is increasing talk of "unleashing" the CIA. And while the new mood won't stop the Russians cold in Afghanistan, it is stymieing efforts in Congress to write a legislative charter to govern CIA activities.

The only bill that the Senate Intelligence Committee has come up with falls deplorably short of the ideal. Yet in today's atmosphere of renewed superpower tensions, it is probably about as far as Congress will go. The practical task is to improve the inadequate measure's provisions as much as possible.

On the plus side, the bill would freeze into law the rules that presidents themselves have imposed on the CIA to guard against abuse. That means a future president couldn't rewrite these rules on a whim. The bill also would make a reasonable change in the reporting requirements on CIA operations. The CIA now must report its covert activities to a total of eight congressional committees; the bill would reduce that number to two — the House and Senate Intelligence Committees. Proponents of the change argue convincingly that having to report covert spying and other clandestine activities to more than 150 senators, representatives and various committee staff members almost assures leaks in secrecy.

However, other changes proposed in the bill are more questionable. Under the measure, the president would have to notify the two intelligence committees in advance of all "significant" CIA operations. But the president would also be grant-

ed some significant exceptions. Under "extraordinary circumstances," the chief executive could limit notification to eight congressional leaders. And in some undefined instances, the president could avoid *all* prior notification. Apparently, that means he could choose not to tell the committees anything — before or after the operation.

These exceptions are supposedly designed to protect a president's executive powers. But for an unscrupulous president, they could become loopholes wide enough to drive a truck through. And as recent history has unfortunately revealed, presidents do abuse their power. Remember the screwy assassination plots, the illegal bugging, the burglaries in the name of the law and on and on? The bill's exceptions should be tightened.

The committee measure has other shortcomings, too. For example, it fails to prohibit the CIA from using journalists, academics and clergy as spies. While such "covers" might be useful to the intelligence agency, they undermine the moral and intellectual integrity of the professions they are attempting to exploit. Such a ban should be included.

The general rationale for relaxing oversight of the CIA is that the agency needs room to maneuver if it is to generate high internal morale and do its job. And we agree that unnecessary hobbling of American intelligence activities should be avoided. However, let's remember that "dirty tricks" are not at the heart of CIA operations. The agency's main job is information gathering and evaluation. Ninety-nine percent of that task does not require making like Mata Hari. Rather, it requires mundane but competent day-to-day analysis. If the CIA concentrated on that core responsibility, its problems with oversight would be minimized.

NEWSDAY (LONG ISLAND, N.Y.)
14 MAY 1980

Holding Out for Tighter Control of the CIA

With hope all but abandoned for a comprehensive charter placing needed limits on what the Central Intelligence Agency may do, reformers in Congress must be careful not to play their one trump card too soon.

That card is the desire of the agency and the administration to reduce congressional notification of covert operations to two committees from the eight required under current law.

This may well be a sensible move, but conceding it too soon could leave those seeking to impose controls on the CIA with nothing in return.

Last week the Senate Intelligence Committee voted to pare down the notification requirement, but without tying the change to reforms in other areas. Among the most urgent of these is a ban, sponsored by Sen. Daniel P. Moynihan (D-N.Y.), on the employment of journalists, academics or members of the clergy as CIA operatives.

The CIA is pushing hard for counter-reforms: It wants total exemption from the Freedom of Information Act, for instance,

even though there are plenty of safeguards against release of classified materials now.

That's hardly the direction new rules for the CIA should be taking. It was, after all, grave abuses by the agency and previous administrations that spawned demands for more accountability and more effective congressional oversight.

Some senators on the Intelligence Committee recognize the value of postponing action on the changes sought by the CIA and the administration until the committee members can get agreement on genuine reforms. Otherwise, as Sen. Joseph Biden (D-Del.) noted, "there would be little impetus" ever to pass a comprehensive charter with restraints.

Reformers must hold out for trade-offs, even if that means waiting until next year before reducing the number of senators and representatives who would be privy to covert operations. So far, there's no evidence that the notification requirement has shackled the agency—but there's plenty of evidence that the CIA went overboard without it.



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THE WASHINGTON POST
5 June 1980

Clark Intends To Probe U.S. For Iranians

By Stuart Auerbach

Washington Post Foreign Service

TEHRAN, June 4—Former U.S. attorney general Ramsey Clark indicated tonight that he will establish and head a commission in the United States to investigate Iran's case against Washington as a first step leading to the release of the 53 American hostages.

The formation of the commission was suggested today by Iranian President Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr. Clark, one of the earliest American supporters of the Islamic revolution that overthrew the shah of Iran 17 months ago, suggested that the commission could use the Freedom of Information Act to obtain secret U.S. government documents.

Clark told the Associated Press that the proposal was of "enormous importance" and an "idea that I will pursue with full vigor."

In a 38-minute meeting with 10 Americans attending a government-sponsored conference here on U.S. imperialism in Iran, Bani-Sadr listed a series of specific steps he said the United States could take to win freedom for the hostages. The hostage issue has plagued U.S.-Iranian relations and carried the constant threat of military action that could spread beyond this country into the already turbulent Persian Gulf area.

According to Los Angeles attorney Leonard Weinglass, Bani-Sadr did not insist on the return of the shah to face trial here and the return of his wealth that Iranian authorities insist be plundered illegally from this country. Those two demands have consistently been made by the militants since they seized control of the U.S. Embassy on Nov. 4.

Bani-Sadr's suggestion today was similar to others made in the last seven months by him and Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh as steps

that could lead to the release of the hostages. These two men, nonclerical supporters of the Iranian revolution, have been thwarted in their efforts by the hard-line Islamic clerics who have supported the embassy captors and who, some observers here say, have much of the power but none of the responsibility for running Iran.

All these efforts, including a U.N. commission, have been blocked by the militants and the clerics, who have stuck to their demand for the return of the shah and his wealth as the only price of freedom for the hostages.

The Clark commission, however, differs from previous proposals since it would be a nonofficial panel composed of jurists and attorneys and would not require permission from the United States government. The Iranians would have the satisfaction of airing their grievances fully and the Carter administration would be spared having to take part in what promises to be a long attack on U.S. policy in Iran.

Although Iranians insist the United States should release all its documents on its public and clandestine activities in Iran during the past 27 years, these are really not needed by any commission. Iranian students claim to have found documents in the U.S. Embassy and in the files of Iranian ministries showing how the United States was involved in Iranian affairs.

These documents allegedly include a top-secret message talking about American-supported plans for a military takeover of this country just after the shah fled.

Moreover, Iran's revolutionary leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, has given the newly elected parliament sole authority on the hostages' fate. The parliament is controlled by hard-line, clerical Islamic Republic Party, many of whose members have indicated already they favor putting the hostages on trial here before releasing them.

In any case, it appears it will take the parliament more than a month to organize and select a prime minister. Only then, probably in late July, will it begin to take up the hostage issue.

Further adding to the complicated political situation here, Islamic Republic Party leader, Ayatollah Mohammed Beheshti, today derided the international conference. The meeting was established by Bani-Sadr and is headed by Ghotbzadeh as a way to bring world attention to what they consider the longtime interference by the United States in Iran's internal affairs, including returning the shah to the throne in 1953 through a CIA-sponsored coup.

Beheshti has emerged as Bani-Sadr's main political opponent, challenging all the president's prerogatives under the new constitution. Although Bani-Sadr is considered a favorite of Khomeini, he appears to be losing most of the battle to Beheshti, which further complicates efforts to release the hostages, who have become pawns in Iran's internal political battles.

Nonetheless, Weinglass said he thought Bani-Sadr's plan was a well-considered effort to end the hostage crisis and its release today was meant as a message to the United States. But some of the other Americans at the meeting said the Iranian president was merely floating ideas that could possibly help free the hostages.

Among the main points that Bani-Sadr raised as conditions for the hostages' release was a pledge by the United States not to interfere any more in Iran's internal affairs. Included in that pledge, Weinglass said, would be assurances that the United States would take no punitive action against Iran for holding the hostages.

Meanwhile, Khomeini said today that President Carter should be put on trial for threatening Iran and asserted "the superpowers will not have the slightest effect on our will." The 80-year-old revolutionary leader said in a radio and television message, "We are not afraid of anything."

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ON PAGE A25

THE WASHINGTON POST
4 June 1980

Iran Cites Secret U.S. Note as Attempt to Disrupt

Washington Post Foreign Service

TEHRAN, June 3—Iranian authorities today released another purported American document—allegedly a confidential memo on White House stationery from President Carter's national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, to then-secretary of state Cyrus Vance—designed to show America's continued attempts to interfere in Iran's internal affairs.

The four-paragraph, single-spaced memo, dated Aug. 6, 1979, said President Carter wants "to exploit the climate of suspicion and mistrust that exists between Iran and its neighbors"—presumably Iraq and the Soviet Union—to weaken the foreign policy positions of the new government here.

[In Washington, deputy White House press secretary Rex Granum called the document an "utter fabrication." He said the alleged memo had surfaced in late April, that the White House had denied its authenticity then, and added, "It's no more true now than it was then."]—

The purported memo said the American policies should take "into consideration the views expressed by the shah of Iran during recent consultations."

The Iranians have maintained that the deposed shah, who was forced to flee Iran in January 1979 as a result

of violent demonstrations against his regime, still influences U.S. policy, which they say is aimed at overthrowing the new Islamic republic here.

The alleged Brzezinski-to-Vance memorandum, marked "confidential," was reported to have been found in the U.S. Embassy here by militant students who occupied it Nov. 4. Photocopies of the memo were distributed to reporters today at an Iranian government-sponsored conference aimed at detailing alleged illegal interventions by the United States in Iranian affairs in the last 27 years.

According to the document distributed today, President Carter wanted American diplomats here "to establish contacts with leaders of all political trends and organizations, without exception, including the minorities and the extremist groups, which are able to provoke armed uprisings against [Ayatollah Ruhollah] Khomeini's regime."

While these diplomatic activities could be seen as a normal attempt to maintain contact with all elements of the Iranian political spectrum—something the United States was accused of not doing during the reign of the shah—the reference to the extremist groups is viewed by the current Iranian government as an attempt to stir up trouble for the Islamic republic.

Iran currently faces an armed up-

rising in Kurdistan, and there have been antigovernment activities during the last six months in Baluchistan, Azerbaijan and Khuzestan, where Fedayis want more autonomy from central government rule.

Adding to suspicions among the Iranians here is the presidential directive supposedly quoted by Brzezinski against establishing contacts with religious leaders, politicians or members of the opposition "without prior consultation with the director of Central Intelligence."

The CIA was responsible, in 1953, for overthrowing the nationalist government of Mohammed Mossadegh and returning the shah to power here.

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ON PAGE **A-7**

NEW YORK TIMES
4 JUNE 1980

CLARK WOULD TAKE PLACE OF HOSTAGES

Ex-Attorney General Makes Offer in
Teheran — Asks Iran to Free
These 53 Little People

By JOHN KIFNER

Special to The New York Times

TEHERAN, Iran, June 3 — Former Attorney General Ramsey Clark, calling on the Iranian authorities today, to free these 53 little people, volunteered to take the place of any of the American Embassy hostages if it would help end the crisis.

His voice sometimes catching with emotion, he said he was making the offer because he was "so sure that it is imperative that the hostages be released now, that it is so important to the fulfillment of the Iranian revolution, which it is damaging in a hundred ways, so important to the individual justice and rights of the hostages, and it is so important to peace on earth."

Mr. Clark, who is leading a group of 10 Americans at an Iranian-sponsored conference on "American intervention" here, in defiance of an American ban on travel, made his appeal in a speech to the conference this afternoon.

'A Delicious Excuse to War'

The holding of the hostages, he said, "provides the excuse for the power of intervention: the power of imperialism — never doubt it — a delicious excuse to war, to dominate, to intervene."

There was no immediate response from the Islamic militants, who seized the hostages in the American Embassy seven months ago and demanded that the deposed Shah be returned here for trial. Last fall, when Mr. Clark attempted a mediation mission, the militants denounced him as having served in the American Government during the Vietnam War and said he was suspect because he had headed the Justice Department.

The conference, which is being held to "study and debate" the role of the United States in Iran, is sponsored by President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr and his associates. This element of the revolutionary leadership has been eager to end the hostage crisis, but has met with continued resistance and defiance both from the militants and their allies in the Islamic fundamentalist clerical faction.

Offer Causes Consternation

Mr. Clark's offer caused some consternation among the other members of the American delegation. The delegation, it was learned, had discussed volunteering to serve as substitutes for the hostages as a gesture to convince the Iranians that even their friends regarded the impasse as harmful, but voted against it. Thus, sources in the delegation said, the other members were taken aback when Mr. Clark made the offer.

The former Attorney General did not appear at a news conference tonight held by the other members, who appeared to be reluctant to discuss their reactions to Mr. Clark's offer in public. "I felt absolutely convinced that he was sincere," said the Rev. Paul M. Washington, director of the Church of the Advocate in Philadelphia. "I don't know how that will help, but I am certain he was sincere."

During the course of the speeches throughout the day representatives of three other delegations, from Yugoslavia, West Germany and Italy, also recommended that the hostages be released. The delegates, representing some 50 countries, are members of various liberation fronts, humanitarian groups and generally leftist political organizations.

2 Members to Meet Militants

Two members of the American delegation, the Rev. Charles Kimball, a Harvard divinity student, and the Rev. John T. Walsh, the chaplain of Princeton University, are to meet with the Islamic militants holding the United States Embassy, it was learned. An exchange of mail for the hostages has also been arranged through the delegation.

The American group is also planning to meet privately with what its members would only describe as "high-ranking" Iranian officials.

Mr. Clark's address was delivered with the style and pace of a political stump speech, in contrast to the generally turgid denunciations of imperialism that filled most of the day. It drew a round of applause from the other delegates and a flurry of attention from reporters and photographers.

The speech was filled with praise for the Iranian revolution, which he called "a miracle for the age"; for Persian culture in general — "read their poets . . . Hafiz and Shiraz, oh, that Shakespeare could have written like that"; and was heavily larded with regret for America's role in the world — "Vietnam, I weep at Vietnam." He also charged that the abortive American commando raid to rescue the hostages was an "illegal" violation of Iran's territory.

'Where Is Allen Dulles?'

"The seizure of the hostages here is understandable in human terms, God knows it is understandable," Mr. Clark said, "but it is not right. Of course it is not right."

"For where is Allen Dulles? Where is Kermit Roosevelt? Where is Richard Helms or Henry Kissinger or Richard Nixon?" he went on, naming a series of Central Intelligence Agency or other Government officials who have been involved in Iran.

Mr. Clark argued that the continued holding of the hostages was leading to the defeat of efforts to restrain the C.I.A. to an increase in the defense budget and a belligerent attitude on the part of the American people. And, he said, it was damaging the prospects of the Iranian revolution.

"Holding the hostages takes the focus off the Shah," he said. "The Shah is the villain of the act. People are thinking about the hostages all over the world while the Shah eats his caviar over in Egypt. That, I think, is a serious mistake."

Shortly after Mr. Clark's speech, another member of the American delegation, John Gerassi, a professor at Queens College and an organizer of the Vietnam War Crimes Tribunal, made a speech in which he paid tribute to a number of liberation struggles and asserted that he was not offering to substitute for a hostage.

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ON PAGE A1

THE WASHINGTON POST
4 June 1980

Ex-Attorney General Offers Himself as a Replacement

Clark Urges Iran to Release Hostages

By Stuart Auerbach

Washington Post Foreign Service

TEHRAN, June 3—Former attorney general Ramsey Clark, one of the earliest American supporters of Iran's Islamic revolution, today urged the quick release of 53 American hostages held here for seven months and offered to take the place of one of them if that would help gain freedom for all of them.

Clark, in Tehran as a guest of the Iranian government, made his emotional appeal at an "international conference on U.S. involvement in Iran." In the course of his address, he castigated American administrations of the last 27 years for supporting the deposed shah and returning him to power in 1953 through a CIA-sponsored coup.

But Clark said Iran's holding of the hostages "cannot be justified" and "is not right."

"I am so sure that I am right in this, so sure that it is imperative that the hostages be released now. It is so important to the fulfillment of the Iranian revolution, which it is damaging in a hundred ways. It is so important to the individual justice and rights of the hostages, and it is so important to peace on earth that I offer today to take the place of any hostage if that will help resolve this tragic crisis," he said.

The militant students holding the hostages, who are now reportedly scattered in 15 Iranian cities, offered no reaction tonight to Clark's proposal.

Clark's offer was not echoed by the other nine Americans attending the conference here. They had been debating such a move over the last two days, according to some reports, but rejected it as a group effort. Some said they were surprised when Clark, one of three Americans who addressed the conference, made his statement.

"Speaking for myself," said political scientist John Gerassi, in his talk, "I do not want to substitute myself for a hostage. I was invited here by the government of Iran, which I support as a friend. I do not believe that I should abuse the invitation I have from the government by interfering in an internal question."

Later, at a press conference, none of the Americans—who defied the U.S. government ban on travel to Iran—to come here said they would join in Clark's offer.

"I felt absolutely convinced he was sincere," said the Rev. Paul Washington of Philadelphia, "but I personally don't know how it would help."

While Clark's offer was not accepted by the conference, a number of delegates—all anti-American supporters of Iran's Islamic revolution, called for an end to the holding of the hostages. These included Italian Communists, a Yugoslav, and a West German.

The open support here for the release of the hostages by Iran's friends was far greater than at the Islamic foreign ministers' conference in Islamabad, Pakistan, last month. At that conference, delegates told reporters they were quietly urging Iranian diplomats to release the hostages, but they made no public appeal.

There was some speculation here today that Iranian President Abol-Hasan Bani-Sadr, who has been trying to arrange the release of the hostages, staged this conference to get friends of Iran to push his point of view in a way that could reach the hard-line clerics who are supporting the keeping of the hostages.

The American delegates, all of whom said at a press conference tonight they favor the quick release of the hostages, are trying to arrange meetings with Iranian political leaders, including some of the hard-line clerics.

In his speech to the conference this afternoon, Clark made it clear that he was on the side of Iran in its lengthy battle with the United States. He praised Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's Islamic revolution as "a miracle for the century," and said "the U.S. role in Iran is for me incredibly painful." He called America's April 24 attempt to rescue the hostages "a lawless military expedition, an assault on the sovereign territory of Iran."

Clark said he supports putting the deposed shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, on trial, although he did not say where and by whom the shah should be tried. He added that the shah's wealth, "ripped from the bodies and the backs and the sweat and the broken bones of the people of Iran, should be returned."

But despite the support the United States gave to the deposed shah, Clark disputed Iran's holding of the hostages, who he said were "uninvolved in the specified offenses for which you are concerned."

"Where is Allen Dulles? Where is Kermit Roosevelt? Where is Richard Helms or Henry Kissinger or Richard Nixon?" Clark asked in a reference to U.S. leaders and officials of the State Department and Central Intelligence Agency who are seen here as longtime supporters of the shah.

Clark described those men as the people really responsible for U.S. policies in Iran, and said, "If you had one of them [hostage] it might be different."

But, Clark said, the 53 hostages, who include three diplomats held at the Foreign Ministry since Nov. 4, "are little people. The effect of holding these 53, though, provides an excuse for powers of intervention, for powers of imperialism, a delicious excuse to war, to dominate, to intervene."

"Finally," Clark said at the impassioned conclusion to his address, "the hostages are human beings, individuals. They are the wrong people. And there are three main risks to the hostage crisis. First, intervention and violence. Second, the terrible cost to Iran in the fulfillment of its revolution. Third, and finally, the morality."

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ON PAGELOS ANGELES TIMES
3 JUNE 1980

Iran Displays U.S. Formula for Takeover

Claims General's Note Demonstrates Backing for Military Coup

BY WILLIAM TUOHY

Times Staff Writer

TEHRAN—The Iranian government Monday released a purported top-secret U.S. document indicating that U.S. officials seriously considered backing a "military takeover" by the Iranian army after the Shah of Iran was driven from the country early last year.

The document was presented at an international conference on "U.S. interventions in Iran" attended by delegations from 50 countries and organizations, including 10 Americans led by former Atty. Gen. Ramsey Clark, visiting Iran in defiance of a presidential ban.

After the session, Clark told reporters he found the document "very distressing."

He said he came to Tehran in hopes of helping to free the 53 American hostages by showing that they were not responsible for any U.S. intervention in Iran. But earlier, Clark told one reporter that the failed attempt to rescue the hostages in April was "lawless and contrary to constitutional government."

"It is inconceivable that constitutional government could ever delegate to a single person—president or prime minister—the power to risk killing many half a world away in a foreign country," he said.

In the document, which appeared to be authentic, Gen. Robert E. Huyser, then deputy commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, informed his superior, Gen. Alexander M. Haig Jr., on his actions in the days after Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi left the country in January, 1979, and Prime Minister Shahpour Bakhtiar was trying to maintain control. Huyser had been sent from Europe by the Carter Administration.

Headed "top secret" and "eyes only for Gen. Haig from Gen. Huyser," the document mentions Haig's plans 2A and 2B, apparently military-political

"The way I'm working on the problem, it is essential to do 2B," Huyser's message says. "I have been encouraging them to take these steps. He (Bakhtiar) has shown his willingness to do so but that is the pace I would like to accelerate. If that fails then my guidance to them (presumably the Iranian generals) is we must go to a straight military takeover..."

Huyser arrived in Tehran on Jan. 5, 1979, and the shah, after massive street demonstrations, departed Jan. 16—leaving behind the Bakhtiar government, which he appointed.

But the protests continued and the army, under the general control of Bakhtiar, continued to shoot at demonstrators, further enraging the populace.

Huyser, an officer well known to the Iranian military leaders through past connections, was sent here to get tough with the generals.

At the time, diplomats said that he was warning them that the United States would not support a military coup.

But the document released Monday put a somewhat different light on the Huyser mission—at least as reflected in his message to Haig, sent on Jan. 23, 1979.

After discussing the military options, Huyser warned against the return to Tehran of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, whose revolutionary forces would take over the country within a month. If the ayatollah arrived, Huyser said, "I believe there would be a big upheaval. Then things would go to hell in a handbasket. The bottom line would be your case B but without Bakhtiar at the throttle."

Western diplomats said that it was difficult to gauge accurately the sense of Huyser's cable without seeing Haig's original message, but that it appeared that case "2B" would be a military takeover—with or without Bakhtiar's concurrence.

In any event, Khomeini returned on Feb. 1, 1979, and after more rioting Bakhtiar resigned on Feb. 11, on the eve of the revolution that swept out the army leadership.

After the testimony, another of the U.S. delegates to the conference, Los Angeles lawyer Leonard Weinglass, said that if the documents were substantiated they were "very damning evidence of U.S. intervention in Iranian affairs." And Mansour Farhang, Iran's ambassador to the United Nations, cited the document as he told the 100 delegates that in "keeping the military option open," the United States wanted to "destabilize the revolutionary process in Iran."

Attorney Weinglass said the U.S. delegation is basically on a fact-finding mission here but will present its own views before the conference is over.

Weinglass suggested that the U.S. delegation could play a role in attempting to find some solution for the release of the American hostages, who have been held by Iranian militants since Nov. 4.

CONTINUED

As Received

Besides Clark and Weinglass, the American delegation consists of George Wald, professor emeritus at Harvard University and a winner of the 1967 Nobel Prize in biology; May Anderson of Cambridge, Mass., representing the American Friends Service Committee; the Rev. John Walsh, chaplain of Princeton University; the Rev. Charles Kimball, a Harvard theologian; the Rev. Paul Washington, rector of the Church of the Advocate in Philadelphia; Lennox Hind, professor of law at Rutgers University in New Jersey; John Derrase, free-lance journalist from New York; and Kay Camp, president of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom.

Weinglass said the Treasury Department told the delegation that it is illegal for Americans to become involved in currency transactions in Iran—or accept free room, board and air fare from the host government of Iran.

"We don't think we have violated any laws," Weinglass said. "We think it's a farce."

(In Washington, the State Department dismissed the Tehran conference as a propaganda circus, wire services reported.)

"This is a hearing with a hanging judge and a hanging jury, with no promise of anything at the end except the continued holding of the hostages," spokesman Hodding Carter III said.

"It is a propaganda circus—it was conceived as such and its results will be such."

The Treasury Department has threatened \$50,000 fines and 10-year jail terms against the American delegates for traveling to Iran in defiance of President Carter's May 17 travel ban.

(The State Department did not repeat that threat today saying only that the government decision will have to await the return of the Clark delegation.)

(Other officials said they doubted that Clark would be penalized for the trip. There was some embarrassment because Carter himself sought to send Clark to Tehran last November shortly after the Americans were seized.)

At Monday's session, other speakers described the U.S. role in training Savak, the shah's secret police organization, which has been accused of torturing and executing thousands of Iranian dissidents.

"The activities of the agents of CIA and the activities of Savak agents in the U.S. is not a hidden fact," a government report to the delegates said.

"During those years of the shah, the Savak agents either through their military advisers or CIA agents in Iran were trained with the latest methods of torturing, forcing confessions and anti-intelligence methods," the report said.

Curiously, Iranian documents submitted to the conference indicated that Savak agents had penetrated the headquarters of the CIA station chief in Tehran.

The conference was told that the shah let the Americans take over the country and that U.S. military advisers here were even given diplomatic immunity.

But most of all, according to the speakers, the United States remained hostile to the Iranian revolution after the downfall of the shah and Bakhtiar.

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THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
3 June 1980

Iranians Say U.S. General Outlined Plans for Coup

Purported Letter to Haig Is Cited as Proof of Claim

By Raji Samghabadi

Special to The Washington Star

TEHRAN, Iran — Iranian officials yesterday released a purported letter from a U.S. general in which he outlined two plans for coups during the last days of the shah in January 1979.

The purported letter was presented during the first day of what the Iranians are calling their conference on "the crimes of the United States." The Iranians said the alleged letter was addressed to then-NATO Commander Gen. Alexander Haig by his deputy, Gen. Robert Huyser.

Ramsey Clark, head of a group of Americans attending the conference in defiance of President Carter's ban on travel here, said the letter was "very distressing." He reserved further comment on the document, presumably taken from U.S. Embassy files, saying that he wanted to examine the document in more detail.

Huyser made a mysterious visit to Iran during the final days of the regime of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. The deposed shah, in his memoirs, said that he did not know the general was in Iran even several days after his arrival.

The Iranians claimed one coup scenario consisted of a straight military takeover and the other was for the assassination of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini when the ayatollah arrived in Tehran after 14 years of exile abroad.

According to the document, Huyser said the first option would produce a military government incapable of running Iran. "That does not rule out success as I don't know of many countries where such action has occurred that the government functions didn't go back to grass roots for a period. They then grow back to more sophistication," the alleged letter from Huyser said. The second option would create a total civil war, it said.

Ahmad Salamatian, an aide to Iranian President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, said the conference, which opened yesterday, is not a substitute for a trial of 53 Americans who have been held in Iran since Nov. 4.

"If its findings can provide evidence for a tribunal (for the trial of the Americans), so be it," said Salamatian, who was in charge of organizing the conference. "But I should like to emphasize that this is not a tribunal, it is a conference."

Salamatian said that the conference would draw on documents seized in the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, showing, he said, how the U.S. government consistently intervened in Iranian affairs.

A collection of alleged documents from the shah's secret police also purportedly show a history of cooperation between the CIA and Savak.

Most of the documents are reports by Savak agents or accounts of taped telephone conversations between CIA station chiefs and their local contacts.

Two CIA station chiefs are identified by the officially translated documents as Arthur Callaghan and William Brummel.

According to these papers, the CIA station chiefs regularly briefed the shah and chief of Savak, Gen. Nematollah Nassiri (executed by an Islamic tribunal).

A retired army intelligence officer who examined the documents for The Washington Star said, "They accurately reflect Savak reporting procedures, and the incidents are plausible."

A document, dated Sept. 3, 1974, recorded a taped telephone conversation between Callaghan and an Iranian "lieutenant." Callaghan draws the unnamed officer's attention to reprints in the local papers of a series of articles from the London Observer about CIA activities, saying, "In these articles the secret of the CIA has been exposed, and that the printing of such articles is not acceptable. I like you to inform Gen. Nassiri of this matter."

The material has been translated from its original English to Farsi, and then back again.

Iranian journalists said that the next day the Ministry of Information instructed all Tehran editors to forgo printing "all exposes about the CIA."

Another translated report, dated April 4, 1971, quotes Brummel as expressing pleasure at Savak's suppression of an armed uprising in the Caspian Forest. According to the report, Brummel described television programs extolling the secret police achievements, saying, "Savak has carried out its functions effectively well towards the people. We consider this method pleasing, and we are very happy about this matter."

The documents also purport to show that the Americans offered training and advisory services to Savak. They also indicate the two recruited agents from each other.

In one case, documents purported to show that American intelligence officers asked the government to arrange for them to cultivate Iranian senators as sources of information and political analysis. Savak complied.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
3 June 1980

Iran Says It Has Found Site, Data Involved in Rescue Try

Washington Post Foreign Service

TEHRAN, June 2—Iranian officials said today they discovered the hidden garage with the seven trucks that were to be used to carry an assault team to the U.S. Embassy here on a mission to rescue the American hostages.

The garage was located about 50 miles southeast of Tehran and the commandos were to hide there during the day before leaving at midnight for the drive to the embassy.

The April 24 rescue mission was called off when three of its helicopters broke down. Eight Americans were killed in an accident during the pull-out from a desert refueling spot.

The new information on the American rescue attempt was presented to the conference on U.S. intervention in Iran and was profusely illustrated with maps, satellite photos, charts and pilots' notes detailing many previously unconfirmed aspects of the plan. They showed a picture of the trucks lined up in front of the garage, which the Iranians said was owned by a CIA agent.

Many of the pictures and documents were interpreted for the Iranian government by Lt. Manouchéhr Solrani, 27, an Iranian helicopter pilot who said he had been trained at four U.S. military bases.

"I am familiar with all of these," he said, pointing to a display case containing coded descriptions of landing sites, radio frequencies to be used during different parts of the mission

and detailed descriptions of the helicopter flight path from carriers in the Indian Ocean to deep within Iran.

The display even included a receipt lost by one of the members of the American team for a gold necklace he purchased; a mimeographed invitation to a June 7 shipboard party that was to feature the burning of an Iranian flag, and a Visa card from a Virginia bank.

There was also a large satellite photograph dated March 31 of the desert refueling spot and a pilot's strip map illustrating the full flight path across Iran and showing the

spot where the helicopters were to be hidden for a full day waiting to pick up the assault team inside Tehran.

The map had a footprint in the middle of it, apparently made by someone in a hurry to get away from the desert landing site.

The captured documents also said jet fighters from American carriers in the Indian Ocean would take off to escort the transport planes carrying the rescued hostages out of Iranian airspace. But there was no documentary information that they would be used in tactical support of the rescue mission in Tehran.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
3 June 1980

Iranian Documents Show Apparent Spying on CIA

By Stuart Auerbach

Washington Post Foreign Service

TEHRAN, June 2—Iranian authorities released a series of documents today designed to prove that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency really ran the deposed shah's dreaded secret police organization, SAVAK. Instead, the documents appear to show that SAVAK spent a great deal of time spying on the CIA, including bugging the station chief's telephone.

One purported six-year-old memo from SAVAK's files told the organization's general director of the conversation heard while controlling the telephone of [CIA station chief] Arthur Callaghan's home.

Another SAVAK report told how Callaghan became disgusted with the way American officials were treating the CIA. As a result, the alleged SAVAK memo quoted Callaghan as saying, "I have lost inter-

est in working in this organization and have resigned."

Western correspondents resident in Tehran at the time knew Callaghan to be the CIA station chief.

Another memo discussed an Iranian who worked in security at the U.S. Embassy here, but who was not happy with his job. He was described as being trusted by the CIA, and SAVAK said it was working to win him over to get information about the people in whom Americans were interested in Iran.

When Callaghan left Iran, SAVAK placed a long report in his file including a purported list of his Iranian contacts and friends. Among the people named on the list were two listed as British intelligence officers—Desmond Harney, who worked as manager of the Morgan Grenfell Bank, and Berkley Milten, who was listed as the chief of British intelligence in Iran.

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NEW YORK TIMES
3 JUNE 1980

Iran Panel Hears Reports Alleging U.S. Interference

Ramsey Clark Delegation Flouts Ban on Travel

By JOHN KIFNER

Special to The New York Times

TEHERAN, Iran, June 2 — An Iranian-sponsored conference on United States "intervention in Iran" opened here today with a 10-member American group led by former Attorney General Ramsey Clark attending in defiance of President Carter's ban on travel to this country.

The four-day international meeting, ordered by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini after the unsuccessful American attempt to rescue the 53 hostages in April, brought together several hundred nongovernmental delegates from what were described as "anti-imperialist" organizations in about 50 countries. The purpose is to hear reports prepared by Iranian officials on American policy in Iran.

The Iranian Government is paying for the American group's transportation, lodging and food, delegation members said.

[In Washington, the White House said that "criminal and civil" penalties were available to punish Mr. Clark and the others for their "violation" of the President's order. The Justice Department, which had warned earlier that those violating the travel ban could receive "up to 10 years in prison and fines of up to \$50,000," said it would investigate "the circumstances of this travel to determine whether action against the group was warranted. Page A12.]

'Dialogue Is Essential'

"Our reason for coming here," Mr. Clark told reporters today, "is the belief that dialogue between all people is essential for understanding and respect."

He said he was "hopeful" that, in some way, the conference might help obtain the release of the hostages.

However, Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, one of the officials presiding at the conference, said that the gathering had no relation to the hostages. He said it was not the "trial" of American policy that had been mentioned in connection with several earlier plans for obtaining the release of the Americans held hostage since Nov. 4 to back demands for the return of the deposed Shah and his wealth.

Today's opening session was marked by the reading of what was described as a top-secret document depicting an American officer pressing the Iranian military just before the Iranian revolution of February 1979 to take a more activist role and to stage a coup if necessary.

The document was said to be a message from Gen. Robert Huyser, the American officer sent here by President Carter just after Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlavi left Teheran for Egypt on Jan. 16, 1979.

It was addressed to Gen. Alexander M. Haig, then the North Atlantic Treaty Organization commander and the superior of General Huyser, the deputy commander. After describing efforts to shore up the Prime Ministership of Shapur Bakhtiar, the last head of Government appointed by the Shah, the message read at the conference said, referring to the Iranian general staff:

"If that fails, then my guidance to them is we must go to a straight military takeover."

The original American reports of the Huyser mission had said that it was intended to discourage the Iranian general staff from staging a coup against Prime Minister Bakhtiar. However, reports from Washington last month said that the general had been ordered to develop contingency plans for a coup should the Bakhtiar Government be threatened by revolutionary forces. Such plans reportedly became unworkable because of the rapid disintegration of the Iranian military just before the revolution.

[In Washington, officials, asked to comment on what the document read at the news conference said, declined to comment.]

Mr. Clark said at his news conference that he and his group were "very anxious as Americans to achieve a reconciliation with Iran."

"Of course," he went on, "we believe the hostages are not responsible for the 30 years of American wrongful intervention and cannot be held responsible. We are anxious to be very constructive."

Ghotbzadeh Favors Clark

Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh was asked by an Iranian reporter if he didn't think that "Ramsey Clark's attendance was a plot."

"This gentleman is a very well known figure in the States and very respected," he said. "He was one of the opponents of the Vietnam War and he was one of the first Americans to announce his support of our revolution."

Actually, as Attorney General under President Johnson, Mr. Clark had ordered the prosecution of one of the other members of the American delegation here, Dr. John Gerassi, a political science professor at Queens College, for traveling to North Vietnam during the war in defiance of a Government travel ban.

This afternoon the conference — which included large blocs of delegates who kept their heads entirely swathed in red-checked Arab scarves except for narrow eyeslits — listened to several hours of reports and speeches attacking what was described as some 27 years of American interference and domination of Iran.

Files From Savak

The Iranian Government documents included a large packet of files from Savak, the Shah's secret police, designed to show their relationship with the American Central Intelligence Agency.

However, the documents that were produced also showed that Savak was spying on the Central Intelligence Agency authorities working out of the American Embassy. In fact, according to one document, the Savak had a contact named "Melikian" who was a part of the security section of the Embassy.

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THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
2 June 1980

Ramsey Clark, In Tehran, Calls Raid 'Lawless'

By Raji Samghabadi
Special to The Washington Star

TEHRAN, Iran.—Former Attorney General Ramsey Clark, in Tehran for an international conference on "U.S. crimes in Iran," told reporters today that the U.S. military attempt to release the American hostages "was a lawless act" which violated the U.S. Constitution.

The 10-member U.S. delegation headed by Clark, which went despite administration warnings of stiff fines and prison terms for violating a U.S. ban on travel to Iran, is among delegations from about 100 countries.

The conference opened today with a blistering denunciation of Washington in a message sent by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

Clark's comments were made after the conference's morning session.

In Philadelphia, the American Friends Service Committee said the Americans accepted invitations to attend "in the hope that they may help to diffuse tensions between the two countries."

"The delegation believes that its participation may begin a needed dialogue. The delegation has been assured that the conference will entertain discussions of every relevant issue including the great concern for the American hostages," the statement said.

U.S. Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti issued a statement Friday saying that "persons who violate these rules (against travel to Iran) are subject to penalties of up to 10 years in prison and fines of up to \$50,000 under the international emergency economic powers act."

President Carter signed an executive order April 17 prohibiting American travel to Iran without special permission, with reporters exempted.

Meanwhile, Iran's Revolutionary Council decided last night not to attend the Moscow Olympics despite great pressure by Iranian sports organizations and moderate groups for Iran's attendance.

President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr said that after contacts with Afghan revolutionaries Iran determined it could not attend the Olympics without "impairing the Afghan freedom fighters' morale." That's why, he said, Iran made a firm decision not to attend.

Carter had dispatched Ramsey Clark on a mission to Tehran last November, shortly after the U.S. Embassy there was overrun, to try and talk with Iranian officials about release of the hostages. But Clark, who was accompanied by Senate staff official William Miller, never got permission to enter Tehran and that mission ended in Istanbul, Turkey.

Clark had visited Khomeini in Paris in the fall of 1978 when the then-exiled ayatollah was organizing the revolution against the shah. Clark then praised Khomeini's "liberal and progressive" views and rebuffed critics who charged Khomeini intended to impose on Iran a medieval social and governmental system.

Ahmad Salamatian, an aide to Iranian President Bani-Sadr, said the conference that opened today is not a substitute for a trial of 53 U.S. hostages held in Iran since Nov. 4.

"If its findings can provide evidence for a tribunal (for the trial of the Americans), so be it," said Salamatian, who was in charge of organizing the conference. "But I should like to emphasize that this is not a tribunal, it is a conference."

Salamatian said the introductory report to the conference would draw on documents seized in the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, showing, he said, how the U.S. government consistently intervened in Iranian affairs.

Documents so far released by militants who are now keeping the hostages in 17 cities across Iran provide evidence of normal diplomatic assessments of the situation in Iran as well as some intelligence operations. The press and the government here have almost always lumped all such activities together as "crimes against Iran."

In his message to the conference, Khomeini said documents provided to the gathering showed only "a tiny fraction of U.S. government crimes in Iran."

"U.S. advisers directly interfered

in the internal affairs of our nation. . . . We cannot provide all the documents related to the crimes committed for 50 years by the former regime and for 30 years by the U.S.," Khomeini said.

One of the "greatest crimes of the U.S.," said the ayatollah, was its imposition of "the capitulations" — the exemption of U.S. personnel from prosecution by the Iranian judiciary while serving in Iran. The law for the capitulations was passed in early 1960s and evoked violent reaction from the clergy, especially Khomeini.

The law went beyond the normal diplomatic immunity given foreign diplomats. It covered American military advisers as well and was much more thoroughgoing than diplomatic privilege. Khomeini also charged that the U.S. placed "special equipment in its embassy in Tehran for espionage against Iran and the entire region."

Tehran papers led with huge headlines about the conference and Khomeini's message. On the eve of the conference, the national radio ridiculed President Carter's human rights policy and denounced his opposition to participation of the U.S. delegation.

In addition to Clark, the American delegation was said to include:

George Wald (Nobel Prize winner in science); May Anderson of Cambridge, Mass., representing the American Friends Service Committee; Kay Camp, international president of Women's International League for Peace and Freedom; the Rev. John Walsh, chaplain at Princeton University; the Rev. Charles Kimball, post-doctoral student in Islamic studies at Harvard Divinity School; the Rev. Paul Washington, Episcopal minister in Philadelphia; Leonard Weinglass, attorney in Los Angeles; Lenox Hinds, professor of Law at Rutgers; and John Derrase, freelance journalist from New York.

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CUBA

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THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
3 June 1980

Cuban flotilla ending as total nears 100,000

CIA warned of refugee flood, but
State Dept. too slow, critics say

By John Yemma

Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Under Fidel Castro's orders, the "freedom flotilla" is ending.

As the last boats arrive from the Cuban port of Mariel and the refugee total climbs to 100,000, the focus of the crisis is shifting to well within US borders — to unrest at the Ft. Chaffee, Ark., processing center, and to how Washington can prevent a recurrence of the chaotic exodus from Cuba.

Fifty to 60 boats were en route to Key West June 2 with the last refugees, including a large Panamanian-registered ship capable of holding 2,000 persons. All other US craft have been ordered from Cuban waters by President Castro.

Critics are now accusing the Carter administration of failing to heed Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) forecasts of the coming flood, not acting promptly through diplomatic channels to ensure an orderly procedure, and thereby failing to screen out agitators within the refugee groups.

A House intelligence subcommittee, in a study entitled "The Cuban Emigrés: Was There a US Intelligence Failure?" credits the CIA with warning the State Department five times between late January and March that the Castro government might begin a purge of dissidents by allowing a mass emigration.

The CIA reports did not predict the precise date but, according to Rep. Les Aspin (D) of Wisconsin, did indicate that the number of people involved could exceed 100,000. With these early signs, US diplomats should have opened negotiations with President Castro to establish an orderly evacuation procedure, Mr. Aspin and other critics said June 2.

The Cuban government was angered because of US sluggishness in processing the backlog of political prisoners awaiting exit, the congressman said, and also because US authorities were not discouraging the hijacking of Cuban boats to Florida.

"The bad news is that the US government never took advantage of its lead time, conducted a relatively weak, defensive diplomatic strategy, and failed to organize for the human flood it should have known was coming," the congressman said June 2 in a speech on the floor of the House.

Refugee affairs specialist Jerry M. Tinker of the Senate Judiciary Committee told the Monitor that even without the CIA warnings

there were many signs that pressure was building within Cuba. When Mr. Castro ended the large-scale departures from his country that had taken place between 1965 and 1973, more than 135,000 Cubans were left on American waiting lists.

"Some of those came here in the next six years, but if you add to that the number of political prisoners [recently put at 3,000 by Mr. Castro, but thought to number as many as 50,000 by other authorities], you can see that he was sitting on a Mt. St. Helens," Mr. Tinker said.

The net result of not using the Cuban intelligence, said Mr. Aspin, was that a potential foreign-policy bonanza was lost in the disorderly shuffle. This occurred, he said, because the administration:

- Switched from a closed-door to open-door, then back to a closed-door policy, alternatively trying to "bluff the Cuban-American community into foregoing the effort to rescue their relations and the Cuban government into thinking that we were prepared to go the limit."

- Did not listen to the complaints of the Cuban government about delays in routine processing and boat hijackings.

- Failed to develop a publicity campaign. "Given what has happened, the United States should be looking a lot better and the Cubans a lot worse," the congressman said.

- Was unable to mobilize other countries, especially those in Latin America, to accept refugees. "Castro, at will, has broken our effort to make this an international issue and has converted it, to his benefit, into something between him and us."

- Was inadequately prepared for the arrival of thousands of refugees. With better processing, he said, it might have been possible to detect the "undesirables" who are "blackening the reputation of those new arrivals."

While it is no justification for the unrest at Ft. Chaffee, Mr. Tinker said, similar problems occurred in Guam as Vietnamese refugees awaited a future uncertain to them.

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ON PAGE A6

THE WASHINGTON POST
2 June 1980

Aspin Says CIA Foretold Massive Influx of Cubans

By Margot Hornblower
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Central Intelligence Agency predicted that Cuban President Fidel Castro might allow massive emigration three months before he did so, but the Carter administration ignored the warning, a Wisconsin congressman charged today.

In a statement, Democrat Les Aspin, chairman of the oversight subcommittee of the House Intelligence Committee, accuses the administration of converting "a great intelligence success into a great national disaster."

"In the past, there have been instances of intelligence failures leading to bad U.S. policy," he said. "In this case, we have had an intelligence success that nevertheless seems to have made little impact on the consequent behavior of our government."

If the administration had believed the CIA, it could have "done a better job of holding back the floodgates" and, Aspin said, "we could have made good propaganda out of these people leaving."

Instead, according to Aspin, "We have been treated to the spectacle of a floundering administration declaring first a closed-door policy and then an open-door policy and then a closed-door policy again."

Aspin's charges were based on a May 21 closed-door hearing at which a member of the State Department's Cuba desk and an official from the CIA's Cuba Analytic Center testified. A subcommittee aide would not release the names of the witnesses.

State Department official Joanna Caplan said she would have "no comment" on the charges until department officials have a chance to review Aspin's report.

The six-page report issued by the subcommittee—entitled "The Cuban Emigres: Was There a U.S. Intelligence Failure?"—states that:

- On Jan. 30, the CIA's Cuba Analytic Center reported to the State Department that "the Castro regime may again resort to large-scale emigration to reduce discontent caused by Cuba's deteriorating economic condition."
- On Feb. 21, the State Department

learned that discussions about reopening Camarioca, a port opened to unrestricted emigration in 1965, were taking place and that Cuba wanted the United States to let in more Cubans.

- On March 8, Castro alluded to the possibility of a new Camarioca in a speech. If the United States would not discourage illegal boat hijackings to Florida, "we might also have to take our own measures," Castro warned.

- A State Department official testified that at the time of the Castro speech the department believed "that the reopening of Camarioca did not seem imminent."

Aspin said Cuban officials were also frustrated that the United States was not processing faster the political prisoners who were being allowed to emigrate—a situation which eventually led to the storming of the U.S. interest section in Havana April 15.

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ON PAGE A-9

NEW YORK TIMES
2 JUNE 1980

C.I.A. Gave Early Warning of Exodus From Cuba

By RICHARD BURT

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 1 — Carter Administration officials said today that the United States had failed to prepare for the influx of Cuban refugees despite intelligence warnings that suggested that an exodus was likely. But the officials said that the reports had not predicted the extent or timing of the flood of refugees.

The statement, by a State Department official and the Deputy Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, came in response to charges by a Congressional subcommittee and a regional expert that the White

House repeatedly ignored predictions by the Central Intelligence Agency that the Castro Government was preparing to flood Florida with émigrés.

A C.I.A. study made in late January and quoted in a House intelligence subcommittee report scheduled for release tomorrow warned that the Castro regime "may again resort to large-scale emigration to reduce discontent caused by Cuba's deteriorating economic condition."

The C.I.A. warned the Administration five times between late January and March of hints that the Castro Government might be considering a large-scale exodus of dissidents. But Administration officials conceded that the C.I.A. reports did not move the Administration to prepare for the more than 90,000 refugees who have journeyed by boat from the Cuban port of Mariel to Florida.

C.I.A. Criticized Previously

In other foreign crises, such as the Iranian revolution, the C.I.A. has been criticized for inaccurate predictions. Intelligence officials cited the Cuban affair as an example in which the agency issued early and accurate warnings that policy aides failed to heed.

Frank E. Loy, the Deputy Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, acknowledged seeing an intelligence report about Cuba in March. But, he said, warnings about emigration from Cuba did not necessarily mean there would be a large, disorderly exodus.

"We were very aware of the economic deterioration in Cuba," Mr. Loy said, saying that Administration officials were preoccupied with arranging asylum for the 10,000 Cubans who sought refuge in the Peruvian embassy. He conceded that "we did not ready camps or personnel for a flow like that from Mariel."

"With the benefit of hindsight, one wishes we had," he said.

The intelligence subcommittee's report was prepared for its chairman, Representative Les Aspin, Democrat of Wisconsin, after the panel heard testimony from several C.I.A. and State Department officials.

Report Is Called Unfair

A State Department official called the C.I.A. report "unfair," saying it did not predict but only suggested the possibility of a huge Cuban exodus. "We didn't think the exodus was imminent," he said.

Pedro A. Sanjuan, a former White House staff member who is an expert on Latin affairs, said today: "The Administration has not paid enough attention to developments in Cuba and the obvious deterioration of Castro's political situation."

Mr. Sanjuan, who is director of hemispheric studies at the American Enterprise Institute, said that even without intelligence warnings there were a number of public signs that domestic problems in Cuba could force the Government to attempt to rid the country of malcontents.

These signs, he said, included poor agricultural performance, political unrest and high-level changes within the Cuban Government, including the demotion of Mr. Castro's brother, Raul.

C.I.A. 'Was On Its Toes'

In a speech prepared for delivery tomorrow, Mr. Aspin says "the Central Intelligence Agency was on its toes and provided well-reasoned, well-supported analyses, clearly warning of the situation which has now developed."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 6NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
2 June 1980

Fidel lets 442 Cubans in embassy go to Peru

By The Associated Press

Cuba has agreed to let 442 Cuban refugees in the Peruvian Embassy in Havana emigrate to Peru, the Peruvian Foreign Ministry reported yesterday. More than half the refugees, 268, were due in Lima, the Peruvian capital, yesterday and the rest in a few days.

The Cubans sought refuge at the embassy on April 4, after President Fidel Castro's government lifted police protection and announced that anyone who went there was free to leave the country.

Another 30 persons who entered the embassy earlier will remain behind, but the Peruvian government will attempt to negotiate a "satisfactory solution" with Cuban authorities, the ministry said.

First stop, Costa Rica

Peru originally offered to take 1,000 of the approximately 10,000 Cubans who eventually jammed the embassy. Some 330 arrived in April on two flights from San Jose, Costa Rica, where they had first been taken in an airlift from Havana.

Cuba subsequently stopped the flights, but since then, more than 90,000 Cubans have traveled by boat to the United States.

The boatlift from the Cuban port of Mariel was at a virtual standstill yesterday, with only one vessel arriving in Key West, and the U.S. Coast Guard reported no sightings of boats attempting to cross the 90 miles of Florida Straits.

Puzzled American officials believed it was only a temporary halt in the sporadic operation before an expected final surge in the next week or two.

The only boat to arrive in the 24 hours ending at midday yesterday brought 128 weary, wind-whipped men, women and children. This brought the total of those renouncing the Castro regime and risking their lives in the hazardous journey to 94,269 since the boatlift began in April.

Boat captains arriving the last two

days appeared in agreement that the number of vessels waiting to load up in Mariel was about 120. There has been no recent word over Havana radio about the boats.

At Fort Chaffee, Ark., one of several refugee relocation centers, state and local officers wielding nightsticks yesterday quickly rounded up 300 refugees who vaulted over a low wall about 1 p.m. More than 18,000 refugees are awaiting relocation there.

About 200 refugees were stopped by a cordon of state police on Arkansas Highway 22 between the fort and the city of Barling, about a mile away. The remaining refugees were caught by officers who blocked the highway just outside Barling.

The escape attempt was the latest in a series of confrontations between law-enforcement officials and the refugees.

Earlier yesterday, dozens of refugees protesting resettlement delays staged demonstrations at the relocation center following a rock and brick-throwing incident Saturday night that left three federal officers injured.

CIA warning praised

In Washington, Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.), a member of the House Intelligence Committee praised the CIA for "clearly warning" of the flood of refugees into Florida and called the Carter administration's response to the CIA information inadequate.

"In the past there have been instances of intelligence failures leading to bad U.S. policy," Aspin said in a speech scheduled for delivery today. "In this case we have had an intelligence success that nevertheless seems to have made little impact on the consequent behavior of our government."

"The Castro regime may resort to large-scale emigration to reduce discontent caused by Cuba's deteriorating economic condition," the CIA forecast in January.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE D7THE WASHINGTON POST
1 June 1980*Jack Anderson*

A Cuban Defector's Tale

There is disturbing evidence that the Soviets, encouraged by Jimmy Carter's tepid leadership, may be preparing another Cuban missile crisis for the United States.

The appearance of Soviet missiles in Cuba in 1962 brought a nuclear showdown between Nikita Khrushchev and John F. Kennedy. Kennedy faced down Khrushchev, who never recovered from the loss of face. Now with Carter in the White House, the Kremlin czars apparently think they can win a new Cuban confrontation.

Last year, American intelligence experts, after painstakingly putting together bits and pieces of evidence, informed the White House that there was a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba.

President Carter, with his eye on public opinion polls showing that he was regarded as a weak, ineffectual leader, rushed off half-cocked and announced with chest-thumping bravado that the presence of 2,800 Russian troops in Cuba was "unacceptable."

The Kremlin disdainfully dismissed Carter's saber-rattling as empty rhetoric, and when the Soviet combat brigade suddenly became "acceptable," Soviet strategists were confirmed in their suspicion that Carter was no tiger, but a pussycat.

The president's humiliation over the Soviet brigade issue was lost sight of by the American public within a matter of weeks, swallowed up in the greater crisis over the hostage seizure in Iran.

Now, less than a year after the combat brigade fiasco, U.S. intelligence analysts have compiled evidence that the Soviets are secretly developing a nuclear capability in Cuba—may, in fact, already have introduced nuclear weapons into their satellite outpost 90 miles from Florida.

The reason the American public has not heard of this ominous development is that the men in the intelligence agencies fear the disclosure would touch off another international crisis—one that Carter is ill-equipped to handle.

There is, of course, the possibility that the evidence is misleading. But the accumulation of data from various sources points to a "worst-case" projection that the Russians are indeed creating a nuclear arsenal in Cuba—and worst-case scenarios are the only safe ones to assume when dealing with the Kremlin.

One of the most disturbing developments was reported by a high-level Cuban defector, who until recently was being trained by the Russians to command a SAM2 (surface-to-air-missile) site. He told his intelligence debriefers that the Soviets have modified their Cuban missiles by adding three booster rocket

motors that increase their range threefold.

Intelligence sources told my associate Dale Van Atta the Cuban defector had been informed that the purpose of the SAM2 modification was to give it a surface-to-surface capability. In other words, it can now be used for attack as well as defense. The defector reported that the modified SAM2s in Cuba can reach targets in Florida.

What alarmed the intelligence experts even more was the defector's report that he was told the new missiles' twin warheads were "very powerful" and required Soviet personnel to activate them. He was told the warheads are so powerful, in fact, that they were to be detonated only at maximum range.

The defector assumed from these hints that the missile warheads were nuclear. What he didn't know was that the Soviets had tested nuclear warheads of up to 25 kilotons on SAM2s as long ago as 1961, and that there are SAM2s deployed in the Soviet Union that are nuclear-armed.

Intelligence sources also noted that the Russians routinely describe their nuclear weapons as simply "immensely powerful" to disguise their nuclear reality from the troops who handle them. So the defector's reports add up to the distinct possibility that Soviet nuclear missiles are in position in Cuba at this very moment.

Another recent development adds to the overall picture. In 1978, President Carter expressed concern at the appearance of 20-odd Soviet MiG23s in Cuba. But intelligence experts determined that they were for Cuban defense only.

What the American public was never told was that the Russians can rewire a MiG23 to carry nuclear weapons in approximately two days. Furthermore, the Soviets have constructed about 50 hardened shelters for the MiGs in Cuba—an unusual precaution for a climate as mild as Cuba's. Analysts suggest that the strong shelters are intended to protect the MiG force from surveillance and/or attack by U.S. aircraft and missiles.

Perhaps the most alarming evidence of Soviet military preparations in Cuba is the construction that has been taking place at Matanzas, not far from Havana. Initially, the activity around Matanzas was nearly dismissed as "suburban construction." But it now appears that what the Soviets are building there is indeed an underground bunker and/or silo for surface-to-air missiles. With the known nuclear capability of Soviet SAM2s, and the threefold increase in the missiles' range reported by the Cuban defector, this adds up to another Cuban missile crisis.

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FORMER EMPLOYEES STILL IN NEWS

Approved For Release 2009/06/05 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000501390001-6

UPI

5-103

R W

(CENSORSHIP-CIA) RELEASE AT 6:30 P.M.

WASHINGTON (UPI) - CIA PRIOR CENSORSHIP OF BOOKS WRITTEN BY FORMER AGENTS IS "ERRATIC, UNRELIABLE AND ARBITRARY" AND CARRIED OUT SELECTIVELY AGAINST AGENCY CRITICS, A RESEARCH GROUP SAID TODAY.

THE CENTER FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES SAID CONGRESS SHOULD NOT LET STAND THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION UPHOLDING THE CIA'S RIGHT TO CONFISCATE THE ROYALTIES OF A FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL WHO DEFIED HIS AGENCY OATH NOT TO PUBLISH ANYTHING WITHOUT CIA APPROVAL.

THE CASE OF EX-INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL FRANK SNEPP, WHO WROTE OF HIS EXPERIENCES IN VIETNAM, WAS REVIEWED IN THE JUNE ISSUE OF FIRST PRINCIPLES, THE CENTER'S MONTHLY PUBLICATION. SNEPP WROTE IN HIS BOOK THAT THE AGENCY PERFORMED POORLY IN VIETNAM AND ABANDONED ITS AGENTS THERE DURING THE FINAL AMERICAN EVACUATION.

"THE CIA'S PRIOR REVIEW SYSTEM IS ERRATIC, UNRELIABLE AND ARBITRARY AND IS SELECTIVELY APPLIED TO THE WRITINGS OF AGENCY CRITICS WHILE FAILING TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST THE WORK OF SUPPORTIVE FORMER EMPLOYEES" THE CENTER SAID.

NOTING THE SUPREME COURT HAD DENIED A PETITION BY SNEPP'S LAWYER FOR A REHEARING OF THE CASE, THE CENTER SAID IT WAS NOW UP TO CONGRESS TO LEGISLATE CHANGES.

REFERRING TO THE SNEPP APPEAL, THE CENTER SAID, "SERIOUS SEPARATION OF POWERS ISSUES ARE RAISED BECAUSE CONGRESS HAS NOT LEGISLATED THE SYSTEM OF PRIOR RESTRAINT AND THE PENALTIES WHICH THE COURT HAS IMPOSED."

IT ADDED:

"CAN THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, WITHOUT EXPLICIT STATUTORY AUTHORITY, IMPOSE A JUDICIALLY ENFORCEABLE REQUIREMENT OF PREPUBLICATION REVIEW AS A CONDITION OF EMPLOYMENT FOR THE AGENCY?"

"A SYSTEM WHICH PLACES THE POWER OF CENSORSHIP IN THE HANDS OF THOSE WHO MAY BE CRITICIZED AND EMBARRASSED BY PUBLICATION, AND ONE WHICH APPLIES ONLY TO WRITING AND NOT TO SPEAKING MAY BE CONSTITUTIONALLY UNPERMISSIBLE."

THE CENTER IS JOINTLY SPONSORED BY THE FUND FOR PERCE AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, BOTH OF WHICH HAVE BEEN CRITICAL OF CIA ACTIVITIES.

UPI 05-03 04:50 PED

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 11 / 4-5LOS ANGELES TIMES
1 June 1980

TRUTH TAILORED TO FIT AGENCY POLICY

Former CIA Official Tells of Botched Opportunities

By NORMAN KEMPSTER

Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—Citing incidents of botched predictions and missed opportunities from his own 25-year career in espionage, CIA veteran Ralph W. McGehee says the agency often fails to anticipate crucial world development because it slants its intelligence reports to support its covert political activities.

Now a disillusioned retired spy, McGehee contends that the CIA has been effective during its 33-year lifespan in secretly supporting some governments and quietly undermining others. But he says that the gathering of information has suffered as a result.

"I think it has been rather effective in its covert action program," McGehee said in an interview. "But it has never been a very good intelligence agency."

Once a committed, hard-line field operative, McGehee said that unlike some other former CIA employees who have denounced the agency as a threat to world peace and order, he considered the CIA to be ineffective rather than immoral.

"The intelligence that the agency reports is propaganda directed back at the (U.S.) government to support policy," McGehee said.

Sipping a cup of coffee in the study of his home in suburban Virginia, McGehee cited examples of skewed reports and outright wishful thinking that he observed during a career that took him to Thailand, Vietnam, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and CIA headquarters in Langley, Va.

The stories bore a striking resemblance to some accounts of the CIA's performance in Iran. The agency's critics say it failed to predict until it was too late the impending fall from

power of the Shah of Iran because the CIA was too closely associated with the monarch and was unwilling to admit the failure of its policy.

McGehee said, as an example, that the CIA in 1975 suppressed information obtained from the highest level of government in China outlining in detail a radically new Chinese foreign policy in which Beijing would support U.S. objectives in many parts of the world because the Chinese leaders had decided that Washington was the most effective counterweight to the Soviet Union.

But according to McGehee, who was then working in the CIA's headquarters section for analysis of Asian communism, the report was never sent to government decision makers because it would have raised embarrassing questions about the continued purpose of the agency's elaborate operations directed against China.

"If they admitted that China was one of our best allies against the Soviets, it negated their whole operation," he said.

Beijing made the diplomatic moves that had been predicted by the report within the next few years, eventually restoring diplomatic relations with the United States in late 1978.

There is no way to determine, of course, whether U.S. policy would have been different if top officials of the Ford administration had sent the report. However, the primary purpose of intelligence gathering is to provide U.S. leaders with advance notice of such major world events.

Perhaps even more significantly, McGehee said, the top levels of the CIA for years ignored information that showed Communist insurgents throughout Asia were extremely effective in organizing peasants at the village level. Although these village

cells often were not particularly ideological and the peasants frequently were far from committed Marxists, the Communists were able to establish an organizational structure that they could use for their own purposes.

However, he said, the CIA insisted on trying to deal with the Communists as isolated guerrillas rather than as the leaders of an integrated grass-roots organization. As a consequence, programs that might have helped to debilitate Communist organizations throughout Southeast Asia were delayed, sometimes—such as in Vietnam—until it was far too late for the programs to aid pro-Western governments.

McGehee said he organized, with the help of Thai security forces, a program aimed at rooting out the Communist village-level organizations in one province in Thailand in 1967. But the program was eventually canceled. McGehee believes it was cut because the agency's officials refused to believe that such village-level cells ever presented a major threat in the first place.

In 1976, McGehee said, official CIA assessments were finally changed to include the sort of Communist village organizations that he had encountered a decade earlier.

The CIA generally is credited with making a more realistic assessment than uniformed American military leaders of the ultimate chances of survival of the Saigon government. But McGehee said that the agency frequently suppressed reports that raised doubts about the prospects of CIA operations in the country.

CONTINUED

In late 1974, less than a year before the fall of Saigon, McGehee said, he became aware that the CIA station chief in Saigon was refusing to forward to Washington any reports that predicted the ultimate fall of the regime of President Nguyen Van Thieu. Despite the station chief's opposition, two such reports got through to McGehee's desk in Langley. One reported a "staggering" number of defections to the Viet Cong of South Vietnamese military and civilian police. The other reported growing Communist control of the Vietnamese countryside.

"As soon as the chief of station learned that we had received the reports, he said they were not accurate and should not be disseminated," McGehee said.

Although McGehee said he wrote a memo to his superior calling attention to the two reports, the information never reached the White House or other government decision makers.

In McGehee's opinion, the CIA's personnel policies are intended to produce case officers who are more suited for dramatic covert political action than they are for the frequently more mundane work of intelligence analysis.

As a result of congressional investigations in the mid-1970s of intelligence "abuses," the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies have scaled down their covert operations. CIA Director Stansfield Turner has said repeatedly that the agency now conducts very few covert operations, preferring to concentrate on the collection of intelligence.

McGehee said it is unlikely that the organization will stay away from political manipulation for long.

"Its covert action capabilities are

much greater than its intelligence capabilities," he said. "That covert action capability remains in the agency today and when the controls are relaxed, it will start using them again. I don't think it has ever gotten out of the business of supporting other governments. It may be out of the business of overthrowing governments, but that is just a respite."

In a letter sent to prospective employers after his retirement, the CIA said of McGehee, "He was commended many times in writing for his work here and at CIA field stations overseas. After a recent trip abroad, one commendation read, in part: 'He was relentless in digging into the materials at hand, pursuing various avenues of investigation, and seeking new information and channels as he proceeded with his research.' His performance evaluations are full of superlatives, especially for his last half dozen years of research, analysis and briefings in the field of Asian and international communism."

COLORADO SPRINGS GAZETTE TELEGRAPH
10 MAY 1980

Ex-CIA agent decries 'tightening' controls

By JOHN WOLZ
GT Staff Writer

The Supreme Court's "gag" order on a former agent of the Central Intelligence Agency is part of "a trend of tightening of government control," the ex-agent told publishers meeting here Friday.

Frank Snepp, author of "Decent Interval," and Rep. Les Aspin, D-Wis., spoke at a session of the American Association of Publishers' convention at the Broadmoor Hotel.

The Supreme Court ruled 6-to-3 earlier this year that Snepp could not keep any royalties from his book and must submit all future publications or speeches for clearance. The order includes a novel Snepp, who worked for the CIA for 10 years, recently completed.

"I am in this fix not because I violated a contract," Snepp said. The court's decision was "not an aberration. It is a trend of tightening of government control."

The Nixon White House sought to prosecute Daniel Ellsberg under an "imaginative" use of laws in the Pentagon Papers case, Snepp said. They sought to prosecute the former Department of Defense employee for stealing government property instead of using old espionage laws restricting giving national defense information to foreign governments with the intent of injuring the United States.

The government failed to convict Ellsberg but the Carter White House has succeeded in court with convicting former government officials on larceny charges, Snepp said.

Snepp said that in his own case, "never once did the government ever accuse me of publishing classified information." The government used a contract Snepp signed during his employment that stated he would submit anything he authored for prior approval.

But Snepp said there were two contracts used during his tenure with the agency, and the second one he signed did not require writings to be submitted before publication.

The second contract nullified the earlier one, his attorneys argued in court.

The government did not argue the case on constitutional or any other grounds, Snepp said.

The agency officials argued that books "had caused a drying up" of sources for the CIA, Snepp said.

"The Supreme Court used my case to fashion a law," he said.

Aspin said agency officials told a congressional committee the CIA was having trouble getting foreign intelligence sources to cooperate because of recent books and the agency needed the authority to look over memoirs and insist on deletion of information that would damage the agency's work.

Aspin said the information in books becomes "graymail" because after it is out the agency has suffered but it "is impossible to prosecute afterwards."

Aspin said Congress does not believe believe books by former agents are harmful. The agency does as much damage to itself as the books do, he said.

"I read in Mr. Snepp's book that in Vietnam the agency left a town and left behind lists with names of their agents," Aspin said. The foreign agents were then in trouble because of the agency's mistake rather than any book.

Leaks from the administration about the recent attempt to rescue the American hostages is another example of damage to the agency.

Congressmen were told the reason only a small rescue crew was headed for Iran was that they had undercover people working there already under European passports.

One agent rented a warehouse near the embassy and "some poor guy has signed for that warehouse" and is in trouble now, Aspin said. Anyone in Iran with an European passport is in trouble too, he said.

Aspin said the committee considered which agencies should have such authority and what procedures the agencies should use. Time limits for review of materials and an appeals process outside the agency were discussed.

There are four "schools of thought" among congressmen as to what Congress should do about the situation, Aspin said.

The first is fostered by the American Civil Liberties Union and former CIA director William Colby. The civil liberties group and Colby propose a voluntary pre-publication review.

The next suggestion is for Congress to do nothing and wait for the issue to die or a new justices to make a different ruling.

The administration also could propose remedies for Congress to consider.

The final option is for Congress to write a law governing agency restraints.

Aspin said the ACLU-Colby suggestion is the least likely to succeed because "Congress isn't going to pass anything supported by the ACLU."

"Neglect is likely because it is easier to get Congress to do nothing than something," Aspin admitted.

As Received

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WILDERNESS OF MIRRORS

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 96NEWSWEEK
9 June 1980

Sweet Warriors

Wilderness of Mirrors. By David C. Martin. 236 pages. Harper & Row. \$12.50.

The twin focuses of David C. Martin's compact yet mesmerizing history of the CIA are a study in contrasts. James Jesus Angleton is a cadaverous orchid fancier and sometime poet, a Yale graduate with the face of a Gahan Wilson character and the mind of a Medici intriguer. William King Harvey, a failed small-town lawyer from Indiana, was a pear-shaped, foul-mouthed ex-FBI man with a fascination for guns and a prodigious appetite for martinis. What they had in common was a conspiratorial turn of mind, a reflexive suspicion of appearances, an obsessive antipathy to Soviet Communism and an instinctive attraction to the murky world of espionage.

For nearly three decades, these two men toiled in the labyrinthine vineyards of the CIA—Angleton as the agency's chief counterspy, Harvey as its leading covert operative. In the end, both were destroyed—partly by events, mainly by themselves. In this, Martin maintains, the two were living paradigms of the organization they served. Like them, the CIA was inevitably seduced and devoured by bewildering intrigues and an inviolated logic of its own making; eventually, it became its own worst enemy, a scorpion striking at itself in what Angleton once described as a "wilderness of mirrors."

Paranoia: That evocative and mordantly apt phrase (borrowed from T. S. Eliot) is a fitting title for Martin's closely observed account of the CIA's 30 years' secret war against the KGB—and how its prudent fear of being penetrated by a Soviet "mole" ripened over time into a nearly paralyzing paranoia. Martin, a NEWSWEEK Washington correspondent and longtime CIA watcher, tells the tale through the intertwined stories of Angleton and Harvey as a kind of Pilgrim's Progress in reverse. "No one waged [the] secret war with greater intensity, with colder rage, than James Jesus Angleton and William King Harvey," Martin writes. The two men were with the CIA from the very beginning; they rose as it rose and fell as it came into disrepute.

As rival counterintelligence officers in the early 1950s, Harvey had bested Angleton by blowing the whistle on Kim Philby, the brilliant double agent who served as British liaison to the FBI and CIA in Washington from 1949 to 1951. The coup

propelled Harvey to the front lines of the secret war—to Berlin, where he earned a reputation as "America's James Bond" by masterminding the construction of a tunnel into the eastern zone that allowed the Allies to tap Soviet phone lines. Angleton, meanwhile, stayed in Washington, where his chess master's intellect—and fervent desire never to let another Philby slip past him—made him a formidable chief of the CIA's counterintelligence operations.

Mafia Hit Men: Both men carried the seeds of their own destruction. Harvey's success in Berlin brought him to the attention of the White House—and when John and Robert Kennedy decided that Fidel Castro had to be overthrown, he was given the job. Though Harvey stopped at nothing—even to the extent of trying to enlist Mafia hit men in an ill-conceived assassination plot—it proved to be an impossible assignment. Unaccustomed to failure, Harvey let his drinking get out of control; eventually, he had to be eased out of the agency.

Angleton lasted longer. But his growing suspicion of everyone and everything eventually made him, too, more of a liability than an asset. He refused to take the Sino-Soviet split at face value, believing it to be a Communist diversion, and he discredited dozens of CIA agents and Soviet defectors by insisting they were KGB plants. So effectively did he undermine the internal trust that an intelligence agency needs in order to function that he himself wound up being accused of working for the Soviets. The last straw came when he told French authorities that the new CIA station chief in Paris, a man who had been exhaustively vetted, was not to be trusted. Angleton was fired in 1974.

The tragedies of Angleton and Harvey—and Martin presents their stories as such—were that neither man did anything more than his job. By the same token, Martin contends, the CIA never did anything it wasn't asked to do by successive administrations. The problem was that, like Angleton and Harvey, the agency "had been asked to do things nobody should have been asked to do, been given secret powers no one should have been given." As Martin's shrewd and illuminating portrait shows, there is a crazy logic to the bleak universe of espionage: self-destruction, it seems, comes with the territory.

ALLAN J. MAYER

True Spy Stories

Wilderness of Mirrors by David C. Martin, published by Harper & Row, New York, NY, 236 pages, \$12.50.

I CAN'T FIND THE QUOTE, but I believe it was Cavour who said that if we did in pursuit of our personal fortunes what we are called upon to do in the service of our sovereigns, we would all be scoundrels. David Martin's book (*The Title From T.S. Eliot*) is about people who, in the service of their sovereign—the United States Government—were called upon to make difficult decisions and do dangerous and disagreeable things. They are the old heroes and villains of yesterday's CIA. With the benefit of hindsight it can be said that some of their decisions were mistaken and some of their deeds were ill considered. The more recent indiscriminate disclosure by press and politicians of these shortcomings has stimulated an outpouring of revelations and recriminations among some of those involved who now seek to defend their reputations or settle old scores.

Former intelligence professionals can deplore the resulting distortions and security breaches which have contributed to Martin's story. But they should remember that Martin is a journalist working in a highly competitive environment—if he doesn't get the story others will; and it is not Martin who is supposedly qualified to decide what can properly be made public about past Agency activities, or is bound by secrecy agreements not to disclose them without approval. Whatever is wrong with Martin's book arises from the fact that some of the former high priests of secrecy—senior officers working in the privileged inner sanctum of the Operations Directorate—have escalated past professional differences into present public quarrels. Reputations of individuals have been damaged and the integrity of the Agency has been questioned.

It should be noted in this connection that, despite the ever-present danger of penetration of the Agency by our adversaries, there seems to be no credible evidence to support speculation of a KGB "mole" now or formerly operating in the upper echelons of the organization. It should also be noted for the record that the victims of past allegations of KGB involvement mentioned by Mr. Martin have, on the basis of diligent investigation, now been completely exonerated.

Subject to the foregoing, Mr. Martin's book is exciting, informative and highly readable. It is the work of an outstanding investigative reporter. Perhaps because so much of it rings true, I find it infinitely more absorbing than any current spy fiction. One could quarrel with the excessive and questionable use of direct quotes and wish he had included more dates to provide a precise chronology—always essential to an analysis of any intelligence operation. But *Wilderness of Mirrors* is an always exciting collection of largely true spy stories.

However, to me the most significant, and doubtlessly unintended, contribution of the book is its demonstration of how easily some of the most sensitive secrets of the Agency—and indeed of the United States Government—can be ferreted out with the aid of the Freedom of Information Act and how freely they can be anonymously spread around with impunity by former responsible and respected Agency officers.

The real irony—indeed the real scandal—is that if these were officers of the Department of Agriculture, leaking estimates of next year's soybean crops, they could go to prison for 10 years; if they were bank examiners leaking loan information, they could get five years; a leaky patent office employee could get two years; and a leaker from the Internal Revenue Service, five years. But the leaker of our most sensitive intelligence information, often involving matters vital to national security or jeopardizing the lives of valuable public servants, is normally beyond the reach of criminal prosecution. Until the Congress plugs this loophole with effective criminal penalties to protect the operational sources, methods and identities of our intelligence services, this hemorrhaging of our secrets will persist and our first line of defense against surprise and subversion will continue to be eroded. For as General Washington wrote to Colonel Elias Dayton in 1777 regarding intelligence operations:

"Upon secrecy success depends in most enterprises of this kind and for want of it, they are generally defeated however well planned."

Jack Maury

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 14

THE LEADER
RESEARCH TRIANGLE PARK, N.C.
15 MAY 1980

Book

CIA losing secret war?

WILDERNESS OF MIRRORS.
By David C. Martin. Harper &
Row. 236 pp. \$12.50.

By JOHN BARKHAM

This is a rare look at that other cold war, the underground war between the CIA and the KGB, which is waged without interruption. It is a silent, secret war where the seapons are ideology, ingenuity and cool courage. If we are to believe David C. Martin, who covers the CIA for "Newsweek," the KGB is winning that war. "The CIA's defeats have been resounding and its victories Pyrrhic," he declares. "What the KGB has not done, the CIA has done to itself."

This depressing conclusion is one that readers will probably share after purusing this book. Not only has unsought publicity in recent years damaged CIA morale, but there is some reason to believe that the Agency might have been infiltrated by a Russian "mole" or deep penetration agent of the KGB. 'Twas not ever thus. Martin's opening chapters recall several of the Agency's triumphs in the years after World War II, such as the unmasking in Washington of Kim Philby, the Soviet Union's British superspy, the breaking of a



DAVID C. MARTIN

supposedly unbreakable Soviet secret code, and the collection of valuable data through the use of a secret tunnel burrowed into East Berlin.

These were authentic successes attributable in large part to two men — James Jesus Angleton, an Ivy League intellectual, and William King Harvey, a former Midwestern smalltown lawyer. It was the flamboyant Harvey who put two and two together and exposed Philby, and it was Harvey who was the driving force behind the Berlin

Tunnel. What brought about his downfall was his association with a bizarre plot to assassinate Cuba's Castro.

Martin takes us inside the CIA as no other writer has done to my knowledge. Thanks to the availability of now declassified documents we learn how the charred fragments of a Russian codebook found on a battlefield in Finland enabled the CIA to decode Moscow-New York traffic. Martin goes so far as to suggest that information so obtained could have provided damaging evidence against Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, an American couple tried, convicted and executed for passing secret information to the Russians. The evidence was not introduced for fear of tipping off the Russians to the code-break. The Rosenberg case remains controversial to this day.

Most hurtful to the CIA morale was the case of a Soviet defector named Nosenko, who sought and was granted asylum. Was he a genuine defector or was he a double-agent sent over to supply "disinformation"? Endless hours of interrogation have failed to settle the issue. Two long CIA reports reached opposite conclusions. The CIA brass found all this "deeply frustrating" — and presumably still does. Meanwhile the secret war goes on — mysterious, duplicitous, where no operative can ever be sure that anything is what it appears to be. And the Russians, it seems, are winning.

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MISCELLANEOUS

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
ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE W-6

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
1 June 1980

FACES & PLACES

By EDWARD BENES
and JESSE BRODEY

Central Intelligence Agency Director Stansfield Turner will speak on "Priorities in a Changing World" at Pace University's Pleasantville/Briarcliff commencement ceremony to be held at 2 p.m. today at the Dick Clark Theater in Tarrytown. He will receive an honorary Doctor of Commercial Law degree at the



Stansfield Turner: speaker at Pace University commencement.

ceremony. Turner was sworn in as director of the CIA in March 1977 and heads the U.S. foreign intelligence agencies as well as directing the CIA. In 1974, he was named the commander of the U.S. Second Fleet and NATO Striking Fleet Atlantic. He was then named commander in chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe, and promoted to the rank of admiral. He retired from the Navy in 1979. Approximately 1,200 graduate and undergraduate students will be awarded degrees this year on Pace's Westchester campuses.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 11THE NEW LEADER
2 June 1980

A THREAT TO ARMS CONTROL

The Sverdlovsk Incident

BY MARK HOPKINS



ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER

WASHINGTON

FOR THE FIRST time since World War II, U.S. officials are saying privately that they are virtually certain the Soviet Union has violated the central provision of an international arms control treaty. Publicly, CIA Director Stansfield Turner told a recent conference of newspaper editors here that there is a "reasonable possibility" an epidemic of anthrax a year ago in Sverdlovsk was caused by bacteria intended for military weapons. This would be a breach of a 1975 accord signed by the U.S., the USSR and 85 other nations, outlawing the production or stockpiling of bacteria for such purposes.

It is known that the Kremlin attempted to cover up the outbreak of anthrax that killed hundreds of people last spring in Sverdlovsk, a military-industrial center 875 miles east of Moscow. Now it is maneuvering to prevent a full investigation of the incident out of what appears to be fear that the findings would irrevocably doom SALT II and the Vienna talks for a mutual reduction of forces in central Europe, as well as critically undermine existing agreements like the one banning orbiting nuclear weapons. In an unusual move, for example, the Foreign Ministry telephoned a statement to Western correspondents in Moscow warning that American suggestions of secret Soviet germ warfare facilities could "shatter current international accords and complicate the efforts of states to curb the arms race."

Actually, it was after piecing together bits of information from eyewitnesses and emigrant sources that U.S. intelligence analysts concluded an explosion had occurred the night of April 3-4, 1979, at a military facility on the outskirts of Sverdlovsk. (This is reportedly one of nine in the USSR that intelligence experts have suspected of producing or storing biological weapons.) Whatever the cause of the eruption, it

is thought to have released hundreds of thousands of anthrax spores.

Among the ancient plagues of animals and man, anthrax attacks humans in two ways. If contracted from the meat of infected cattle, it causes severe inflammation of the intestines, vomiting and eventual death; in this form, the disease has long been known in Russia as "Siberian ulcer." If inhaled from the atmosphere, anthrax germs cause paralysis of the bronchial tubes and lungs, choking victims to death within hours.

The information gathered by American analysts, including some accounts of medical personnel on the scene, indicates that the disease took this latter form. Four days after the explosion the first victims—about 40 military personnel—were brought to the Sverdlovsk hospital. They were followed six days later by the first of more than 200 civilians who were moved into the hospital after other patients had been evacuated. The civilians lived and worked in an area downwind from the explosion site, indicating that they, too, had contracted anthrax from the

MARK HOPKINS, a past contributor to THE NEW LEADER, is a specialist in Soviet and East European affairs.

CONTINUED

air. Like the soldiers, the civilians were suffering from choking, fluid in the lungs and high fever. All the hospitalized soldiers and civilians are known to have died, and hundreds more, unable to get into the overcrowded hospital, are thought to have perished at home.

Initially, resident Soviet physicians told concerned citizens that autopsies had indeed proven death from anthrax—but of the gastric variety. The victims were said to have eaten diseased meat. As more cases developed, military physicians were brought into Sverdlovsk to handle the staggering load. Told that “Siberian ulcer” had been spread by anthrax-infected black market meat, the newly arrived doctors disagreed. Their patients, they noted, showed clear symptoms of pulmonary anthrax.

A coverup story, though, was already in the making. The Sverdlovsk Communist Party newspaper published three articles late last spring warning of the dangers of anthrax, and describing symptoms associated with the gastric variety. Thus when news of the epidemic surfaced in Washington in mid-March of this year, the editor of *Evening Sverdlovsk*, Yuri Cheremovsky, was prepared to tell UPI in Moscow by telephone that, yes, he had approved publication of the anthrax series. It is exceedingly rare for regional Soviet newspaper editors to discuss internal problems with Western correspondents, especially where international repercussions are possible.

While the editor had been primed to respond to UPI questions, for a full year the Soviet government failed to mention the outbreak of anthrax, despite the fact that it is on the list of diseases that are supposed to be reported to the World Health Organization in Geneva. Not until Moscow was confronted with inquiries from Washington did it acknowledge the epidemic.

The first published story about the incident, however, appeared October 26, 1979, in the British magazine *NOW*, although this mistakenly gave the place as Novosibirsk and the time as June. The West German tabloid, *Bild Zeitung* of Hamburg, repeated the ac-

count the next day, and on February 13 of this year added more details. Some of these were incorrect, too, yet clearly the newspaper had access to sources close to the event. On March 14, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service bulletin, published by the CIA, reprinted the German articles, creating some controversy over the reasons for the move.

One reliable source maintains that a discussion among State Department, CIA and Pentagon analysts—who had been sifting through information for months—led to the unintentional publication of the *Bild Zeitung* articles. But since the daily FBIS selection of foreign broadcasts and press items seldom includes material more than two weeks old, some correspondents covering the State Department reacted with skepticism to the belated presentation of the two *Bild* pieces. They suspected that it was part of an American campaign to castigate the Soviets in the aftermath of Afghanistan, a campaign they felt had already produced exaggerated charges of Soviet troops using poison gas in that invasion.

State Department officials directly involved in the Sverdlovsk case were privately enraged by this interpretation. They insist that a deliberate effort has been made to handle the whole matter in a serious, quiet manner. For one thing, they want the Soviets to understand that the U.S. has no intention of exploiting an event of such import without cause. Secondly, they have no desire to give the Soviets an excuse for avoiding a frank discussion of the facts.

THE “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Producing and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction” was signed in 1927 and went into force in 1975, when the three depositary governments—the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain—ratified it. The agreement does permit the production or use of limited amounts of bacteriological agents for research and other peaceful purposes. But 10,000 anthrax spores are considered suffi-

cient for any research, and hundreds of thousands had to be released to kill the number of persons known to have died in Sverdlovsk. American officials scoff at the notion that infected meat caused the deaths. Cooking the meat kills the germs, they note, and Soviet citizens would unquestionably cook black market meat.

By an unhappy coincidence, the Sverdlovsk incident erupted in the American press while diplomats were meeting in Geneva for the five-year review stipulated in the germ warfare treaty. Although the United States delegation voiced its suspicions of a Soviet violation of the agreement, the press treatment undermined the discussions. The Soviet representatives left Geneva without offering a satisfactory explanation of the epidemic.

Should the Soviet Union fail to come up with one in the near future, the United States could appeal to the UN Security Council. The treaty provides for a hearing of evidence and a Security Council investigation. If the Soviets vetoed that, the next possible step would be an American-initiated discussion in the General Assembly.

What concerns Washington, as one official put it, is that the U.S. may never be able to produce “courtroom evidence” that 1) pulmonary anthrax killed hundreds of Soviet citizens, 2) the germs came from a Soviet military installation, and 3) the Soviet government knowingly violated the 1975 biological weapons treaty. The Soviets, being fully aware of this difficulty, naturally are likely to take the safest course and squat low.

Thus, as the Sverdlovsk case plays out over the next few months, U.S. officials may reach the point where they conclude that it would be best simply to release whatever facts are in their possession. In this Presidential election year, with the major candidates raising doubts about Soviet peaceful intentions, and the Kremlin’s own actions clouding the international horizon, the disclosure would at the very least be taken as further proof that the U.S. cannot trust the USSR to abide by its arms control bargains.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-6NEW YORK TIMES
5 JUNE 1980

K. G. B. Is Reported to Warn Sakharov's Relatives

By CRAIG R. WHITNEY

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, June 4 — Relatives and friends of Andrei D. Sakharov, the exiled human rights activist, said today that they were coming under increasing pressure from Soviet authorities to stop relaying information to the outside world about conditions of his banishment in Gorky.

Yelizaveta Alekseyeva, the prospective wife of Dr. Sakharov's son-in-law, said that she had been warned by an official of the K.G.B., the security police, to

stop passing "slandorous information" about Dr. Sakharov's life in exile to foreign correspondents here. Last month, she was informed that she would be prevented from traveling to visit him in Gorky, a city east of Moscow that is closed to foreigners.

This morning, she said she was summoned and given a formal warning that if she continued relaying information she could be prosecuted criminally for "oral dissemination of false information damaging to the Soviet state and social order."

Miss Alekseyeva, who wants to emi-

grate to the United States to marry Dr. Sakharov's stepson, Aleksei Semyonov, said she would pay no note to the warning.

24-Hour Police Surveillance

Dr. Sakharov was banished to the Volga River city of Gorky on Jan. 22 and has been living in an apartment, his relatives say, under 24-hour police surveillance. Visitors are prevented from seeing him. He is not allowed to receive or make telephone calls to Moscow and he is followed everywhere he goes, the relatives say.

The exile's main link with the outside world is his wife, Yelena Bonner, who was with him today. Until now, she has been allowed to travel back and forth between Gorky and Moscow for treatment of an eye ailment. But she, too, has been warned against meeting with foreign correspondents.

Some friends who had been allowed to visit Dr. Sakharov in exile have been rebuffed recently. Yesterday, Miss Alekseyeva reported, two of Dr. Sakharov's colleagues from the Soviet Academy of Sciences, who were planning to go talk with him about physics, were told that their trip had been canceled.

Many of Dr. Sakharov's dissident friends in Moscow have been prosecuted. Today, another of them, Mariya G. Podyapolskaya, was summoned by the prosecutor's office.

In an all-day search of her apartment on May 27, she said, the authorities seized 202 items, including letters that Miss Alekseyeva had written to her from Dr. Sakharov's place of exile.

Miss Podyapolskaya was prevented last winter from going to Gorky to visit the dissident physicist.


Dr. Sakharov retains status as a full member of the Academy of Sciences. But the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet stripped him of the honors he won in the 1940's and 50's for his work in development of nuclear weapons, including the hydrogen bomb. No legal basis for banishment has ever been given by the authorities, who have said only that it was an "administrative measure" without trial.

Nine dissident friends of Dr. Sakharov, including Miss Podyapolskaya, two writers, Georgi N. Vladimov and Lev Z. Kopelev, and a lawyer, Sofiya V. Kalistratova, have written a letter to the Presidium and Leonid I. Brezhnev, its chairman, asking it to establish a special commission "to investigate the circumstances of Academician Sakharov's exile from Moscow."

The signers have no illusions that any such commission will ever be formed.

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
4 June 1980

DOONESBURY



HUMAN EVENTS

31 May 1980

ARTICLE APPEARED

ON PAGE 44

THIS WEEK'S NEWS FROM

Inside Washington

Your Tax Dollars at Work

PBS Special Rips Into CIA

The taxpayer-financed Public Broadcasting System (PBS) has been featuring a three-part TV series on the Central Intelligence Agency called "On Company Business." The major thrust of the series: that the CIA, in the name of fighting communism, has been waging a wicked war against genuine nationalist movements all over the world. Judging from the series, in fact, communism has never been a threat.

Put together by Allan Francovich and Howard Dratch of the Isla Negra-Blanca Films in Berkeley, Calif., the film was financed through a PBS-administered fund whose major contributions come from the Ford Foundation and the National Endowment for the Arts. The anti-CIA tone of the film is not particularly surprising, especially when one becomes aware of the raging anti-CIA sentiments of Francovich and Dratch.

HUMAN EVENTS has a copy of the proposal for the film project that Francovich and Dratch were circulating as far back as 1976, hoping to get funding for its completion. This proposal, also called "On Company Business," was not the one they eventually submitted to PBS, but Dratch, contacted in New York by us, admitted that it was the genesis of the antiseptically worded outline that was finally accepted.

NEWHOUSE NEWS

BY LEONARD CURRY

NEWHOUSE NEWS SERVICES

WASHINGTON - DESPITE U.S. PRICE CONTROLS AND WORLD COMPLAINTS OF CHEAP GASOLINE IN THE UNITED STATES, THE CIA REPORTS THAT AMERICANS PAY NEARLY AS MUCH FOR GASOLINE AS DO CITIZENS OF OTHER DEVELOPED NATIONS WHEN TAXES ARE FACTORED OUT.

THIS INDICATES THAT BARRING ANY NEW SURGE IN PRICES BY THE ORGANIZATION OF PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES OR NEW ENERGY TAXES BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, DOMESTIC ENERGY CONSERVATION THROUGH

PRICING MAY

BE NEAR ITS PEAK.

THE AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE ESTIMATES U.S. DEMAND FOR GASOLINE IS ABOUT 8 PERCENT LOWER THAN IT WAS A YEAR AGO, PROBABLY BECAUSE HIGHER PRICES HAVE ENCOURAGED CONSERVATION. API ALSO CALCULATES THAT DOMESTIC DEMAND FOR GASOLINE DECLINES 2 PERCENT FOR EACH 10 PERCENT INCREASE IN PRICES.

WITH PRESIDENT CARTER'S DECISION LAST YEAR TO PERMIT U.S. PRICE CONTROLS ON ENERGY TO ELAPSE, DOMESTIC ENERGY PRICES ARE EXPECTED TO RISE TO WORLD LEVELS BY THE SPRING OF 1981. AT PRESENT LEVELS, THAT MEANS U.S. PRICES WOULD INCREASE ONLY ABOUT ANOTHER 10 PERCENT WHICH WOULD TRIM DEMAND SOME 2 PERCENT.

THE CIA ALSO POINTS OUT THAT GASOLINE PUMP PRICES HAVE RISEN FASTER IN PERCENTAGE TERMS IN THE UNITED STATES THAN IN MOST OTHER DEVELOPED NATIONS SINCE THE ARAB OIL EMBARGO KICKED OFF ENERGY INFLATION IN 1973. THIS HAS OCCURRED BECAUSE SOME DEVELOPED COUNTRIES WITH HIGH TAXES HAVE REDUCED THEM TO OFFSET THE IMPACT OF RISING PRICES.

BETWEEN JUNE 1977 AND JUNE 1978, GASOLINE PUMP PRICES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM ACTUALLY DECLINED 15 CENTS A GALLON, BECAUSE OF A 10-CENT-A-GALLON TAX CUT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF NORTH SEA OIL.

WHEN OPEC DOUBLED WORLD PETROLEUM PRICES IN THE SPRING OF 1979, U.S. GASOLINE PRICES INCREASED 23 CENTS. BUT BECAUSE OF GOVERNMENT CUTS IN GAS TAXES, GERMAN CONSUMERS ONLY PAID 13 CENTS A GALLON MORE, AND IN ITALY PRICES REMAINED UNCHANGED.

FOR A WHILE LAST YEAR, AMERICANS PAID HIGHER GASOLINE PRICES BEFORE TAXES THAN THE ITALIANS OR THE FRENCH.

PRE-TAX GASOLINE PRICES IN ITALY REMAINED AT 60 CENTS A GALLON BETWEEN JUNE 1978 AND JUNE 1979. IN THAT 12-MONTH PERIOD, U.S. PRE-TAX GASOLINE PRICES ROSE FROM 51 CENTS A GALLON TO 74 CENTS.

IN ITALY, THE TAX PER GALLON IN JANUARY 1980 WAS \$1.83; FRANCE, \$1.62; WEST GERMANY, \$1.14; AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, 89 CENTS. THIS COMPARES WITH 14 CENTS IN THE UNITED STATES. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PUMP PRICES IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES IS PRIMARILY A MATTER OF GOVERNMENT TAXATION.

200-2012

NEWHOUSE NEWS

CIA

UNLIKE U.S. TAXES; HOWEVER; WHICH GO INTO A FUND FOR HIGHWAY CONSTRUCTION; REVENUES COLLECTED BY OTHER COUNTRIES ARE PAID INTO THE GENERAL FUND. THE AMOUNT OF REVENUE EARNED FROM GASOLINE TAXES HELPS TO LOWER EUROPEAN INCOME TAXES AND SOCIAL SECURITY TAXES.

STILL; THE CIA SAYS; AMERICANS DO CONSUME MORE GASOLINE AND PAY LESS FOR IT AT THE PUMP THAN DO CITIZENS OF OTHER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES; WHO ARE ALMOST ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON PETROLEUM IMPORTS. BUT THE PRE-TAX MARGINS ARE NOT NEAR THOSE THAT ARE WIDELY PUBLICIZED.

EXCLUDING TAXES; GERMANS AND ITALIANS IN JANUARY PAID ONLY 7 CENTS A GALLON MORE FOR REGULAR GASOLINE THAN AMERICANS; WHILE THE FRENCH PAID 13 CENTS MORE AND THE BRITISH 20 CENTS; ACCORDING TO DATA COMPILED BY THE CIA.

AT THE START OF THE YEAR; THE CIA SAYS; REGULAR GASOLINE IN THE UNITED STATES SOLD FOR AN AVERAGE OF 96 CENTS A GALLON NOT COUNTING TAXES. THIS COMPARED WITH \$1.03 IN ITALY AND WEST GERMANY; \$1.09 IN FRANCE AND \$1.16 IN THE UNITED KINGDOM.

THE CIA BASED ITS REPORT ON RETAIL PRICES THAT PREVAILED IN JANUARY. IT ADJUSTED THE PRICES FOR DIFFERENCES IN CURRENCY VALUES THROUGH MARCH.

SIMILAR FINDINGS HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED BY THE PROFESSIONAL STAFF OF THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES. THE EUROPEAN MEMBER NATIONS HAVE NOT APPROVED THE STAFF REPORT; HOWEVER.

ALTHOUGH LEADERS OF DEVELOPED COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN CRITICAL OF THE LOW ENERGY PRICES IN THE UNITED STATES; THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES COMMISSION STAFF REPORT SAYS THERE IS ALSO A LACK OF COHERENCE IN EUROPEAN ENERGY POLICY.

"THE DIVERSITY OF TAXATION PRACTICE SHOWS THAT THE TAXATION OF ENERGY IS NOT AT PRESENT RELATED TO ENERGY POLICY;" THE STAFF STUDY SAYS. WHILE TAXES ARE HIGH ON GASOLINE; THERE ARE MUCH LOWER TAXES ON HOME HEATING FUEL AND IN SOME COUNTRIES NO TAX AT ALL FOR NON-OIL ENERGY.

SB END CURRY

NY-0530 1944EDT

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